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Program Preface: 
 
The Challenge Program on Water and Food (CPWF) contributes to efforts of the 
international community to ensure global diversions of water to agriculture are 
maintained at the level of the year 2000. It is a multi-institutional research initiative that 
aims to increase the resilience of social and ecological systems through better water 
management for food production. Through its broad partnerships, it conducts research 
that leads to impact on the poor and to policy change. 
 
The CPWF conducts action-oriented research in nine river basins in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, focusing on crop water productivity, fisheries and aquatic ecosystems, 
community arrangements for sharing water, integrated river basin management, and 





Project Preface:  
 
Yellow River Basin Focal Project (YBFP) 
 
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) Focal Project set out to study water poverty, water 
availability and access, water productivity, and water and related institutions in the 
Yellow River basin to develop and rank a series of high-priority interventions aimed at 
increasing water and food security for the poor, while maintaining environmental 
sustainability. The YBFP identified complex relations between water and poverty in the 
YRB; identified streamflow declines in the basin despite predicted higher rainfall; 
calculated basin-water shortfalls as a result of both economic development and climate 
change; assessed various aspects of rainfed and irrigated crop water productivity; and 
identified key reforms for water-related institutions. Moreover, the YBFP empirically 
assessed the benefits of agricultural water rights trading applying an innovative 
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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS 
China is facing growing water scarcity in many river basins due to its rapid economic 
development, an expanding population, growing urbanization, and limited scope to 
develop new supplies. Water overdrafts, both from surface and sub-surface sources, are 
causing serious environmental problems ranging from the degradation of ecosystems in 
the deltas of major rivers to aquifer depletion in northern China. The Yellow River Basin 
(YRB) is symptomatic of the challenges facing China’s water economy. The YRB, which is 
the second largest basin in China, is a key agricultural and industrial region in the 
country and also considered the "cradle of Chinese civilization". However, the basin faces 
severe water shortages. The particular climatological and hydrologic conditions together 
with very rapid industrial and urban development are making sustainable water supply 
for all users and uses a complex and difficult task. Given the extreme water shortages in 
the basin, how can water resources be managed to continue to support agricultural and 
economic development while also improving outcomes for the environment?   
 
To assess this question, we asked a series of sub-questions, including: How are water 
and poverty related in the basin? We found that the headcount poverty ratio is 
significantly lower in irrigated areas than in nonirrigated areas of the YRB region. For 
instance, while 19.4 percent of all households living in irrigated villages are poor, the 
rate is more than double (41.4 percent) in nonirrigated villages. Moreover, we found that 
the combination of higher rainfall and the extensive use of tubewell irrigation contribute 
to higher crop productivity, and hence, increased income of the households living in the 
downstream area. As a result, the poverty rate in the upstream area (47.5 percent) is 
nearly five times higher than in the downstream area (only 9.9 percent), while the rate 
in the midstream area (29.6 percent) is three times higher. We also found important 
linkages of irrigation with other development indicators. For example, school enrollment 
rates are higher in irrigated villages than in nonirrigated villages; and irrigated villages 
have better access to safe drinking water in the YRB—78 percent of households in 
irrigated villages have access to safe water compared to only 47 percent in nonirrigated 
communities. Higher irrigation coverage of cultivated land at the village level is 
associated with greater crop productivity and greater use of HYVs of wheat and maize. 
Finally, increasing irrigation coverage by 10 percent reduces the incidence of poverty by 
5.1 percent.  
 
We also looked at the water supply and demand balance in the basin over time to assess 
implications for both food and water security. We found that socioeconomic 
development, along with rising concerns for public health and environmental 
degradation, and global climate change will drive water demand increases over the next 
10–20 years. We found that based on projected changes in water supply and demand, 
by 2020 the YRB will face water shortages of 8 km3 and a water deficit ratio of 14.5 
percent, which would mostly affect the rural production sector, particularly irrigation. 
Under drier-year scenarios, water shortages would increase significantly and outflows to 
the Bohai Sea would drop to 15 km3 and 9 km3 under 75 percent exceedance frequency 
and 95 percent exeedance frequency, respectively. If climate change is considered as 
well, the water deficit ratio would increase to 23 percent under average conditions. As 
expected, conditions would be most dire under combined climate change and dry-year 
conditions, with shortages of 21 km3 and a water deficit ratio of up to 37 percent. We 
evaluated a series of engineering solutions and found that none of these would be able 
to close the growing gap between water supply and demand.  
 
As irrigation water supplies are increasingly squeezed by domestic, industrial, and 
environmental water demands, including large water needs for sediment flushing, an 
important question to address is the potential to enhance water productivity in the 
irrigation sector. We found that for all key basic food grains that we assessed in the 
basin that irrigated and rainfed water productivity was higher in the downstream area 
compared to the midstream area of the YRB. Interestingly, for both maize and soybean, 
Research Highlights CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 10 
rainfed water productivity—depending on precipitation only—was significantly higher 
compared to irrigated water productivity in the downstream basin; and for soybean 
rainfed productivity is also slightly higher in the midstream area of the basin. However, 
the standard deviation of rainfed productivity levels is considerably higher than that of 
irrigated productivity. This implies that from upstream to downstream regions of the 
YRB, irrigated maize and soybean may not be as water-efficient as rainfed crops, but 
irrigation stabilizes crop production per unit of water consumption, which increases in 
importance with increased incidence of extreme events under climate change. 
 
Policies and institutions are considered to be key to effective water management in the 
YRB and elsewhere. We found that the Government of China has made significant strides 
in its legal framework for water management. For example, the 2002 Water Law 
considers increased conservation of water resources as a key objective. Moreover, the 
law calls for a water-allocation system based on the issuance of water-abstraction 
permits and water-use fees. A wealth of successive ad hoc regulations further support 
water savings by providing clarifications on water permits and rights, water pricing, and 
abstraction fees. Despite this, implementation has been slow, particularly at the province 
level, and field research on the ground has shown that irrigation districts have been 
implementing changes only slowly.  
 
The Government of China has been highly successful in eliminating flow-cutoffs that had 
plagued the Yellow River annually for more than 2 decades (1972-1998). The Yellow 
River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) implemented a province-level, quota-based 
water allocation system (Unified Water Flow Regulation-UWFR) that had been in 
existence since 1987. Despite this success, the regulation is facing criticism, particularly 
in the upstream and poorer regions of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia. 
Before the regulation entered into effect, these regions had free access to water 
resources and enjoyed more than three times the per capita water availability of the 
downstream regions. The lack of compensation for the interprovincial water transfers has 
contributed to a decline in irrigation water use, and tension has risen as some producers 
in the irrigation districts have started to see negative effects. 
 
We also found that the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs) in China did 
not have the desired effect—conserving water resources—in many irrigation districts, as 
governance structures only changed in name, whereas economic incentives were often 
not provided. However, when new irrigation management entities (or existing ones) 
were entitled to keep as excess profit the difference between the water fee collected 
(which is based on an estimate of village water needs compiled before the farming year) 
and the total fee calculated from the actual water supplied (which can be reduced at the 
request of the water manager), then water user per ha declined. Preliminary survey 
results found that such declines did adversely affect wheat yields, whereas declines for 
other crops were not statistically significant. However, no clear impacts on farmer 
incomes could be detected suggesting the need for further analyses.  To achieve water 
use savings without adverse impacts on crop yields or farmer incomes, it would be 
important to provide economic incentives directly to this user group instead of to 
irrigation districts.  
 
We also assessed the possibility of trading of water rights in a market system to 
compensate irrigators or other water-using sectors for giving up water. From a legal 
perspective, laws and regulations, particularly starting with the 2002 Water Law, have 
established a system of water-use rights and water abstraction fees, but the law does 
not allow transferability of these rights. In some regions of the YRB experiments have 
been conducted on water-rights transfers from the agriculture to the industry sector, but 
these experiments were set up and run by the local government rather than resulting 
from trade driven by market mechanisms. The establishment of water transfers is also 
hindered by a still underdeveloped water-use rights system; although the system is 
supported by law, most provinces have yet to allocate water quotas to individual users. 
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We empirically implemented the potential impact of irrigation-water-rights trading across 
the YRB on the basin gross domestic product (GDP) using a multi-agent system (MAS) 
modeling framework. We compared two scenarios to evaluate the consequences of 
changes from the current scheme of water allocation (that is, business-as-usual under 
the current UWFR based on the 1987 allocation agreement): (1) water allocation across 
provinces without quotas, and (2) water trading among agents using irrigation water. We 
also studied the impact of enforcing full environmental flow requirements (as established 
by several Chinese studies) on the potential for water trading. As expected, under a 
scenario without any water quotas, annual water consumption is higher—by 11 percent 
(38.3 km3 compared with 34.5 km3 under the UWFR). At the same time, the basin-wide 
GDP—at 1123.26 billion RMB under the scenario without regulation—is 10 percent lower 
than the 1246.68 billion RMB achieved under the UWFR scenario. As a result of increased 
water consumption without the UWFR, flows to the downstream ecosystem are reduced 
and flow cutoff events occur from February to June. Flow impacts are even stronger for 
the delta, where cutoff periods start in February and continue through December. This 
scenario thus adequately mimics the 1972-1998 period before the Government enforced 
provincial water-use quotas. 
 
If irrigation water trading is allowed, upstream districts tend to sell water to gain 
revenue, while downstream users buy water for greater water-use benefit. The GDP 
increase is 5.64 billion RMB for upstream agents and 17.8 billion RMB for midstream and 
downstream agents, with a total GDP increase of 23.45 billion RMB. Moreover, annual 
water consumption under the water-trading scenario is slightly lower at 33.8 km3 than 
the annual water consumption under the UWFR scenario while total GDP is higher at 
1270.1 billion RMB in the former scenario. 
 
Can the YRB economy accommodate full environmental flow requirements? We find that 
it is physically impossible to satisfy both human and ecosystem requirements for the 
months of January, April, and June unless additional measures, such as reservoir re-
operation or new infrastructure development, are undertaken. Thus, water trading has 
the potential to mitigate growing water shortages in the YRB. Ongoing intra-provincial 
irrigation-to-agriculture transfers provide important inputs for the potential development 
of inter-provincial water trading, which has been discussed for several years by both 
policymakers and water allocation managers at the Ministry of Water Resources and the 
YRCC. Such a reallocation could increase the water allocation efficiency of the 1987 
cross-provincial water-allocation agreement. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) is a key food production center of global importance facing 
rapidly growing water scarcity. Water availability is further threatened by growing water 
pollution, global warming, environmental water needs, and continuing industrial and 
municipal water demand growth.  While poverty in the basin has declined rapidly over 
the last three decades (in line with rapid overall declines in China), pockets of poverty 
remain in the upstream areas. Water productivity in the basin varies by both crop and 
location in the basin and has improved considerably over the last several decades.  While 
China has made significant changes in managing its water resources, current governance 
structures leave much to be desired for effective and efficient water allocation in the 
basin. To assess how water can be allocated more efficiently and effectively to ensure 
sustainable food production in the YRB into the future, a series of engineering, 
institutional, and economic measures have been assessed.  
 
In this final report we discuss the results of a two-year study on biophysical and 
socioeconomic aspects of the water and related resources in the YRB; the relation of 
water development and agricultural and economic growth; and options for enhancing 
water availability and access for sustained agricultural and economic development, while 
maintaining environmental sustainability. 
 
Objectives 
The Yellow River Basin Focal Project studied water poverty, water availability and access, 
water productivity, and water and related institutions in the YRB to develop and rank a 
series of high-priority interventions aimed at increasing water and food security for the 
poor, while maintaining environmental sustainability. To achieve the expected outputs, 
the project implemented six distinct work packages: 
 
WP1: Water Poverty 
WP2: Water Availability and Access 
WP3: Water Productivity 
WP4: Institutional Analysis 
WP5: High-Impact Interventions 
WP6: Knowledge Base and Evaluation Platform 
 
Research area 
Research took place in the Yellow River Basin in China. The Yellow River (or “Huang He” 
in Chinese) is the second longest river in China.  Originating in the Bayangela Mountains 
in western China, the river drops a total of 4,500 meters as it loops north into the Gobi 
Desert before turning south through the Loess Plateau and then east to its terminus in 
the Bohai Gulf. In total, the river flows 5,464 kilometers and passes through nine 
provinces and autonomous regions, with a basin area of 795,000 km2.  
 
Methods 
We used a variety of research methods, ranging from stakeholder consultations, 
workshops with researchers, to descriptive qualitative analysis, and quantitative, 
modeling analysis. Quantitative analysis methods included a) econometric analyses to 
relate agricultural water with poverty outcomes and to relate water-related institutions 
with water savings; b) hydrologic and water supply and demand simulation modeling, 
including SWAT modeling to assess the impact of climate change on Yellow River Basin 
water resources; water supply and demand modeling (YRCC-led) to assess water 
availability and use in the basin; and MAS modeling to assess the impact of alternative 
high-impact interventions; and c) GIS-based analysis of water productivity to assess the 
spatial variation of water productivity across the basin.  
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Research findings 
Our key findings include:  
Water Availability 
The Yellow River Basin is a highly water-scarce basin. Much of the infrastructure on this 
highly controlled river has been built for flood control, but climate change and droughts 
will bring new challenges to a basin that has only been prepared for flood management.  
While the situation is already severe under average conditions, water availability is 
expected to worsen significantly under climate change.  
The HadCM3 and SDSM used in this study project warming of 1.34oC by 2020, 2.6oC by 
2050, and up to 3.9oC by 2080 for the maximum air temperature in the study area. The 
values are 0.87oC, 1.49oC, and 2.27oC for minimum air temperature. Weak changes in 
regional precipitation amounts are also projected. Annual precipitation is projected to 
increase by 3.47% by 2020, 6.42% by 2050, and 8.67% by 2080. However, streamflow 
for three benchmark periods will decrease by 88.61 m3/s, 116.64 m3/s, and 151.62 
m3/s, respectively. The decline in streamflow will affect regional water supply and 
security in the YRB. The scenarios presented here, and the simulated impacts on the 
hydrologic regime, raise questions over the availability of future water resources in the 
study area, particularly in terms of the magnitude of seasonal runoff. 
Climate change would raise the annual water deficit by 4.21 billion cubic meters (BCM), 
and the discharge into the Sea would drop by 2.18 BCM. As expected, the worst water 
situation is achieved under combined dry-year and climate change condition: In a year 
with 75% and 95% exceedency frequency, respectively, the volume of water shortage 
would reach 15.055 BCM and 21.022 BCM, respectively, under climate change, and the 
water deficit ratio for the entire basin would reach 28% and 37%, respectively. A key 
concern regarding water shortages is not only fulfilling productive water demands, but 
also the large minimum flow requirement to move sediments downstream to avoid 
breaching the dikes, estimated at 15 BCM during the rainy season.  
At the same time, the water engineers at YRCC still see some potential for total water 
savings in the basin, amounting to up to 5.7 BCM by 2020 and 7.6 BCM by 2030. As the 
dry-season, climate change calculations show, however, these savings will not be 
sufficient to turn around trends of growing water deficits in the basin.  
Water Productivity 
Irrigated yield is significantly higher than the rainfed yield for corn, and soybean in 
different regions of the YRB; however for soybean in downstream areas, rainfed yield is 
even higher than irrigated yield.  WPI is slightly lower than WPR for corn and soybean, 
which implies that the irrigated crops may not be as efficient as rainfed crops with regard 
to water productivity for particular crops in the YRB. 
WPI and WPR vary spatially from upstream to downstream with both changing climate 
and water supply conditions.  The water factor is particularly sensitive to spatial scale, 
which reflects the impact of water regulation over space in the YRB through engineering 
measures.  The water factor has stronger effect on both crop yield and WP than the 
energy factor. 
Irrigation stabilizes the crop production per unit of water consumption.  Croplands have 
higher water consumption than urban lands but lower than forest lands.  Among the sub-
basins, the midstream region has more important agricultural water management issues 
from the perspective of both crop yield and WP. 
Water Institutions 
Increased conservation of water resources is one of the key goals of China’s 2002 Water 
Law. Under this law, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) manages all water 
resources through a water-allocation system based on the issuance of water-abstraction 
permits and water-use fees.  A wealth of successive ad hoc regulations support water 
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savings by providing clarifications on water permits and rights, water pricing, and 
abstraction fees. Despite the development of this legislative body, implementation of the 
allocation system at the provincial level has been slow due to a lack of details on how to 
implement the law, conflicts between water users, and financial difficulties. 
Given the scarcity of water resources in the Yellow River Basin and the lack of 
compensation for transferring water to more well-off, downstream users, tensions and 
conflicts among water stakeholders have risen. Although YRCC is authorized by the State 
Council to control the Yellow River water resources, it has limited powers to penalize 
those users who consume beyond specified province-level water use limits. Only the 
State Council can actually enforce water use, but this power is seldom exercised in 
practice. Integrated management of the Yellow River water is faced with many 
difficulties, particularly given the fact that water control is new and no ready-made river 
control standard can be followed.  Further, the Yellow River Water Quantity Control 
Management Method does not have detailed implementing regulations; and many 
aspects of reservoir control application regulations of hydropower stations are at odds 
with the Yellow River Water Quantity Control plan.  Currently, the YRCC only directly 
allocates water from Liujiaxia Reservoir to Toudaoguai and from Sanmenxia Reservoir to 
Lijin gauge; other sections remain without integrated management.  Since 2006, limited 
water allocation is also exercised by YRCC on two tributaries, the Weihe River and the 
Qinhe River. 
A field survey across 51 villages in four irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan found 
that, following the liberalization of collective water management, the share of villages 
with collective management of water resources declined from 91 percent in 1990 to 49 
percent in 2004. By that year, 30 percent of the villages in the two provinces managed 
water resources through a hired manager, whereas 21 percent instituted water user 
associations (WUAs). The pace of reform has been significantly faster in Ningxia than in 
Henan; this is not unexpected in China, as local governments are often given large 
autonomy to decide on the form and timing of institutional changes.  Analyses of field 
data showed, however, that hired managers or WUAs were not necessarily more 
effective than the past collective system. Instead, what mattered were the incentives 
provided by the various governance mechanisms as well as the overall implementation 
process. When new irrigation management entities (or existing ones) were entitled to 
keep as excess profit the difference between the water fee collected (which is based on 
an estimate of village water needs compiled before the farming year) and the total fee 
calculated from the actual water supplied (which can be reduced at the request of the 
water manager), then water user per ha declined. 
Water Poverty 
Using the purchasing power parity (PPP) $1.25 a day poverty line and per capita income 
levels, we estimated that 30.5 percent of the population in the rural YRB region were 
living in poverty in 2001. The poverty rate was highest in the mountain region and 
lowest in the plain land region.  
The incidence of poverty (headcount poverty rate) varied widely in different parts of the 
rural YRB, ranging from a low of only 3.1 percent in the YRB part of Shandong province 
in the east to as high as 52.2 percent in the YRB part of Gansu province in western 
China. This pattern of poverty incidence corresponds quite well to that of the national 
level—poverty in China is mainly concentrated in the western part of the country.  
The profile of poverty in the YRB focused on the empirical links between water and 
poverty in the basin. The PPP $1.25 a day headcount poverty rate is significantly lower in 
irrigated areas than in non-irrigated areas of the YRB region: while 19.4 percent of all 
households living in irrigated villages are poor, the rate is more than double (41.4 
percent) in non-irrigated villages.  
The estimated income elasticity with respect to irrigation coverage suggests that, a 10-
percent increase in the village-level irrigation coverage increases per capita income of 
Executive Summary CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 16 
households living in that village by 1.7 percent on average. Further, poverty simulations 
using the estimated parameters of the income model suggest that, increasing irrigation 
coverage by 10 percent reduces the incidence of poverty by 5.11 percent. 
While the impact of irrigation expansion on poverty reduction is large, we also find fairly 
large and positive effect from expanding off-farm income opportunities in rural YRB. The 
headcount poverty rate is expected to decline by 4.52 percent if the share of non-farm 
income in total per capita household income increases by 10 percent.  
In sum, expanding irrigation in the YRB will help boost crop yields, which in turn will 
increase incomes of the poor and reduce poverty. However, there are limits to expanding 
irrigation coverage, and labor productivity is known to be lowest in agriculture. 
Therefore, accelerating a shift of rural labor force out of agriculture by creating off-farm 
employment opportunities in higher productivity sectors in rural areas is arguably even 
more important for the poor. That said, rapid agricultural growth must be pursued for 
poverty reduction. The World Development Report 2008 shows that growth in agriculture 
is two to four times more poverty alleviating than growth in other sectors. Both China 
and India offer concrete evidence of this finding. Therefore, faster agricultural growth 
accompanied by a speedy shift of rural labor force out of agriculture is key for poverty 
reduction in the YRB. 
High-Impact Interventions 
Given the size of the YRB, no single intervention could possibly do justice to the extreme 
diversity of water-related challenges found in the basin, which ranges from the upstream 
mountainous areas dominated by livestock herders, to the hilly/mountainous Loess 
Plateau with severe erosion challenges, the semi-arid to arid irrigated plains in Inner 
Mongolia/Ningxia with rapidly growing industries, to the key urban-industrial centers 
interspersed with highly productive irrigation downstream. Many interventions have been 
implemented in the past to increase water supply and enhance flood control. Key among 
these are the construction of the Xiaolangdi reservoir, completed in 1999, which has 
increased the designed flood-control period from 60 years to over 1000 years; the 
construction of several thousand silt-trap dams across the Loess Plateau; and two large 
watershed rehabilitation projects implemented by the government of China and the 
World Bank. Additional interventions in recent years to address growing water shortages 
and the need for food include the conversion of hillside production into terraces (this was 
also done as part of the watershed rehabilitation project); rainwater harvesting schemes 
in the western upland areas; the use of plastic sheeting to contain soil moisture and 
reduce evaporation in the arid parts of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia; and the resettlement 
of people out of extremely dry areas. 
Based on stakeholder working groups, expert discussions among the research team, and 
quantitative analysis, we are suggesting the following high-impact interventions: 
Technical interventions:  
While many technical or engineering interventions have been already implemented in the 
basin, a series of additional measures could increase water supply or reduce demand. 
The possibly most important one is the south-to-north water transfer (SNWT) project. If 
fully implemented, it could transfer up to 50 km3 (comparable to total Yellow River 
runoff) from the Yangtze River in southern China to the North China Plain. However, 
among the three routes (western, middle and eastern routes) only the western route 
would directly affect water resources in the YRB. It could transfer 20 km3 to irrigate an 
additional 1.3 million ha and provide water for economic development in Qinghai, Gansu, 
Shanxi and Shanxi provinces, as well as Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, all in the YRB. 
However, economic, engineering, and ecological side effects prevent this route from 
development in the foreseeable future.  
Even without the SNWT, engineers at YRCC still see some potential for water savings in 
the basin, amounting to 5.7 km3 by 2020 and 7.6 km3 by 2030, mostly in the agriculture 
sector (but allowing for continued agricultural and economic growth and small increases 
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in irrigated area). However, these savings will not be sufficient to turn around trends of 
growing water deficits in the basin, particularly in dry years.  Thus, even more 
investment in agricultural research and development will be needed to achieve even 
more rapid improvements in crop yields without use of more irrigation water. 
An assessment of crop water productivity across the YRB showed that while there is still 
scope for increased water-use efficiency in irrigated agriculture in the YRB, the scope is 
limited and further declines in allocation of water to irrigation will eventually result in 
reduced food production with serious implications for local food security and farmer 
incomes, as well as potential impacts on global food prices and trade. 
Reform of governance: 
Despite high levels of water scarcity in the country and in the YRB, integrated water 
management in China remains elusive as a result of fragmented management and 
conflicts among water users at the national, provincial, and local levels. Key challenges 
in Chinese water legislation and administration relate to the lack of regulations 
supporting implementation of the 2002 water law; and poor incentives for water 
conservation at the level of the irrigation system. To address growing water scarcity, in 
addition to water supply/engineering measures, the government has started to support 
reform of irrigation management. Our studies found that significant scope for 
governance and institutional reforms remain in the following areas: 1) Reforming 
irrigation management institutions; 2) Reforming water pricing; 3) Implementing water 
rights transfer projects; and 4) Support for water reallocation across provinces.  
Economic solutions: Role of water pricing and water markets 
Although water prices have been steadily raised over the past several decades in China, 
and particularly since the latest round of water-pricing reforms started in 1997, 
agricultural water is still thought to be much under-priced. As a result, water charges 
remain a limited instrument to increase water use efficiency and productivity further. 
Moreover, given the growing rural-urban income divide, it is unlikely that the 
government will raise irrigation fees to levels high enough to reduce irrigation water use 
seriously. Furthermore, in the YRB, the UWFR has led to income shortfalls of districts in 
parts of the basin where irrigation water supplies were cut considerably, particularly in 
midstream provinces. 
Since 2000, YRCC has promoted the establishment of water-right systems by conducting 
demonstration projects aimed at reducing water competition among sectors. The 
purpose of these demonstration sites is to reallocate water from agriculture to industry 
through increasing irrigation efficiency, generally through engineering measures, such as 
canal lining. One transfer pilot project operates in Ningxia Province and 16 projects 
signed transfer contracts in Inner Mongolia, with a value of US$100 million. Under these 
projects, irrigation districts transfer part of their water use rights to industrial enterprises 
for a period of 25 years. However, analyses showed that water users in the irrigation 
districts are generally not aware of the water rights transfer; transfers are determined 
by the administration, not markets; and there are no adjustments based on market 
signals or economic measures. Thus, major challenges remain until a true market for 
water rights can be established.  
Importantly, the intra-provincial irrigation-to-agriculture transfers in the YRB provide 
important inputs for the potential development of inter-provincial water trading, which 
has been discussed by both policymakers and water allocation managers at the MWR and 
YRCC for several years.  Given the key importance of compensating irrigators for giving 
up water for both flows at the river mouth and rapid urban-industrial development 
downstream, we analyzed the potential impact on basin GDP of water rights trading 
using a multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework developed for the YRB. 
We compared two scenarios to evaluate the consequences of changes from the current 
scheme of water allocation (that is, business-as-usual under the current UWFR based on 
the 1987 allocation agreement): (1) water allocation across provinces without quotas, 
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and (2) water trading among agents using irrigation water. We also studied the impact 
of enforcing full environmental flow requirements (as established by several Chinese 
studies) on the potential for water trading. As expected, under a scenario without any 
water quotas, annual water consumption is higher—by 11 percent (38.3 km3 compared 
with 34.5 km3 under the UWFR). At the same time, the basin-wide GDP—at 1123.26 
billion RMB under the scenario without regulation—is 10 percent lower than the 1246.68 
billion RMB achieved under the UWFR scenario. As a result of increased water 
consumption without the UWFR, flows to the downstream ecosystem are reduced and 
flow cutoff events occur from February to June. Flow impacts are even stronger for the 
delta, where cutoff periods start in February and continue through December. This 
scenario thus adequately mimics the 1972-1998 period before the Government enforced 
provincial water-use quotas. 
If irrigation water trading is allowed, upstream districts tend to sell water to gain 
revenue, while downstream users buy water for greater water-use benefit. The GDP 
increase is 5.64 billion RMB for upstream agents and 17.8 billion RMB for midstream and 
downstream agents, with a total GDP increase of 23.45 billion RMB. Moreover, annual 
water consumption under the water-trading scenario is slightly lower at 33.8 km3 than 
the annual water consumption under the UWFR scenario while total GDP is higher at 
1270.1 billion RMB in the former scenario. 
Conclusions 
The government of China has recognized the severe water constraints in the YRB. To 
address growing water scarcity, the government has started to change its approaches 
from management of water supply toward improved management of water demand. 
Signs of the new approaches are the 2002 water law, the increased number of 
regulations on water prices and a series of water trading pilots implemented in the YRB. 
However, most organizations concerned with water management are still headed and 
staffed by engineers, and traditional water-engineering measures, as exemplified by the 
SNWT, still dominate interventions in terms of funding. 
There is no panacea for addressing the severe water scarcity challenges in the YRB. 
Based on an assessment of options available, we believe that the government should 
continue to reform the institutions responsible for irrigation management and water 
pricing across all water-using sectors; but current users need to be compensated for 
ceding water resources to users with higher-valued uses. Projects that transfer enhanced 
water rights that follow market mechanisms, and include the establishment of water 
rights and related responsibilities would be a first step in that direction. Reform is also 
required at all the administrative levels from the central to the local government to 
support fully integrated land and water management at the basin level and to avoid 
large inefficiencies caused by conflicting objectives of the various agencies involved in 
water supply and food production in the YRB. 
Expanding irrigation in the YRB will help boost crop yields, which in turn will increase 
incomes of the poor and reduce poverty. However, the potential for expanding irrigation 
is limited, and labor productivity is known to be lowest in agriculture. Therefore, 
accelerating a shift of the rural labor force out of agriculture by creating off-farm 
employment opportunities in higher-productivity sectors in rural areas is arguably even 
more important for future rural economic development. 
Other ancillary measures that need to be continued include further adoption of water-
saving technologies, and continued support to agricultural research and development to 
increase crop productivity for both irrigated and rainfed crops. Continued productive 
investment is needed, rather than subsidies, in the rural non-farm sector to ensure that 
the urban-rural poverty gap does not widen even further. There is still scope for savings 
of agricultural water through improved water productivity. But continued transfers of 
water out of agriculture will eventually result in declining production, with implications 
for national food production as well as global food prices and trade.
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The Yellow River Basin Focal Project (YBFP) studied water poverty, water availability and 
access, water productivity, and water and related institutions in the Yellow River Basin to 
develop and rank a series of high-priority interventions aimed at increasing water and 
food security for the poor, while maintaining environmental sustainability. To achieve the 
expected outputs, the project implemented six distinct work packages (see also Figure 
1.1.1): 
 
WP1: Water Poverty 
WP2: Water Availability and Access 
WP3: Water Productivity 
WP4: Institutional Analysis 
WP5: High-Impact Interventions 
WP6: Knowledge Base and Evaluation Platform 
 
WP0 Phase I
• Data/Project/Models Review/Basin Tour
• Project Design
• Conceptual Framework 

















WP3 Water Productivity 





























































































Figure 2.1.1.1: Yellow River Basin Focal Project Implementation Process 
For this final report, we will report on each of these work packages, starting with 1) 
Water Availability and Access, 2) Water Productivity, 3) Institutional Analysis, 4) Water 
Poverty, 5) High-Impact Interventions, and 6) Knowledge Base and Evaluation Platform.  
1.2 Introduction to Study Site 
China is facing growing water scarcity in many river basins due to rapid economic 
development, an expanding population, growing urbanization, and limited scope to 
develop new supplies. Water overdrafts, both from surface and sub-surface sources, are 
causing serious environmental problems ranging from the degradation of deltaic 
ecosystems of major rivers to aquifer depletion in North China. According to an estimate 
by China’s Ministry of Water Resources, the loss of food production due to water stress 
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has reached 25–30 million metric tons (mmt), and the direct economic loss to agriculture 
and industry was about RMB 150 billion (equivalent to US $18 billion) in 2005 (China 
Economic Herald, 2005). As serious as the economic costs of water scarcity are its 
ecological consequences. The drying of the Yellow River, the large-scale groundwater 
mining in the North China Plain, and rapidly growing water pollution in the basin are 
some of the symptoms of negative environmental impacts of water scarcity.  
The Government of China has declared the lack of water resources a serious limitation to 
the economic and social development of the country (Premier Zhu Rongji, National 
People’s Conference meeting, February 2000.). Several studies found limited water 
supplies to have direct negative impacts on food production in the country (see, for 
example, Brown, 1995; Brown and Halweil 1998; Rosegrant et al., 2002; Yang et al., 
2003). With business-as-usual water management and agricultural development 
practices, these trends are set to worsen in future years given the continued rapid 
economic development in China combined with continued, albeit low, population growth, 
and rapidly changing diets, including increased consumption of meats and vegetables. 
 
The Yellow River (or “Huanghe” in Chinese), is the second longest river in China.  
Originating in the Bayangela Mountains in western China, the river drops a total of 4,500 
m as it loops north into the Gobi Desert before turning south through the Loess Plateau 
and then east to its terminus in the Bohai Gulf (Figure 1.2.1). In total, the river flows 
5,464 km and passes through nine provinces and autonomous regions, with a basin area 
of 795,000 km2 (including 42,000km2 inland river catchments in the northwest of the 
basin) at present.  The basin population is estimated at 0.11 billion and farmland area 
covers 0.244 billion mu (equivalent to 16.3 million ha), about 13 percent of China’s total 
cultivated area. The annual average natural runoff amounts to 53.5 billion m3, and total 
water resources amount to 64.7 billion m3 (Yellow River Water Resources Bulletin 2006). 
 
The Yellow River is one of the most heavily controlled rivers in the world by advanced 
engineering systems.  Thus, spatial and temporal variability of water availability depends 
on both natural hydroclimatic processes and human interferences.  Unique water 
availability and access challenges of the Yellow River Basin include low per-capita water 
availability, significant potential impact of climate change and variability; large spatial 
and temporal variation in surface runoff generation; the significant role of multipurpose 
reservoirs that control the whole runoff (sometimes with competing uses); important 
roles of flooding, drought, and the notorious large flow cutoffs of the late 1990s (which 
had been gradually increasing since the 1970s); large differences in access and use by 
water use sector and socioeconomic group; and water quality degradation in the middle 
and downstream main channel and tributaries.  As a result of high levels of water 
scarcity, the basin faces competition between irrigators in the mid- and upstream areas 
and growing non-irrigation demands downstream, as well as rapidly growing water 
degradation.  Water scarcity and poor quality have already contributed to economic 
losses in the basin as a result of both water scarcity and poor water quality and resulting 
environmental problems. 
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Figure 2.1.2.1: Yellow River Basin Hydrologic Boundaries 
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2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
The project aimed at studying water poverty, water availability and access, water 
productivity, and water and related institutions in the Yellow River Basin to develop and 
rank a series of high-priority interventions aimed at increasing water and food security 
for the poor while maintaining environmental sustainability. Outcomes from the following 
six work packages are reported in the following: 
 
1. Water Poverty Analysis 
2. Water Availability and Access 
3. Water Productivity 
4. Institutional Analysis 
5. High-Impact Interventions 
6. Knowledge Base and Evaluation Platform 
 
2.1 Water Availability and Access (YRCC, BNU, and IFPRI) 
 
The Yellow River is one of the most heavily controlled rivers in the world by advanced 
engineering systems. Spatial and temporal variability of water availability depends on 
both natural hydroclimatic processes and human interferences. Unique water availability 
and access challenges include low per-capita water availability, significant potential 
impact of climate change; large spatial and temporal variation in surface runoff 
generation; the significant role of multipurpose reservoirs that control the whole runoff 
(sometimes with competing uses); flooding; droughts; large differences in access and 
use by water use sector and socioeconomic group; and water quality degradation in the 
middle and downstream main channel and tributaries. Natural and human factors 
generate conditions of extreme water scarcity and as a result the basin faces competition 
between irrigators in the mid- and upstream areas and growing non-irrigation demands 
downstream, exacerbated by rapidly growing water degradation. Water scarcity and poor 
quality, and the ensuing environmental problems, have already contributed to economic 
losses in the basin. From 1950 to 1990, the total direct damage of floods and droughts 
was estimated at 116.4 billion RMB (1 RMB = US$0.146), with floods accounting for 45% 
percent of total damage (Ma 1996).  
 
The following sections provide a brief description of the modeling tools used (longer 
descriptions can be found in Appendix B); describe the current water supply and demand 
situation in the river; review the impact of future supply and demand, as well as the 
potential impact of climate change on water resources; and concludes with a combined 




To undertake this analysis, two modeling systems were used: the YRCC water simulation 
model and the BNU SWAT model.  
 
2.1.1.1 Yellow River Conservancy Commission Water Supply and Demand Model 
 
The YRCC water simulation model is a node-link model simulating the characteristics of 
water use spatially and temporally based on given boundary conditions and given 
operating rules. The core of the model is a simulation model, which can simulate and 
evaluate alternative water allocation rules, as well as alternative water development 
plans. The YRCC supply and demand model is used to assess water shortages over space 
and time based on different hydrologic flow inputs. 
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2.1.1.2 BNU SWAT Model 
 
SWAT, acronym for “Soil and Water Assessment Tool”, is a river basin, or watershed-
scale model developed by Arnold et al. (1992; 1998) for the United States Department 
of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS). SWAT was developed to 
predict the impact of different land uses/covers and land-management practices on 
water resources, water flow, and sediment and agricultural chemicals transport in large 
complex watersheds with varying soils over long periods of time (Neitsch et al. 2005). 
This model has been adopted by many U.S. federal and state agencies (USDA, USEPA, 
etc.) and many countries (Pang et al. 2007; Cheng et al. 2009b). SWAT is employed in 
this study to simulate the hydrologic regime and estimate responses to the future 
climate change. 
 
For the climate change analysis, the SRES B2 scenario was used in combination with the 
HadCM3 model. The output of the HadCM3 model was downscaled to the basin using the 
Statistical DownScaling Model (SDSM). The local climate change scenarios generated by 
the downscaling were then used to drive the SWAT model of Beijing National University. 
With this input, the SWAT model is able to simulate future hydrologic processes and 
changes in the modeled daily flow regime between current and future climate scenarios 
can be compared and analyzed. 
 
2.1.2 Results 
2.1.2.1 Water supply and demand in the YRB 
Based on data collected from 1956 to 2000, total annual water resources in the Yellow 
River Basin are 64.71 BCM, including 53.48 BCM from surface water, and 11.23 BCM 
from net utilizable groundwater resources. The annual water quantity upstream of the 
town of Huayuankou is 62.08 BCM, which includes 53.28 BCM from surface water, and 
8.81 BCM for net utilizable groundwater. Runoff in the Yellow River is mainly 
concentrated from July to October, a period that accounts for about 58 percent of annual 
runoff. The lowest monthly runoff occurs in January, accounting for only about 2.4 
percent of annual runoff. The maximum monthly runoff typically occurs in July and 
August, accounting for 14~16 percent of annual runoff. The regions of upper 
Longyangxia, from the Longyangxia dam to the city of Lanzhou and from Long men to 
Sanmenxia, respectively account for 34.8 percent, 22.3 percent, and 20.3 percent of the 
total surface water runoff in the Yellow River Basin. In provinces and autonomous 
regions within the basin, the province with the largest amount of surface water resources 
is Qinghai province, accounting for 34.8 percent; the Gansu province follows with 20.5 
percent; Ningxia is the most water-poor province receiving only 1.6 percent of surface 
water resources. Table 2.1.1 presents basin area, river length and number of tributaries 
by basin section.  
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Table 2.1.1. Basin area and river length in key YRB reaches  







River source to 
Hekouzhen 
385,966 3471.6 43 
 River source to Madou 20,930 369.7 3 
 Madou to Longyangxia 110,490 1417.5 22 
 Longyangxia to 
Xiaheyan 
122,722 793.9 8 
Upper 
reaches 
 Xiaheyan to 
Hekouzhen 
131,824 990.5 10 
Hekouzhen to 
Taohuayu 
343,751 1206.4 30 
 Hekouzhen to 
Longmen 
111,591 725.1 21 
 Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
190,842 240.4 5 
Middle 
reaches 
 Sanmenxia to 
Taohuayu 
41,318 240.9 4 
Taohuayu to estuary 22,726 785.6 3 
 Taohuayu to Gaocun 4,429 206.5 1 
 Gaocun to Aishan 14,990 193.6 2 
 Aishan to Lijin 2,733 281.9 0 
Lower 
reaches 
 Lijin to estuary 574 103.6 0 
 
The Yellow River has the highest sediment concentration in the world; it annually carries 
1.6 billion tons of sediment to the sea, with an average sediment load of 37.6 kg/m3 (Xu 
et al. 2002; Shi and Shao 2000). While an important research topic, we do not conduct 
any research on sedimentation for the YBFP. 
 
The YRB has been heavily engineered. Currently, over 3,100 large, moderate and small 
reservoirs have been built in the basin with a total volume of 58 billion m3 (table 2) 
essentially the equivalent of total runoff; more than 4,500 water diversion projects and 
29,000 water-lifting projects have been constructed. 
 
Since the 1980s, water supply to all sectors has increased from 35 BCM to 48 BCM. 
Within basin boundaries, water supply for agriculture is 38.6 BCM, accounting for 80 
percent of total supply. Supply for industry is 5.95 BCM, accounting for 12.4 percent of 
total supply. Total urban domestic water supply is 1.81 BCM, accounting for 3.8 percent 
of total supply. Rural domestic water supply is 1.7 BCM or 3.5 percent of total supply. An 
overview of annual water withdrawals by province and sector for 2008 in the YRB are 
shown in table 2.1.2. 
 
The provinces of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia have become the regions with the greatest 
water use in YRB, with 10.64 BCM and 9.96 BCM, accounting for 22.1 percent and 20.7 
percent of total withdrawals, respectively. The regions of Shaanxi, Henan, Gansu and 
Shanxi are following, with withdrawals of 7.04 BCM, 6.02 BCM, 4.97 BCM and 4.9 BCM, 
respectively, accounting for 14.7 percent, 12.5 percent, 10.3 percent and 10.2 percent 
of the total. The regions of Shandong and Qinghai, had withdrawals of 2.46 BCM and 
2.06 BCM, respectively, accounting for 5.1 percent and 4.3 percent of the total. The 
lowest water use province is Sichuan, as a result of its very small share in the basin 
area. The province used 0.016 BCM, accounting for 0.03 percent of the total.  
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Qinghai 0.08  0.12  0.28  1.58  2.06  
Sichuan 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  
Gansu 0.26 0.26 1.21 3.25 4.97 
Ningxia 0.13  0.07  0.46  9.30  9.96  
Inner Mongolia 0.20  0.15  0.54  9.76  10.64  
Shaanxi 0.47  0.35  1.29  4.93  7.04  
Shanxi 0.32  0.27  0.73  3.58  4.90  
Henan 0.21  0.34  0.94  4.53  6.02  
Shandong 0.15  0.13  0.50  1.69  2.46  
Total 1.81  1.70  5.95  38.61  48.07  
Note: Only areas within the basin are included. 
Source: Yellow River Conservancy Commission (2009). 
 
- Irrigation 
Irrigated area inside basin boundaries increased from 8.0 BCM in 1950 to 75.3 BCM (7.5 
million hectares) in 2008/9—if areas outside basin boundaries are included area 
increases to 12.6 million hectares. Expansion has been most rapid in the downstream 
reaches where area expanded from 3.0 billion m2 in the 1950s to more than 23.3 billion 
m2 (2.3 million ha) in 2008/9, and water use increased from 1.9 BCM in the 1950s to 
12.2 BCM in 1990s (average water use is a very high 10,000 m3/ha ).  
 
- Domestic water use 
Domestic water use includes residential uses and the water used by commerce and 
public institutions such as schools and government offices. The YRB is responsible for the 
domestic water supply for more than 100 million people. However, the population is not 
evenly distributed in the basin. The highest population concentration is found in the area 
from Longmen to Sanmenxia (45.1 percent), mainly centered in the Wei River Basin, a 
key economic, cultural, and political center of China. The second highest area is from 
Huayuankou to the river mouth in Henan and Shandong provinces (13.2 percent). These 
are two of the most densely populated areas in China.  
 
During the past several decades, urban growth has outpaced overall population growth 
in China and elsewhere. Rapid urbanization has greatly increased urban-domestic water 
use. Furthermore, in rural areas, rising income levels have enabled more households to 
turn to piped systems, and the amount of domestic water uses has also increased 
significantly. According to Jin and Young (2001), the total annual domestic water use in 
China was only 1 BCM in 1949. It then increased from 2 BCM in 1965 to 20 BCM in 1993 
and to 54 BCM in 1998. In the YRB, the amounts of domestic water use in urban and 
rural areas (including livestock uses) in 1990 were 1.14 BCM and 1.35 BCM, respectively 
(inside the basin area). By 2001, water use increased to 2.27 BCM and 1.6 BCM, 37.8 
percent of which was contributed by surface water and the reminder by groundwater 
(YRCC 2003). In other words, nearly two-thirds of the domestic water resources were 
supplied by groundwater. By 2008, the total surface and groundwater depletion for 
urban (urban public use and domestic use) was 1.64 and 1.343 BCM, respectively; and 
surface and groundwater contributed similar amounts.  
 
- Industrial Water Use 
The industrial sector in the YRB has been developing rapidly over recent decades, and 
the amount of water used for industrial activities has experienced a drastic increase. 
Between 1980 and 1993, water use in the YRB increased from 2.79 to 5.45 BCM, and 
then to 6.19 BCM in 2001. In 2001, surface water accounted for 45.1 percent of total 
industrial use, and groundwater accounted for 54.9 percent (YRCC 2003). Although the 
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rate of groundwater use is not as high as for domestic water uses (54.9 percent versus 
62.2 percent), it definitely plays a major role for the industrial sector. Most industries 
(including mining) are concentrated close to urban areas. According to Xi et al. (1997) 
five industries, including chemical engineering, electric power, metallurgy, mechanical 
engineering, and textile industry accounted for 67.1 percent of total industrial water use. 
 
Similarly to domestic water use, the region from Longmen to Sanmenxia has the highest 
share of industrial water uses (30.4 percent); and the region from Lanzhou to 
Toudaoguai has the second highest share (20 percent). The general shift of economic 
development from the relatively rich (and high-wage) eastern to middle and western 
China implies that the YRB would become more critical as a source of water for growing 
industries in the future.  
 
- Environmental water use 
In the past 40 years (1960-2000), 11 large reservoirs have been built in the main 
channel of the Yellow River in the upper and middle reaches (Yu 2006). All of these have 
contributed to changes in the riverine ecosystem (Liu et al. 2008). The environment is 
particularly fragile in the Loess Plateau and in the arid regions of the basin. Up to now, 
little attention has been paid to the river’s ecological health; instead, the focus was on 
increased withdrawals to supply a rapidly increasing population and for urban-industrial 
growth. Flow cutoffs in the YRB were the most striking evidence of excess water 
withdrawal and consumption in the basin with increasing cutoff periods from 1972-1998. 
In 1997, there was no discharge from the basin to the sea for 226 days, and the river 
dried up to Kaifeng, 600 km inland from its mouth (Ke and Zhou 2007, Cai and 
Rosegrant 2004). 
 
Such occurrences impacted industrial and agricultural production in both urban and rural 
areas along the lower reaches, destroyed the ecosystem of the estuarial delta, and as a 
result damaged the livelihoods of people across the basin.  
 
2.1.2.2 Significant water related challenges in the basin 
- Floods 
Flood damages of the Yellow River have attracted worldwide attention. During 2540 
years, from 602 BC to 1938, records show 1,590 documented dike breaches, including 
five major changes of the downstream river course (i.e. the reaches below the 
Huayuankou gauge station). Five provinces in the Huang-Huai-Hai Plain have been 
affected by floods: Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu. According to 
instrumental records fourteen levee breaches have occurred from 1919 to 1938 (20-year 
period). In 1933, the flood peak flow at Huaxian Station was 22,000m3/s; more than 50 
dikes breached downstream, affecting 2.73 million people in Henan, Shandong, Hebei 
and Jiangsu provinces. Overbank flows are frequently caused by medium and small 
floods in the lower Yellow River, and seriously affect people's lives and property. 
According to incomplete statistics, since 1949 to before the operation of the Xiaolangdi 
reservoir, more than 20 floods were recorded in the lower floodplains. In August 1996 
the peak flow was 7,860 m3/s at Huayuankou station. The entire floodplain was 
inundated, with an average water depth of about 1.6 m, and a maximum depth of 5.7 
m. A total of 1,374 villages, 1.188 million people, and 247 million mu arable land were 
affected by the flood; 265.4 thousand houses collapsed, 409.6 thousand houses were 
damaged, and the direct economic loss amounted to 6.46 billion RMB. 
 
- Droughts 
Mainly as a result of rapid growth in both irrigation and non-irrigation water demands, 
and partly because of a declining trend in annual runoff over the past decades, droughts 
have overtaken floods as the main weather-related hazard in the YRB. The basin is 
among the regions of China that are most seriously affected by droughts. The 
northwestern Loess Plateau Region is especially drought-prone. After the foundation of 
People Republic of China (PRC), the Party and government focused on hydraulic 
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engineering construction projects in the basin and developed a large number of irrigation 
projects to combat drought. However, for most parts of the Loess Plateau agriculture still 
relies heavily on rainfall. From 1950 to 1974, the Loess Plateau region was hit by 
seventeen drought episodes, once every 1.5 years on average. Nine of these years 
registered severe droughts. In 1965 droughts in northern Shaanxi caused crop failure 
over 1,000 mu, and in northwest Shanxi 2,600 mu were affected. During the past 20 
years, severe drought occurred several times in the upper and middle reaches of the 
Yellow River Basin, causing significant grain yield reduction and drinking water 
shortages. In 1994, the drought disaster covered an area of 6,000 mu, and the reduction 
of agricultural production reached 6 million metric tons. From winter 2008 to spring 
2009, wheat-producing provinces in northern China suffered drought stress. The area 
affected by drought reached 1.13 million mu (75,000 ha) in Gansu, Shaanxi, Henan, 
Shanxi, and Shandong provinces in the YRB. 
 
- Declining groundwater tables 
With the rapid increase in the amount of groundwater extraction in some areas, the 
groundwater level has declined rapidly. In turn, this has caused expanding land 
subsidence, cracks and a series of environmental geological problems. According to 
some statistics, the area subjected to groundwater overexploitation in the YRB covers 
15,900 km2. Of these, 12,500 km2, or 78 percent of the total, are affected by severe 
exploitation. There are ten larger groundwater funnels, including Yinchuan, Dawukou 
funnel in Ningxia, Fengdong, Xinghua, Luqiao, Weibin funnel in Shaanxi Province, 
Songgu, Taiyuan and Yuncheng funnel in Shanxi Province, and Wu zhi ~ Wenxian ~ 
Mengxian funnel in Henan Province. In the last few years, groundwater tables have been 
generally declining north of the Yellow River, but increasing in the area south of the 
Yellow River (Shuming, personal communication). 
 
- Water pollution 
A 2007 study by the Yellow River Conservancy Committee surveyed water quality over 
more than 8,384 miles of the river. Based on the analysis, water in 33.8 percent of the 
river system was considered below level five quality. Based on UNEP guidelines, level 
five is unfit for drinking, for aquaculture, for industrial use and even for use in 
agriculture. The report stated that waste and sewage discharged into the system totaled 
4.29 billion tons. Industry and manufacturing accounted for 70 percent of the discharge 
into the river, households accounted for 23 percent, and just over 6 percent came from 
other sources.  
 
In addition, the continuous increase in wastewater discharge into the river is 
exacerbating the conflict between water demand and supply (Xue 2007). 
The YRB is affected by many water resource problems, ranging from water scarcity, to 
pollution issues, to flood risk. Water authorities will face great challenges in meeting the 
instream flow requirements and providing more water for the growing populations, for 
industry and agriculture in this century. 
 
2.1.2.3 Climate change impacts on hydrological flows (SWAT BNU) 
Along with the challenges described in the previous section, water managers may have 
to face even worse water scarcity conditions as a result of climate change. 
Understanding the relationships between the hydrologic regime, climate factors, and 
anthropogenic effects is important for the sustainable management of water resources 
for the study area and for the entire YRB. Climate change impacts are assessed for two 
areas, the upper catchment of the Yellow River Basin, north of Lanzhou station, which 
accounts for 58 percent of total water supply in the YRB; and the Wei River Basin, which 
includes the Wei River, the Jing River and the Beiluo River and flows across Shaanxi, 
Gansu and Ningxia provinces and autonomous region.  
 
Downscaling through SDSM shows that daily Tmax and Tmin have an increasing trend 
under the B2 emission scenario (table 2.1.3). 
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Table 2.1.3 Increment of daily Tmax and Tmin in future periods compared with the baseline 
 
Future Scenarios Parameter Baseline 
2020s 2050s 2080s 
Daily Tmax（℃/d) 13.5 0.4 1.9 4.0 
Daily Tmin（℃/d） 0.6 0.5 1.6 2.7 
Annual precipitation（mm/yr） 451.3 -81.9 -32.2 -41.3 
 
Figure 2.1.1 shows the spatial distribution of annual mean increment for daily Tmax and 
Tmin in different time periods compared with the baseline (1961-1990). Findings show an 
increase in daily minimum and maximum temperatures of up to 2°C by mid-century, and 
up to 4°C by 2080.The magnitude of this increasing trend is higher in the western part of 
the study area. Figure 2.1.2 presents changes in precipitation compared to the baseline. 
Generally, precipitation is expected to decline under this scenario. Average annual 

















































































Figure 2.1.1. Spatial distributions for the increment of daily Tmax and Tmin  
Note: spatial distributions for the increment of daily Tmax and Tmin in the future (20s, 50s and 80s describe 2020s, 
2050s and 2080s respectively), Tmax spatial distribution are shown on the left. 
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Figure 2.1.2. Spatial distribution for the increment of annual precipitation 
Note: spatial distribution for the increment of annual precipitation in the 2020s, 50s and 80s. 
 
As a result of climate change, streamflow would decline by 9-20 percent in the area 
north of Lanzhou, by mid-century, whereas in the Wei River Basin flows could decline by 
8 percent or increase by up to 5 percent in the 2050s. The trends seem to point to an 
overall reduction of water availability under climate change. Without adequate 
adaptation strategies, climate change is likely to aggravate the competition for water 
across the domestic, agriculture, and industry sectors. 
 
 
2.1.2.4 Water supply and demand analysis, using the YRCC model 
 
- Average annual water supply and demand analysis 
Without considering climate change, average annual water supply in the YRB is 44.58 
BCM (1956-2000), the gap between water supply and demand is 7.53 BCM, and the 
water deficit ratio for the whole basin is 14.5 percent. Sectors lacking water include 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and irrigation.  The water deficit ratio is 18.1 
percent for the area from Hekouzhen to Lanzhou. Moreover, the water deficit ratio in 
Qinghai, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Shandong is in excess of 15 percent. Total  
surface water consumption is 24.03 BCM, and the average annual water volume flowing 
into the sea is 18.96 BCM. Therefore, the water volume in the rainy season could not 
meet the water requirements for sediment transport. Considering that the water volume 
required for sediment transport is 15 BCM in the flood season, the volume of water 
shortage for meeting the water requirement for sediment transport is 1.56 BCM. Details 
are presented in Table 2.1.4. 
 
Considering climate change, the natural flow of rivers is reduced in the Yellow River. The 
average annual water supply declines to 40.37 BCM—based on information from the 
SWAT BNU model. As a result, the volume of water shortage is 11.75 BCM, and the 
water deficit ratio reaches 22.5% in the whole basin. For the Hekouzhen to Lanzhou 
reach, the deficit is 29.6% and for Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi  
more than 25%. The total surface water consumption is 20.53 BCM, the average annual 
water volume flowing into the sea is 16.78 BCM. Compared to a situation without taking 
into account climate change, the average annual volume of water shortage increased by 
4.21 BCM, the ratio of water deficit increased by 8%, the water volume into the sea 
declined by 2.18 BCM, of which 1.73 BCM is reduced during the flood season. Finally, the 
water shortage for meeting sediment transport demands is 3.29 BCM. 
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-  Dry-year water supply and demand analysis 
A dry-water year results in both lower runoff and increased agricultural water demand. 
As a result, water shortages will increase dramatically in the YRB. Without climate 
change, using 75% and 95% exceedency frequency over average flows, the average 
annual volume of water shortage increases by 4.49 BCM and 12.21 BCM, respectively, 
and the water volume flowing into the sea drops by 4.09 BCM and 9.71 BCM, 
respectively. 
 
Considering the impact of climate change, the runoff of the Yellow River will reduce 
further. At 75 percent and 95 percent exceedency frequency, the volume of water 
shortage will reach 15.055 BCM and 21.022 BCM, respectively, and the ratio of water 
deficit in the whole basin will reach 28 percent and 37 percent, respectively. Taking into 
account climate change, therefore, the supply and demand of water resources will be 
extremely serious in dry years (Table 2.1.5).  
 
 
Table 2.1.4  Supply and demand analysis of water resources for the Yellow River with and 
without considering climate change (BCM) 
 
The scenario 
without considering climatic change 
The scenario 



































0.263 0.257 0.006 2.4 0.214 0.262 0.001 0.38 0.219 
From 
Longyangxia to 
4.819 4.042 0.777 16.1 2.636 3.741 1.078 22.37 2.398 
From Lanzhou 
to Hekouzhen 
20.026 16.412 3.615 18.1 9.645 14.094 5.932 29.62 7.792 
From 
Hekouzhen to 
2.62 2.437 0.183 7 1.245 2.434 0.186 7.1 1.28 
From 
Longmen to 




3.772 3.524 0.248 6.6 1.594 3.539 0.233 6.18 1.605 
Underside 
HuaYuankou 
4.931 4.469 0.462 9.4 2.039 4.259 0.672 13.63 1.829 
Inner Flow 
Area 
0.588 0.475 0.113 19.2 0.102 0.476 0.112 19.05 0.111 
Qinghai 2.592 2.006 0.586 22.6 1.4 1.922 0.67 25.85 1.293 
Sichuan 0.031 0.031 0.001 1.8 0.025 0.031 0 0 0.025 
Gansu 5.996 4.667 1.329 22.2 2.893 3.931 2.065 34.44 2.375 
Ningxia 8.64 7.519 1.12 13 3.848 6.48 2.16 25 3.197 
Inner 
Mongolia 
10.713 8.91 1.803 16.8 5.487 7.743 2.97 27.72 4.337 
Shaanxi 9.03 7.416 1.614 17.9 3.524 6.426 2.604 28.84 2.622 
Shanxi 6.585 6.206 0.379 5.8 3.275 6.238 0.347 5.27 3.346 
Henan 6.065 5.801 0.264 4.4 2.938 5.581 0.484 7.98 2.721 
Shandong 2.462 2.026 0.436 17.7 0.644 2.016 0.446 18.12 0.618 
Total 52.113 44.581 7.532 14.5 24.034 40.367 11.745 22.54 20.533 
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in the basin 
Water 










 out of basin 
Runoff flowing 
into the sea 
not considering climatic change 52.113 44.581 7.532 14.5 9.28 18.958 
considering climatic change 52.113 40.367 11.745 22.54 9.28 16.777 
Average 
annual 
difference value 0 -4.214 4.213 8.04 0 -2.181 
not considering climatic change 53.687 27.617 12.025 22.4 8.242 14.868 
considering climatic change 53.687 24.587 15.055 28.04 8.242 12.977 75% 
difference value 0 -3.03 3.03 5.64 0 -1.891 
not considering climatic change 57.228 23.947 19.737 34.49 7 9.244 
considering climatic change 57.228 22.663 21.022 36.73 7 7.715 95% 





The Yellow River Basin is a highly water-scarce basin. Much of the infrastructure on this 
highly controlled river has been built for flood control, but climate change and droughts 
will bring new challenges to a basin that has only been prepared for flood management.  
While the situation is already severe under average conditions, water availability is 
expected to worsen significantly under climate change and in dry years.  Both the water 
and economic development scenarios and the climate change scenarios raise questions 
over the availability of future water resources in the study area, particularly in terms of 
the magnitude of seasonal runoff. Climate change would raise the annual water deficit by 
4.21 BCM, and the discharge into the Sea would drop by 2.18 BCM. As expected, the 
worst water situation is achieved under combined dry-year and climate change 
condition: In a year with 75% and 95% exceedency frequency, respectively, the volume 
of water shortage would reach 15.055 BCM and 21.022 BCM, respectively, under climate 
change, and the water deficit ratio for the entire basin would reach 28% and 37%, 
respectively. A key concern regarding water shortages is not only fulfilling productive 
water demands, but also the large minimum flow requirement to move sediments 
downstream to avoid breaching the dikes, estimated at 15 BCM during the rainy season. 
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2.2 Water Productivity Assessment 
In this section, we use experimental data, statistical data, and empirically estimated 
data to analyze the water productivity (WP) of major crops (corn, wheat, rice, and 
soybean) in 461 counties in the YRB.  WP values for rainfed crops and irrigated crops are 
estimated separately and maps of WP by crop are generated for the whole basin.  We 
analyze the spatial variability of WP with regard to climate, land cover, and agricultural 
practices.  We map WP by crop for the entire basin by interpolating from the WP 
assessment for the 461 counties.  These maps provide information for WP spatial pattern 
analysis.  Finally, we conduct Budyko curve analysis to assess the relationship between 
WP and water and energy across different spatial scales. 
 
2.2.1 Methods 
The first step for WP assessment is to collect data on the main agricultural production 
systems, including the water data such as precipitation, irrigation application, and crop 
ET; and crop data such as yield and area by crop.  Challenges arise with incomplete or 
unknown data, particularly to split irrigated and rainfed crops. To assess WP for irrigated 
and rainfed crops separately, we adopt a method presented by Cai et al. (2007) to 
retrieve irrigated and rainfed area and yield using gross crop production data and 
hydrologic and agronomic inputs.  Cai et al. (2007) proposed a method to split harvested 
area and yield for irrigated and rainfed crops in a region given gross area and yield; and 
climatic, agronomic, and economic data for crops.  Irrigated area is defined as the 
physical land crop area with an irrigation system; rainfed area is defined as a cropped 
area that only utilizes effective rainfall, which is the portion of rainfall that is available to 
meet consumptive crop water requirements, excluding surface runoff and deep 
percolation.  In contrast, irrigated areas use surface runoff by diversion (withdrawal) 
and/or groundwater by pumping in addition to effective rainfall. The method based on 
the principle of generalized maximum entropy (GME), which combines incomplete data, 
empirical knowledge, and a priori information. Data requirements for the GME model 
include: 
 
• Crop data, including total crop area, gross crop yield, crop growth period and 
stages by month, crop ET coefficient (kc) (Doorenbos and Pruitt, 1977), crop 
response coefficient to water stress (ky) (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979), and 
crop value indicator (e.g., producer’s crop prices, crop trade prices; FAOSTAT 
www.faostat.org) 
• Climate data, including monthly rainfall in the study area and reference crop 
evapotranspiration (ET0) (Allen et al., 1998) 
• Land and water data, including total irrigated land (TIA), multi-planting factor 
(MP), and monthly total irrigation water withdrawal in the study area (TIW). 
 
Based on these data items, the following items are computed and used for the retrieval 
of the irrigated and rainfed crop area and yield:  
 
• Monthly crop potential evapotranspiration (ETC) (Doorenbos and Pruitt, 1977, 
Allen et al., 1998) 
• Monthly effective rainfall (PE) (USDA-SCS, 1967)   
• Irrigation water withdrawal by month 
 
It has been demonstrated that this method provides reasonable estimates of irrigated 
and rainfed crop area and yield under different spatial scales (as large as the entire YRB 
and as small as one county in Texas, USA).  This model is used in this section at the 
county level to retrieve the crop data and to calculate the WP in the YRB. 
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2.2.2 Results 
Sixty counties have been selected to evaluate the irrigated/rainfed area aggregation.  
Selection was based on the locations of the CLIMWAT stations. We established the GME 
model for each of the sixty counties using the crop and climate data described in the 
previous section.  The percentages of irrigated area to the gross area in the sixty 
counties are 100 percent, 89 percent, 100 percent, and 83 percent for rice, corn, wheat, 
and soybean, respectively, and 94% for all of these crops. The average irrigated crop 
yield for rice, corn, wheat, and soybean are 5.4, 5.3, 3.7, and 1.4 ton/ha, respectively, 
compared to the average rainfed crop yield of 3.0 and 1.4 ton/ha for corn and soybean, 
respectively. Table 2.2.1 shows the average values of irrigated and rainfed area (AI and 
AR) and yield (YI and YR) by sub-basin. 
 
 







Rice 25.3 13.0 12.3 
Corn 540.2 254.3 284.9 
Wheat 1141.0 536.4 597.7 
AI 
(1,000 ha) 
Soybean 149.6 80.6 69.0 
Rice 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Corn 68.8 30.3 37.9 
Wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AR 
(1,000 ha) 
Soybean 30.1 14.3 15.8 
Rice 5.4 5.5 5.3 
Corn 5.3 5.0 5.7 
Wheat 3.7 2.8 4.4 
YI 
(ton/ha) 
Soybean 1.4 1.2 1.7 
Rice 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Corn 3.0 1.9 4.0 
Wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 
YR 
(ton/ha) 
Soybean 1.4 1.0 1.9 
 
The WP values are calculated for irrigated (WPI) and rainfed (WPR) crops for the 
selected 60 counties.  Note that the actual ET for irrigated crops include both effective 
rainfall and irrigation water consumption, and for rainfed crops include effective rainfall 
only. The mean and standard deviation of WPI and WPR for different crops are given in 
Table 2.2.2. 
 
Table 2.2.2 Area-Weighted WPI and WPR for different regions in YRB 
WPI (kg/m3) WPR (kg/m3) 
Region/Crops 
Rice Corn Wheat Soybean Rice Corn Wheat Soybean 
Basin wide 
average 0.50 0.97 1.39 0.26 - 1.09 - 0.41 
standard 
deviation 0.25 0.32 0.51 0.13 - 0.36 - 0.16 
Middle stream 0.49 0.94 1.16 0.26 - 0.68 - 0.28 
standard 
deviation 0.22 0.33 0.49 0.13 - 0.35 - 0.15 
Downstream 0.51 0.99 1.57 0.27 - 1.41 - 0.52 
standard 
deviation 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.12 - 0.33 - 0.12 
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The modeled results from this study mostly fit the ranges from previous studies. The 
average value for WP of rice from Zwart and Bastiaanssen (2004) is 0.6–1.6 kg/m3, and 
the average WP for corn from Zwart and Bastiaanssen (2004) is 1.1–2.7 kg/m3. WPI for 
wheat is similar to that assessed by Zwart and Bastiaanssen (2004). 
 
It is interesting that WPR for corn and soybean are slightly higher than WPI, although 
the variation of the WPR (over the sixty counties) is also higher than the variation of 
WPI.  This implies that from upstream to downstream regions of the YRB, the irrigated 
corn and soybean may not be as efficient as rainfed crops with regard to water 
productivity, but irrigation stabilizes the crop production per unit of water consumption, 
which is expected. 
 
This result is related to the synchronized pattern of precipitation and solar energy in the 
YRB and most of the area in China (Figure 2.2.1).  Reference evapotranspiration (ET0), 
which indicates the solar heat flux in plant growth, moves in concert with precipitation.  
The coincidence of water and radiation provides conditions highly favorable to crop 
growth.  This favorable pattern also explains the fact that a large portion of irrigated 
crops in the YRB belongs to the category of supplementary irrigation, which only uses 
irrigation water as a supplement to effective rainfall for crops during dry periods. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1.  Monthly reference crop evapotranspiration (ET0) and precipitation (PREP) in the YRB 
(multiple-year average) 
 
Using crop area as the weighting factor, the irrigated and rainfed water productivity for 
all crops can be calculated for the 60 selected counties (Figure 2.2.2 and Figure 2.2.3) 
and interpolated to the entire YRB.  One can see that the spatial patterns of WPI and 
WPR differ in the midstream area but are similar in the downstream part of the YRB.  
The values of WPI range from 0.31 to 2.17 kg/m3.  The values of WPR have a wider 
range, from 0.0 to 1.4 kg/m3.  The counties with higher WPR are located at the 
southeastern part of the basin, where the rainfall is relative sufficient.  The maps shown 
in these figures were created by interpolation of the 60-county results.   
 
ET0 PREP 
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Figure 2.2.2:  Basin-wide average WPI for the YRB 
 
 
Figure 2.2.3:  Basin-wide average WPR for the YRB 
 
Figure 2.2.4 assesses the relationship between two ratios throughout the duration of the 
crop growing season: (1) crop water use (actual evapotranspiration, or Ea) to 
precipitation (P) and (2) potential evapotranspiration (Ep) to precipitation (P). Potential 
evapotranspiration is the amount of water that could be evaporated and transpired if 
there was sufficient water available. It incorporates the energy available for evaporation 
and the ability of the lower atmosphere to transport evaporated moisture away from the 
land surface. Values for Ep/P that are below one indicate humidity and limited energy to 
move the moisture away from the land surface; Ep/P ratios greater than one indicate 
relatively dry areas, where potential evapotranspiration is larger than the total rainfall. 
 
In the YRB, about 10 percent of counties are located above the line where 
evapotranspiration and precipitation are equal (Ea/P = 1). In these counties, crop water 
use is in excess of precipitation, which implies a need for irrigation. These counties are 
chiefly located in the northern part of Inner Mongolia for midstream counties and in parts 
of Qinghai province for upstream counties. Most upstream counties in the YRB are 
relatively wet with relatively low potential crop evapotranspiration and are therefore 
located close to the Ep/P = 1 line. 
 
  Objectives CPWF Project Report 
 




















Figure 2.2.4:  Relationship between potential evapotranspiration to precipitation and actual 
evapotranspiration to precipitation 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
To systematically evaluate the spatial pattern of WPI and WPR in the YRB, two more 
maps have been generated. The AI ratio map (Figure 2.2.5) shows that the most 
intensive irrigated area is located in the northwestern part of the midstream basin, 
where several major irrigation districts are located.  The irrigation water requirement is 
computed as ET0 discounted by PE.  The annual irrigation water requirement map 
summed over the months in the crop growth season is shown in Figure 2.2.6, which is 
also created by interpolating the 60 counties’ results.  The spatial pattern of irrigation 
water requirement mostly matches with that of the irrigated area.  The highest irrigation 
water requirement in the northwestern part of the midstream basin is close to 1 meter.   
 
If we compare the result of WPI with these two maps, it is clear that the high WPI values 
have a similar spatial pattern to the AI ratio and irrigated water requirement map. This 
result implies that although the midstream area uses more water for irrigation due to the 
climate characteristics, it also has higher water productivity than the downstream area. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.5: The distribution of the ratio of irrigated area to gross area in the YRB 
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Figure 2.2.6: Irrigation requirement (mm) in the YRB  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
In general, irrigated yields are significantly higher than rainfed yields in the YRB, which 
justifies the large-scale presence of irrigation in the basin. However, rainfed water 
productivity is higher for both maize and soybean in the downstream part of the basin 
and in the midstream part of the basin for soybean as well, given that sufficient 
precipitation is typically available for growing these crops. Efficient water productivity is 
also related to the synchronized pattern of precipitation and solar energy in the YRB, 
supporting rainfed crop development when sufficient precipitation is available. However, 
the standard deviation of rainfed water productivity demonstrates that irrigation 
stabilizes crop production per unit of water consumption, which is valuable given the 
increased incidences of extreme flood and drought events. 
Given the extreme water scarcity in the YRB management and technical solutions need 
to be found to increase water productivity. Further irrigation development is likely limited 
in these areas, specifically in the Loess Plateau located in the midstream region. We 
have also found that water productivity is most sensitive to water availability in the 
upper and middle regions of the basin—in particular, throughout Inner Mongolia—given 
the combination of low precipitation and high temperatures. Reducing irrigation in this 
region would save large amounts of water, but it would also demand that alternative 
rural development strategies be used in its place given how essential irrigation water for 
agricultural production in this area.
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2.3 Institutional Analysis  
This work package described the legal framework for water administration and 
management in the Yellow River Basin. Water allocation principles and mechanisms in 
the basin are described at the national, basin, and local levels. Given the significant 
correlation between access to irrigation and wealth in villages in the YRB, policies and 
institutions affecting irrigated agriculture are examined in detail. Given the growing 
scarcity of water resources in the basin, institutions and economic incentives affecting 
water use are also described and assessed. The research focused on the effectiveness of 
current institutional arrangements regarding water productivity and reducing poverty 
and on institutional reforms that could improve the situation. 
 
2.3.1 Methodology  
We used a variety of methodologies for this work package, including literature reviews, 
econometric analysis of data collected in the past, and stakeholder forums. Detailed 
information on econometric analyses and equations can be found in Wang and Zhang 
(2009). In the following, we provide a brief summary regarding the data and key 
equations. 
The data for come from a survey that CCAP conducted in 51 villages in four irrigation 
districts (IDs) in Ningxia (upstream) and Henan (downstream) in 2001 and 2005. 
Villages were picked in the upper, middle and lower reaches of a canal. Due to different 
water availability in the canal, choosing villages in the upstream and downstream part of 
the ID means that the sample includes villages located both in relatively water-abundant 
and water-scarce regions. Villages were randomly chosen from a census of villages in the 
upper, middle and lower reaches of the canals within the IDs. In total 51 village’ leaders, 
56 water managers, 189 farm households and 378 plots were surveyed. 
In order to explore the relationship between crop water use and irrigation management 
institutions, including incentives, we used the following equation: 
  ijkw =  jkijkijkikij DZI εδβα ++++                (2.3.1) 
where wjk represents average water use per hectare of wheat, maize or rice from the i
th 
plot of  household j in village k.  The rest of the variables are those that explain water 
use: Iijk, our variable of interest, measures the nature of the incentives faced by the 
water manager; Zjk, a matrix of control variables, represents other village, household 
and plot factors that affect water use. Specifically, we included a number of variables to 
hold constant the nature of the village’s production environment and its cropping 
structure. We include variables such as the source of water (either surface or ground), 
the degree of water scarcity, and the level of irrigation investment per hectare to 
measure the production environment. Besides, we included variables reflecting village 
socioeconomic characteristics such as cultivated land per capita, share of labor with 
education above middle schooling, distance to the township, households, share of labor 
working outside, income per capita, and share of lining canals. Household characteristics 
include age and education of the household head and land endowment.  We also add 
four plot characteristics, including measures of: soil types; plot location (distance from 
the plot to the farmer’s house); and whether the crop on the plot is planted in rotation 
with another crop or not (single season equals one, if not). Finally, our model also 
includes Dijk, a dummy variable representing the ID that serves the household. The 
symbols α , β  and δ are parameters to be estimated and jkiε  is the error term that is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables in our initial equations, 
an assumption that we subsequently relax. 
We used the following equation to examine the relationship between water productivity 
(production of per unit of water) and its determinants: 
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ijkP  = ijkijkijkijkijk DZXI εδγβα +++++                 (2.3.2) 
where Pijk represents the water productivity of wheat, maize or rice from the ith plot of 
household j in village k. In equation (2.3.2), water productivity is explained by 
incentives, Iijk, (same definition as equation (2.3.1)), Xijk, which measures agricultural 
inputs, Zijk which holds other factors constant, including characteristics of the production 
environment of the village, household and plot, and the irrigation district dummy, Dijk. In 
addition, we add a variable reflecting production shocks (measured as yield reduction on 
a plot due to floods, droughts or other “disasters”).   
In order to control for the potential endogeneity of incentives in the water use and water 
productivity equations, we adopt an instrumental variable approach.  To do so, prior to 
estimating equation (2.3.1) and (2.3.2), we regressed a set of variables on the incentive 
indicator variable of village, Ik: 
  kI = kkk ZIV εγβα +++                               (2.3.3) 
where the predicted value of Ik from equation (2.3.3) multiplied by the dummy variable 
of incentives of plot, Iijk, results in the predicted value of Iijk. This value would replace Iijk 
in equation (2.3.1) and (2.3.2).  Equation (2.3.3) includes Zk, which are measures the 
other village-level control variables (most of which are the same as those in equation 
2.3.1—e.g., measures of the village’s production environment and cropping structure).     
In addition to irrigation management reform, other socioeconomic factors also influence 
agricultural production, income and poverty.  In order to answer the question of whether 
irrigation management reform affects outcomes, it is necessary to control for these other 
factors. To do so, we specify the link between agricultural production and its 




         (2.3.4) 
where Qijk represents the yields of wheat, maize or rice from the ith plot of household j 
in village k. In equation (2.3.4), yields are explained by the variable of interest, Wijk, 
which measures water use per hectare, Xijk, which measures other inputs to the 
production process, Zijk which holds other factors constant, including characteristics of 
the production environment of the village, household and plot, and the irrigation district 
dummy, Dijk. The control variables of village production environment, household and plot 
characteristics are similar to those of equation (2.3.1) except for the village-level 
cropping structure.  In addition, we add a variable reflecting production shocks 
(measured as yield reduction on a plot due to floods, droughts or other “disasters”).  The 
impact of irrigation management reform is measured through the water use variable.   
We also establish the following equation to examine the relationship between income 




                       (2.3.5) 
where yjk represents total income per capita for household j, and the other variables, 
including Mjk, a measure of incentives, are the same as in equation (2.3.1).  In 
examining the effect of irrigation management reform on poverty, we proceed in largely 
the same way.  Because we are measuring poverty in terms of income, one would use 




- Legal framework for water management 
Due to increased water shortages and environmental problems as a result of rapid 
agricultural and economic growth, China has implemented a range of changes in its legal 
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systems related to water resources starting in the 1980s (Wang and Huang, 2000). In 
1988, the first comprehensive Water Law was issued, which provides the general 
framework and principles for water resources management in China. Three other water 
laws (Soil and Water Conservation Law, Water Pollution Law, Flood Control Law) were 
formulated or revised in the 1990s. In 2002, the 1988 Water Law was revised to 
implement a series of key changes in water management (Ma et al. 2007; Ministry of 
Water Resources 2003). First, river basin management was emphasized by explicitly 
including river-basin management as part of administrative regional level management 
(Art. 12). Second, the new Water Laws placed a strong focus on water savings and 
improved water-use efficiency (Arts. 8/50). In order to strengthen water management, 
the Law asks the central government to take full control over all water resources and to 
allocate quotas for different uses (Art. 47). Moreover, the Government is tasked with 
implementing a system based on permits and fees for water withdrawals (except 
domestic water use and small-scale livestock watering, ponds, and community-owned 
reservoirs) (Arts. 7/48). Third, in water allocation decisions, ecological water use was 
given high priority and equal importance with both industry and agricultural water use 
(Arts. 9/21). The new Water Law also suggests that in arid and semi-arid areas, linkages 
between available natural resources, environmental quality and economic growth are to 
be fully considered (Art. 21). Finally, the law provides details on planning regarding the 
protection of water resources, and the control of water-related conflicts.  
 
In addition to the four water laws, several water management regulations have been 
issued. They mainly cover individual aspects of water management, such as water 
pricing, water rights, the water withdrawal permit system, water resource fees, water 
projects, water finance, water savings, and irrigation district management. 
 
In order to promote the establishment of a water rights system and water rights 
transfer, some relevant regulations were also issued recently. For example, in 2004, the 
MWR issued a Guidance on Water Rights Transfer Demonstration Works in Inner 
Mongolia and Ningxia. In 2005, the MWR formally released some suggestions on water 
right transfers (Ministry of Water Resources, 2006). The MWR also issued a framework 
for the establishment of water right systems in 2005.  
 
Based on the Central Government’s water law and regulations, local governments are 
called upon to develop plans for implementation that reflect the local socioeconomic and 
natural resources conditions. However, implementation has generally been slow. For 
example, details for the implementation of the 2002 Water Law were not issued until 
2006 in most provinces of the YRB (Ministry of Water Resources 2006). The slow pace of 
formulation of provincial-level implementation measures indicates that regional 
authorities either give implementation a low priority or face difficulties to decide on how 
to implement the legislation. Yet another explanation could be that political infighting—
particularly sharp conflicts among various stakeholders over the right to manage water 
resources—and other issues at the sub-provincial levels (i.e., financing difficulties) have 
hindered the promulgation of implementing legislation at the provincial level (Wang and 
Huang 2000).  
 
It is worth noting that the Chinese legal system is mainly dominated by regulations not 
laws. Several of these are temporary and many lack implementing provisions; and most 
are very general, making implementation difficult. Furthermore, several key regulations, 
such as on water resource fee collection methods, have not been issued until 2006 
though the State Council intended to formulate them in the 1980s. 
 
- Administration of water resources 
 
In China, water resources are administered through a nested hierarchical administrative 
system (Wang et al. 2007). The MWR is at the highest central level directly under the 
State Council, with Water Resource Bureaus (WRB) at the provincial, prefecture, and 
Objectives CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 42 
county levels. Water management stations in townships are the lowest level of state 
administration. Water Resource Bureaus at the provincial, prefecture and county levels 
are controlled jointly by the government at the same level and the MWR. Water resource 
bureaus at the sub-national level (including all bureaus under national levels, such as 
provincial, prefectural and county level bureaus).are mainly controlled by the 
government at the same level since it appoints the governors of water resource bureaus 
The MWR provides sub-national water resource bureaus with technical guidance, issues 
water policies, laws and regulations, and allocates some water infrastructure 
investments at the local level, normally a function of the local water resource bureaus. 
 
Irrigation Districts (IDs) were developed to administer water resources that span lower-
level administrative boundaries (Wang and Huang, 2000). Any given ID reports to the 
officials in the WRB that encompasses the district’s entire command area. For example, if 
an ID includes two or more prefectures, it is under the provincial WRB, but if it lies in 
two or more counties within the same prefecture, it is under the control of the 
prefecture’s WRB.  
 
This system of water administration is supplemented by seven river commissions, which 
are administered by the MWR (Wang, et al. 2003). The YRCC and the Huai River Basin 
Commission are old commissions created in the 1930s while the Pearl River Basin 
Commission, the Hai River Basin Commission, the Songliao River Basin Commission and 
the Taihu Lake Commission were all created in the 1980s. They are responsible for 
coordinating water allocation among provinces by implementing the policies of the MWR.  
 
In addition to the administrative system of the MWR, there are several other government 
authorities with direct or indirect water management responsibilities such as bureaus or 
agencies of construction, land resources, environmental protection, energy resources, 
meteorology, and finance (Ministry of Water Resources, 2006). Therefore, given the 
various interests of different government agencies water management in China is highly 
fragmented despite the presence of a specific Ministry with authority on the topic. Faced 
with increasing water shortages in most northern regions and even in some southern 
regions, integrated management of water resources has recently become an important 
target of central government agency reform.  
 
The unclear division of responsibilities among various agencies has created conditions 
that allow management conflicts between rural and urban water uses, between 
managers of surface and groundwater resources, and between water quantity and water 
quality control; this state of things has profoundly challenged the realization of 
integrated water management in China and in the YRB (Wang and Huang 2000; Wang et 
al. 2003). For example, surface water and rural groundwater is administrated by the 
MWR, while urban groundwater is administrated by the Ministry of Construction and 
groundwater used for mining is governed by the Ministry of Land Resources (MLR). 
Water pollution control is the responsibility of the State Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA), including inspections and fee collection, while the Ministry of Construction 
inspects wastewater treatment facilities and collects wastewater disposal charges. 
However, the MWR is in charge of management of sewage or polluted water in rivers. 
Both the MWR and the SEPA monitor water pollution in surface and groundwater 
resources, but the MLR also takes part in groundwater monitoring. Management conflicts 
over hydropower between the MWR and the Ministry of Energy Resources (MER) are 
another example of management friction. As a result of such conflicts, the MWR and the 
MER have been divided and merged several times. 
 
Water management conflicts within the vertical administrative system (from central to 
local governments) and across the horizontal local government system are important 
constraints to integrated management both at the national and YRB level (Wang et al. 
2003). Maximizing local revenue and economic growth subject to a certain level of grain 
self-sufficiency in the region is the major objective of local governments. In another 
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word, after ensuring a certain level of grain self-sufficiency, the major objective of local 
governments is to maximize local revenue and economic growth. This objective has 
influenced the decisions of local water resource bureaus regarding water allocation 
among sectors, as well as the efforts of local governments toward investments and 
water activities. As a result, the regional distribution allocation of water resources to 
industry and agriculture is often not consistent with national plans or relative 
profitability. 
 
-  Institutional arrangements for water allocation in the YRB 
 
Water allocation across provinces 
Before the implementation of the Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR), water users 
across the basin could freely draw water from this then “open-access resource” (Ma et 
al., 2007; Wang, 2007). Regional water use was simply determined by water withdrawal 
capacities. Open-access entails a high risk of resources degradation. To satisfy rapidly 
growing water demands, provinces along the Yellow River constructed a large number of 
water withdrawal facilities. From the 1950s to the 1990s, water consumption of the 
Yellow River increased by 150 percent. As a result of poor management and low water-
use efficiency, river waters trickled to a standstill in the lower end of the basin since the 
early 1990s(Wang et al. 2003). Water use per capita and as a share of GDP in the four 
upstream provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia were much higher 
than in the downstream provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong. Due to 
geographical constraints, it was particularly difficult to get water in Shanxi, where per 
capita water use and water use as a share of GDP was less than 200 cubic meters and 
400 cubic meters, respectively. In Ningxia these figures were more than 1,500 cubic 
meters and 400 cubic meters, respectively. 
 
Increasing depletion of Yellow River water resources, particularly, long-term flow cutoffs 
in the downstream reaches, had attracted serious attention from the Central 
Government and the State Council. In December 1998, the State Council, the State 
Planning Commission, and the MWR jointly issued the Annual Allocation and Main River 
Water Quantity Controlling Programme for the Yellow River, authorizing the YRCC to 
exert integrated control of Yellow River waters, through the UWFR. UWFR allocates water 
across provinces based on quotas that had been defined in 1987, amounting to a total of 
37 BCM (Table 2.3.1). Compared to an average of 126 days in which the river flow to the 
Sea was cut off during 1995 to 1998, flow at Lijin Station was cut off only for 8 days 
between 1999 and 2000, and since 2000, river flow has not been interrupted anymore.  
 
Table 2.3.1. Water allocation agreement of 1987 and actual withdrawals, 1998 and 2008 (BCM). 
2008 1998 













Qinghai 1.41 1.86 1.47 0.39 1.92 1.63 0.29 
Sichuan 0.04 0.03 0.03 - 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Gansu 3.04 4.44 3.80 0.64 4.15 3.53 0.62 
Ningxia 4.00 7.63 7.12 0.51 9.68 9.14 0.54 
Inner Mongolia 5.86 9.37 6.97 2.40 9.26 7.30 1.96 
Shaanxi 3.80 6.27 3.22 3.05 5.51 2.42 3.09 
Shanxi 4.31 4.14 1.70 2.44 3.64 1.18 2.46 
Henan 5.54 6.63 4.20 2.43 5.77 3.34 2.43 
Shandong 7.00 7.99 7.07 0.92 9.77 8.46 1.32 
Hebei/Tianjin 2.00 0.73 0.73 na na na na 
Total 37.00 49.10 36.31 12.78 49.71 37.00 12.71 
* UWFR: Unified water flow regulation (enforced since 1999). Source: YRCC (2005). 
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However, the UWFR has received criticism. To date, the downstream regions have not 
had to pay compensation for the incremental units of water that they have received as a 
result of water cuts to upstream users. Moreover, because water sales in the upstream 
regions have fallen, upstream IDs are beginning to experience declines in revenues. In 
interviews during 2001, we were told that a significant amount of maintenance would 
have to be delayed or cancelled because of the revenue shortfall. If such practices 
continue and become more severe, the entire irrigation system could suffer serious 
damage.  
 
In response, upstream water suppliers have demanded to increase prices for water to 
maintain revenues. Although initially there was some opposition by the central 
government, after the introduction of the YRB water allocation program, water prices in 
the upstream areas were allowed to rise. For example, Ningxia doubled the price of 
water in agriculture from 0.006 Yuan/m3 (equivalent to US$0.0009/m3) to 0.012 
Yuan/m3 (US$ 0.002/m3) in 2000 (Wang et al. 2003).  As a result of higher water fees, 
the water authorities have regained some of their lost revenues.  
 
Uncompensated water transfers between poorer provinces to more well-off provinces can 
have important impacts on the poor (Wang et al. 2003). Re-allocations to date have 
occurred between the relatively worse-off upstream provinces of Ningxia and Gansu to 
richer provinces, such as Shandong. Most likely, the shift of water access away from 
upstream provinces will have a negative effect on some producers in the ID and (as 
discussed above) could adversely affect the operation and future effectiveness of 
irrigation itself.  Given the scarcity of water resources in the YRB and the lack of 
compensation for transferring water to better-off downstream users, tensions and 
conflicts among water stakeholders have risen.  
 
Although YRCC is authorized by the State Council to control the Yellow River water 
resources, YRCC is not a first-tier government agency. The water law does not clearly 
define the powers of YRCC for administrative enforcement, supervision, and punishment, 
and the relationship between the YRCC and local governments remains unclear. 
Integrated management of the Yellow River water is made more difficult by the fact that 
water-control policies are relatively new. Further, the Yellow River Water Quantity 
Control Management Method does not have detailed implementing regulations. In 
addition, the water control plan has hardly been implemented; detailed plans for 
implementation are therefore urgently needed. Currently, the YRCC has only conducted 
integrated control for two main river reaches: from Liujiaxia Reservoir to Toudaoguai and 
from Sanmenxia Reservoir to Lijin gauge; and since 2006 YRCC has also implemented 
control on two tributaries; however, other sections remain without integrated 
management.  
 
Water Allocation within Provinces 
Generally, the upper-level water resources bureaus, at the provincial and prefecture 
levels, prepare annual water allocation plans for lower-level regions and then submit 
them for approval to the local governments (Wang et al. 2003). Before formulating 
water allocation plans, water resources bureaus at upper levels will solicit opinions on 
water requirements from the water management agencies at the lower levels. Opinions 
on water allocation from lower-level water management agencies are the foundation of 
water allocation plans and are then adjusted and coordinated by upper-level water 
management agencies according to the overall water supply and demand situation. After 
the local government approves the water allocation plan, the allocation plan will be sent 
to lower-level governments to be implemented. Last year’s water supply and demand 
situations and the current year’s water demand are important parameters for the 
formulation of water allocation plans. Because water supply in the current year cannot 
be predicted with great certainty and some water use sectors will not be satisfied with 
the water allocation plan, conflicts among various water use departments tend to arise 
and plans tend to be adjusted.  
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While water resources bureaus at the upper level coordinate and decide on water 
allocation between upstream and downstream water users within their administrative 
boundaries, actual water allocation decisions are made by the upstream local 
government and downstream water users have little power to influence these allocation 
decisions (In China, there are both vertical and horizontal management systems, vertical 
relates to various levels of water resource bureaus, horizontal relates to the local 
management system (including water and other sector’s management, in each 
administrative level, such as at province level, provincial water resources bureau not 
only need to follow the regulation of the Ministry of Water Resources, but also need to 
follow the management of the local provincial government that is in charge of all 
bureaus’ management within the province). Furthermore, higher-level government 
agencies have limited influence on lower-level agencies in actually implementing water 
allocation plans, as relationships are mainly technical, not administrative. When water 
conflicts occur, the water resources agency at the upper level will try to mediate. If the 
problem still cannot be resolved, then the local government that is in charge of all 
bureaus’ management will intervene. For serious conflicts, local or higher-level courts 
will be called upon. 
 
Water Allocation within Irrigation Districts 
Water allocation at the main or first-level canals and the second-level canals within a 
province’s ID are controlled by one of the following government agencies—the provincial, 
prefectural or county’s water resources bureau—depending on the size and reach of the 
ID. By regulation, the general principle for water allocation is to give the first priority to 
downstream users, lift irrigation (vs. gravity irrigation), the canal’s high off-takes 
(versus the lower off-takes), agriculture (versus forestry), more vulnerable groups, and 
large consolidated tracts of land (versus fragmented land).  
 
Irrigation water is allocated based on water quotas. The water quota differs by crop 
type, the availability of water supply, delivery efficiency of the surface water system, the 
location in the canal, and rainfall, climatic, soil, and other local characteristics that 
influence the crop water demand. The purpose of the water quota is to provide IDs with 
a way to allocate water and limit the over-exploitation of an area’s water resources.  
Provincial regulations, for example, for Ningxia, stipulate that officials are supposed to 
send more water to downstream regions and give priority to vulnerable groups, such as 
the poor. The actual record shows, however, that implementation of the regulations is 
spotty. Officials in some areas follow the downstream first rule; while those in other 
areas do not. Moreover, we have found no evidence, on a district-wide scale that water 
officials purposely give priority to the poor. 
 
Water Allocation within the Village Level 
Water allocation at the village level has evolved as a result of a complex set of 
characteristics of the village, the nature of its water resources and local cropping 
patterns. It chiefly follows three approaches--equity, efficiency and payment capacity. 
Based on a survey of 51 irrigating villages in Ningxia and Henan provinces, we found 
that 13 percent of sample villages use the equity method, where water is first provided 
to the tailenders. Irrigating the nearest fields first is the physically most efficient way as 
it reduces delivery losses to allocate water. Interestingly, despite the emphasis of IDs on 
equity, a much greater number of villages (70 percent) claim they use the efficiency 
method of water allocation. Finally, some villages use other methods based on the 
payment order. A mere 2 percent of villages provide water on a first pay, first serve 
basis. The remainder of the villages has no established rules. 
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- Irrigation Management Reform--Econometric results 
Based on our field surveys, after upper-level officials began implementing the reforms, 
three main management systems emerged for surface waters. If the village leadership 
through the village committee directly takes responsibility for water allocation, canal 
operation maintenance (O&M) and fee collection, the village’s irrigation system is said to 
be run by collective management; this is the system that essentially has allocated water 
in most of China’s villages during the People’s Republic period. The alternative is a water 
user association (WUA). This is theoretically a farmer-based, participatory organization 
that is set up to manage the village’s irrigation water. In WUAs a member-elected board 
is supposed to be assigned the control rights over the village’s water. In the third 
system, defined as Contracting, the village leadership establishes a contract with an 
individual to manage the village’s water.  
 
According to our data, since the early 1990s and especially after 1995, reform has 
successively established WUAs and Contracting in place of collective management (Table 
2.3.2). The share of collective management declined from 91 percent in 1990 to 49 
percent in 2004 (column 5). Across our sample, contracting has developed more rapidly 
than WUAs. By 2004, 30 percent of villages managed their water under contracting and 
21 percent through WUAs. Assuming the results from our sample reflect the more 
general trends across north China, the somewhat more rapid emergence of contracting 
may be due to the ease of setting the system up and the similarities of the reforms to 
the other reforms that have unfolded in rural China (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). 
 
Table 2.3.2.    Surface irrigation management in the sample villages, in the four selected irrigation 
districts, Ningxia and Henan Province, 1990 – 2004 
 
Ningxia  Henan   
Weining ID Qingtongxia ID  People’s Victory ID Liyuankou ID  
Total 
1990    (percent)    
Collective 100 81  100 100  91 
WUA 0 5  0 0  3 
 Contracting 0 14  0 0  6 
1995        
Collective 100 72  100 100  87 
WUA 0 10  0 0  6 
  Contracting 0 18  0 0  7 
2001        
collective 27 51  92 100  64 
WUA 50 14  0 0  14 
  Contracting 23 35  8 0  22 
2004        
Collective 25 29  89 100  49 
WUA 38 29  0 0  21 
 Contracting 38 42  11 0  30 
Data source: Authors’ survey 
 
The dramatic differences in type of irrigation management between Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces suggest that upper level government policy may be playing an important role. 
In 2000, in order to promote water management reform, Ningxia provincial water 
officials issued several documents that encouraged localities to proceed with water 
management reform (Wang, 2002). Regional water officials exerted considerable effort 
to promote water management reform in a number of experimental areas. However, 
while there were changes in name, in most cases (85 percent of the WUAs), the 
governing board of the WUA was the village leadership itself. 
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More importantly are the incentives provided to water managers, which are directly 
connected to water fee payments. Water fees collected from farmers include two parts: 
basic water fees per mu (0.067 ha) associated with total cropland in the village and 
volumetric water fees associated with the volume of water used. The basic water fee is 
determined by dividing the total water fee for the village by the total land area; this fee 
is then proportionally allocated to farmers based on their specific holdings. Prior to the 
farming year, ID officials determine (on the basis of historic use patterns and other 
criteria) a targeted amount of water that a village should use (called the target 
quantity). Based on a per cubic meter charge, the total value of the expected water use 
for the village is then divided by the village’s total quantity of land and this volumetric 
water fee is added to the basic water fee to create the farmer’s total water fee. As can 
be seen, the volumetric water fee also provides the farmer no incentives to save water 
since he pays a fixed fee for each hectare of land. The water manager in some 
communities, in contrast, does have an incentive. In implementing water management 
reform ID officials agree that the water manager only has to pay the per cubic meter 
charge for the water that is actually used (actual quantity). If the actual quantity of 
water delivered to the village (at the request of the water manager) is less than the 
targeted quantity, the difference between the volumetric fee that is collected from the 
farmers and that which he pays for the water is his excess profit. The excess profit is an 
amount that is earned by the manager beyond the fixed payment and is what we call the 
incentive. For example, in 2004, on average, leaders in only 46 percent of villages 
offered WUAs and contracting (or non-collective) managers with incentives that could be 
expected to induce managers to exert effort to save water for additional income.  
 
We find that water use for wheat and maize is lower in the villages that have established 
incentives mechanisms compared to villages without incentives, but higher for rice with 
incentives compared to previous irrigation management (collective). 
 
Table 2.3.3     Incentives, water use and water productivity in the sample irrigation districts, 
Ningxia and Henan Province 
 
  Non-collective with incentives Non-collective without incentives Collective 
Water use (m3/ha)    
      Wheat 5484 6794 4990 
      Maize 6622 8006 7112 
      Rice 28012 32237 23378 
Water Productivity (kg/m3)    
      Wheat 1.00 0.80 1.50 
      Maize 1.36 1.05 1.33 
      Rice 0.30 0.31 0.50 
Data source: Authors' survey 
 
Based on multivariate econometric analysis, we find that after holding constant other 
factors, households that are in villages with a high share of canal lining use less water 
per hectare for wheat and maize. We also find that those villages with a higher share of 
rice use less water for wheat and maize per hectare, as most water was allocated to rice, 
and water productivity for other crops therefore increases (Table 2.3.4). Moreover, our 
results show that when officials provide water managers with incentives, without regard 
to whether they shifted to WUA or contract management, managers appear to reduce 
water deliveries for wheat in the village. In other words, without regard to the form of 
the water management institution, if managers face positive incentives, water use per 
hectare of wheat can be reduced by nearly 1,000 cubic meters, about 20 percent of their 
typical water use. 
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Table 2.3.4   Regression analysis of the determinants of crop water use at the plot level 
 
 Water use per hectare 
 OLS 
  Wheat Maize Rice 
Irrigation management institutions    
      If non-collective with incentives -1,186 -7376 -5,552 
 (3.12)*** (1.19) (1.17) 
      If non-collective without incentives -3642 -3532 -5,463 
 (1.17) (0.70) (1.44) 
Production environment    
     Share of village irrigated area serviced by surface 
water (%) 
15.736 28.619 19.233 
 (2.58)** (1.57) (0.24) 
     Village water scarcity indicator variable  -424 -70 -9,606 
            (1=yes; 2=no) (1.55) (0.15) (3.14)*** 
     Value per hectare of accumulated investment into 
village irrigation infrastructure (yuan/ha) 
0.062 0.032 -1.273 
               (2.39)** (0.74) (2.06)** 
Cropping structure    
      Share of sown area in rice (%) -24.666 -38.365 27.042 
 (3.48)*** (2.80)*** (0.36) 
Village characteristics    
      Cultivated land per capita (ha) -795 -7,912 -52,082 
 (0.26) (1.44) (1.79)* 
      Share of labor with education above middle 
schooling (%) 
1.338 22.679 -20.421 
 (0.24) (2.34)** (0.35) 
      Distance to township (km) 47.884 140.503 -445.785 
 (1.40) (2.44)** (1.24) 
      Households 2.657 4.187 15.675 
 (3.44)*** (2.72)*** (1.85)* 
      Share of labor working outside (%) 1.914 -33.737 -189.636 
 (0.21) (2.23)** (1.93)* 
      Log of income per capita 223 1,549 -436 
 (0.67) (2.28)** (0.13) 
      Share of lining canals (%) -22.400 -28.080 19.445 
 (4.78)*** (2.89)*** (0.47) 
Household characteristics    
Age of household head -6.224 -127.5 1,661 
       (0.07) (0.77) (2.01)** 
Age of household head, squared -0.216 0.942 -20.336 
 (0.24) (0.55) (2.25)** 
      Education of household head -48.385 -160.581 -720 
 (1.31) (2.41)** (1.94)* 
      Farm size (ha/household) -311 967 -1,094 
 (0.89) (1.55) (0.34) 
Plot characteristics    
Loam soil (1=yes; 0=no) 169.496 -79.185 351.363 
 (0.56) (0.15) (0.12) 
Clay soil (1=yes; 0=no) -126.425 -451.128 -204.508 
 (0.47) (0.95) (0.07) 
Distance to home (km) -259.910 177.667 -813.347 
 (1.30) (0.43) (0.57) 
Single crop (1=yes; 0=double cropping) 1,103 442 -2,287 
 (2.53)** (0.71) (0.20) 
ID Dummy -- -- -- 
Constant 3,193 -5,501 -1,137 
 (1.03) (0.84) (0.04) 
Observations 432 334 194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.40 0.37 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
The econometric analysis results also show that the water productivity of wheat will be 
increased if reform with incentives have been implemented (Table 2.3.6, column 1). The 
coefficient on the incentives indicator variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
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level. This shows that after holding constant other factors, if water managers face 
incentives during the management reform, wheat production of per unit water can be 
increased by 0.25 kg. In our sample areas, the average water use per hectare is about 
5,500 cubic meter. When putting the predicted value of the incentives indicator into the 
water use model and water productivity equation described in the methodology section 
our results change little and largely support the findings from the OLS model (Table 
2.3.5 and 2.3.7). For example, compared with OLS estimation, the t statistic of the 
estimated coefficient on the incentive variable in wheat water use actually declines (row 
1). However, the magnitude of the coefficient also suggests that the savings from 
providing incentives are large. Holding other variables constant, in the villages in which 
leaders offer managers positive incentives, water use declines 1122 cubic meter per 
hectare, even higher than the result from the OLS model (Table 2.3.5). 
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Table 2.3.5   Regression analysis of the determinants of crop water use at the plot level 
 
 Water use per hectare 
 2SLS 
  Wheat Maize Rice 
Irrigation management institutions    
      If non-collective with incentives -1,118 -29 3,068 
 (2.71)*** (0.04) (0.75) 
      If non-collective without incentives 119 960 1,816 
 (0.25) (1.29) (0.40) 
Production environment    
     Share of village irrigated area serviced by surface 
water (%) 
14.231 23.006 -29.618 
 (2.37)** (1.27) (0.40) 
     Village water scarcity indicator variable  -470 -152 -9,932 
                         (1=yes; 2=no) (1.69)* (0.32) (3.28)*** 
     Value per hectare of accumulated investment into 
village irrigation infrastructure (yuan/ha) 
0.068 0.024 -1.456 
               (2.52)** (0.54) (2.13)** 
Cropping structure    
      Share of sown area in rice (%) -26.543 -43.762 19.685 
 (3.78)*** (3.24)*** (0.26) 
Village characteristics    
      Cultivated land per capita (ha) -606 -8,070 -74,035 
 (0.19) (1.36) (2.27)** 
      Share of labor with education above middle 
schooling (%) 
2.025 25.936 -0.741 
 (0.37) (2.69)*** (0.01) 
      Distance to township (km) 59.045 165.580 -644.714 
 (1.64) (2.72)*** (1.54) 
      Households 2.552 3.115 13.410 
 (3.28)*** (1.99)** (1.52) 
      Share of labor working outside (%) 2.375 -22.496 -152.650 
 (0.25) (1.39) (1.58) 
      Log of income per capita 168 1,681 13.536 
 (0.49) (2.46)** (0.00) 
      Share of lining canals (%) -22.471 -23.763 41.699 
 (4.78)*** (2.40)** (0.97) 
Household characteristics    
Age of household head -7.150 -149.964 1,545 
       (0.08) (0.91) (1.85)* 
Age of household head, squared -0.180 1.192 -19.114 
 (0.20) (0.69) (2.10)** 
      Education of household head -47.508 -160.153 -744.060 
 (1.29) (2.41)** (2.00)** 
      Farm size (ha/household) -490 827 -1,247 
 (1.39) (1.33) (0.38) 
Plot characteristics    
Loam soil (1=yes; 0=no) 187 -106 -778 
 (0.62) (0.20) (0.25) 
Clay soil (1=yes; 0=no) -138 -547 -1,417 
 (0.51) (1.15) (0.50) 
Distance to home (km) -244 209 -589 
 (1.22) (0.51) (0.41) 
Single crop (1=yes; 0=double cropping) 1,106 449 -2,734 
 (2.53)** (0.73) (0.24) 
ID Dummy -- -- -- 
Constant 3,632 -5,776 1,670 
 (1.16) (0.88) (0.06) 
Observations 432 334 194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.40 0.36 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses    
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Table 2.3.6   Regression analysis of the determinants of water productivity at the plot level 
 
 Water productivity (kg/m3) 
 OLS 
  Wheat Maize Rice 
Irrigation management institutions    
      If non-collective with incentives 0.220 0.269 0.046 
 (2.11)** (1.36) (0.56) 
      If non-collective without incentives -0.082 -0.032 0.034 
 (0.85) (0.17) (0.42) 
Production inputs    
Log of labor use per hectare -0.117 -0.138 0.025 
 (2.29)** (0.97) (0.61) 
Log of fertilizer use per hectare -0.043 0.043 0.009 
 (0.47) (0.27) (0.19) 
Log of value of other inputs per hectare 0.029 -0.275 -0.063 
 (0.39) (2.07)** (0.99) 
Production environment    
     Share of village irrigated area serviced by surface 
water (%) 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.76)* (0.14) (0.72) 
     Village water scarcity indicator variable  0.201 0.380 0.076 
                         (1=yes; 2=no) (2.45)** (2.26)** (1.20) 
     Value per hectare of accumulated investment into 
village irrigation infrastructure (yuan/ha) 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Household characteristics (0.95) (0.73) (1.17) 
Age of household head 0.003 0.087 0.009 
       (0.09) (1.32) (0.48) 
Age of household head, squared 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.36) (1.07) (0.43) 
      Education of household head 0.014 0.048 0.008 
 (1.20) (1.83)* (1.01) 
Plot characteristics    
Loam soil (1=yes; 0=no) 0.044 0.075 0.093 
 (0.45) (0.35) (1.40) 
Clay soil (1=yes; 0=no) -0.020 -0.079 -0.017 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.29) 
Distance to home (km) 0.082 -0.021 0.034 
 (1.29) (0.13) (1.05) 
Single crop (1=yes; 0=double cropping) -0.294 0.486 0.832 
 (2.10)** (1.93)* (3.15)*** 
Production shocks    
Yield reduction due to production shocks (%) -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 
 (3.73)*** (1.46) (0.36) 
ID Dummy -- -- -- 
Constant 2.134 2.048 0.302 
 (2.04)** (0.98) (0.45) 
Observations 432 334 194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.10 0.42 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses    
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Table 2.3.7   Regression analysis of the determinants of water productivity at the plot level 
 
 Water productivity (kg/m3) 
 2SLS 
  Wheat Maize Rice 
Irrigation management institutions    
      If non-collective with incentives 0.222 0.233 0.039 
 (1.97)** (1.10) (0.57) 
      If non-collective without incentives -0.141 -0.359 0.013 
 (1.04) (1.49) (0.14) 
Production inputs    
Log of labor use per hectare -0.121 -0.130 0.024 
 (2.37)** (0.91) (0.60) 
Log of fertilizer use per hectare -0.058 0.066 0.007 
 (0.64) (0.42) (0.13) 
Log of value of other inputs per hectare 0.038 -0.245 -0.060 
 (0.50) (1.83)* (0.95) 
Production environment    
     Share of village irrigated area serviced by surface 
water (%) 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.83)* (0.08) (0.56) 
     Village water scarcity indicator variable  0.203 0.377 0.081 
                         (1=yes; 2=no) (2.46)** (2.25)** (1.32) 
     Value per hectare of accumulated investment into 
village irrigation infrastructure (yuan/ha) 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Household characteristics (1.03) (0.84) (1.04) 
Age of household head 0.002 0.091 0.009 
       (0.08) (1.38) (0.48) 
Age of household head, squared 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.37) (1.14) (0.45) 
      Education of household head 0.013 0.045 0.009 
 (1.08) (1.70)* (1.04) 
Plot characteristics    
Loam soil (1=yes; 0=no) 0.031 0.075 0.093 
 (0.31) (0.35) (1.38) 
Clay soil (1=yes; 0=no) -0.012 -0.027 -0.017 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.28) 
Distance to home (km) 0.085 -0.030 0.030 
 (1.34) (0.19) (0.95) 
Single crop (1=yes; 0=double cropping) -0.296 0.460 0.830 
 (2.11)** (1.82)* (3.14)*** 
Production shocks    
Yield reduction due to production shocks (%) -0.010 -0.008 -0.001 
 (3.50)*** (1.43) (0.31) 
ID Dummy -- -- -- 
Constant 2.205 1.540 0.306 
 (2.11)** (0.73) (0.46) 
Observations 432 334 194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.10 0.42 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
Descriptive statistics from our data show that water management reform with incentives 
negatively influences the yields of wheat and rice (Table 2.3.8, rows 1 and 3). Compared 
with villages without incentives, in the villages that provide incentives to managers to 
save water, wheat yields decline by nearly 11 percent. However, farmer incomes do not 
seem to be affected (rows 4 and 5). Part of the explanation for the difference between 
yields and income may be due to the fact that water fees also fall in villages that have 
reformed. Another explanation is that farmers are shifting to other sources of income in 
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Table 2.3.8  Incentives, production, income and poverty in the sample irrigation districts, Ningxia 
and Henan Province. 





Wheat yield (kg/ha) 4310 4716 4880 
Maize yield (kg/ha) 6272 6064 5669 
Rice yield (kg/ha) 6578 7337 6836 
Income (yuan) 3403 2959 2247 
Share of household below poverty line (%) 7.32 5.32 7.43 
Data source: Authors' survey 
 
Similar results also can be found in the poverty model (Table 2.3.9). We measure 
poverty status based on whether or not the poverty line has been crossed. Our results 
say that there is no effect of a village’s decision to provide water managers with 
incentives on a household poverty status. If universally true, such a finding would be 
important, since critics of water management reforms often point out that one possible 
adverse consequence of using incentives to induce water reform is that managers may 
cut back on water deliveries to marginal users, who may also be those on the poorest 
land. Our results here, however, should be interpreted with caution. We have not 
identified what may be behind this result. In many villages, leaders have specified strict 
rules in the agreements with water managers that they cannot exclude households from 
water allocation schedules. In short, while interesting, we believe our current results 
may be more important as raising awareness of possible associations rather than as 
definitive. Future research should try to pinpoint the source of this effect and use larger 
data sets to strengthen our understanding of these issues. 
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Table 2.3.9.  Regression analysis of the determinants of poverty 
 
 Dummy of poverty 
  OLS 2SLS 
Water management institutions   
      If non-collective with incentives 0.471 0.226 
 (1.24) (0.66) 
Production environment   
-0.000 0.001      Share of village irrigated area serviced by surface 
water (%) (0.02) (0.15) 
     Village water scarcity indicator variable  0.562 0.513 
       (1=yes; 2=no) (1.90)* (1.77)* 
      Value per hectare of accumulated investment into 
village irrigation infrastructure (Yuan/ha) 
-0.000 -0.000 
               (0.35) (0.31) 
Cropping structure   
      Share of sown area in rice (%) -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.69) (0.45) 
Household characteristics   
      Age of household head 0.075 0.061 
 (0.64) (0.53) 
      Age of household head, squared -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.77) (0.67) 
      Education of household head -0.064 -0.060 
 (1.55) (1.47) 
      Farm size (ha/household) -1.232 -1.094 
 (2.51)** (2.35)** 
Share of no-farm labor (%) -0.017 -0.017 
 (2.29)** (2.29)** 
Share of no-farm income (%) -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.95) (1.01) 
Assets used in agricultural production per capita -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.19)** (2.11)** 
Number of plots per household 0.016 0.023 
 (0.54) (0.79) 
Production shocks   
Yield reduction due to production shocks (%) 0.018 0.018 
 (2.40)** (2.43)** 
ID Dummy -- -- 
Constant -1.315 -1.145 
 (0.51) (0.44) 
Observations 378 378 




Given the scarcity of water resources in the Yellow River Basin and the lack of 
compensation for transferring water to more well-off downstream users, tensions and 
conflicts among water stakeholders have risen. Although YRCC is authorized by the State 
Council to control the Yellow River water resources, YRCC is not a first-tier government 
agency.  The water law does not clearly define the powers of administrative 
enforcement, supervision, and punishment of YRCC and the relationship between the 
YRCC and local governments remains unclear.  Integrated management of the Yellow 
River water is faced with many difficulties, particularly given the fact that water control 
is new and no ready-made river control standard can be followed.  Further, the Yellow 
River Water Quantity Control Management Method does not have detailed implementing 
regulations; and many aspects of reservoir control application regulations of hydropower 
stations are at odds with the Yellow River Water Quantity Control plan.  In addition, the 
water control plan has hardly been implemented; detailed plans for implementation of 
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the Yellow River Water Quantity Control are therefore urgently needed.  Currently, the 
YRCC has only conducted integrated control for two main river reaches: from Liujiaxia 
Reservoir to Toudaoguai and from Sanmenxia Reservoir to Lijin gauge; other sections 
remain without integrated management. 
Uncompensated water transfers from poorer provinces to more well-off provinces can 
have important impacts on the poor.  Re-allocations to date have occurred between the 
relatively worse-off upstream provinces of Ningxia and Gansu to richer provinces, such 
as Shandong.  Most likely, the shift of water access away from upstream provinces will 
have a negative effect on some producers in the ID and (as discussed above) could 
adversely affect the operation and future effectiveness of the ID itself.  To mitigate these 
negative effects, central government leaders should estimate the value of compensation 
to be paid and implement compensation. 
Econometric research results show that since 1990, and especially after 1995, collective 
management has been replaced by non-collective management, including WUAs or 
contracting. In some regions, non-collective management forms even have become the 
dominant pattern. Innovation of irrigation management reflects many stakeholders’ 
interests, such as upper and local governments, village leaders and farmers, in 
particular, policy makers’ intervention in the reform seems to play an important role.  
Designing the reform is one issue, implementing is another issue. Even though the 
reform has been designed well, effectively implementing the reform seems to be out of 
policy makers’ control and should be highly emphasized. The major difference between 
non-collective and collective management is the incentives faced by managers. The need 
of effective incentives is one of our key results. Research shows that if managers are 
provided with positive incentives to earn money by saving water, they will try to improve 
irrigation management, and water delivered to farmers will be significantly reduced. 
More importantly, our analysis found that even if irrigation management with incentives 
reduces water use and increases water productivity, with negative impacts on wheat 
production, both income and poverty are not be negatively influenced. Although this 
result need to be further explored in the long term, at least in the short term, it appears 
that farm incomes are not affected by reduced water availability.  
Overall, we propose that the Government should continue to support the irrigation 
management reform. However, different from the beginning stage, more emphasis 
should be put on the effective implementation of the reform. Although the negative 
impact on farmers have not been identified at this point, in the long term, the 
government still need to focus on this issue and take some measures to promote the 
healthy development of water reform.  
Another important issue is to identify how much water should be saved through the 
irrigation management reform and how this water can be most effectively re-allocated to 
those uses that have the highest overall benefit to the basin economy and ecology.  
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2.4 Water Poverty Analysis 
 
2.4.1 Methods 
Three types of poverty estimates have been measured for the Yellow River Basin: the 
headcount index, or poverty incidence (P0); the poverty gap index, or poverty depth 
(P1); and the distribution-sensitive poverty index, or poverty severity (P2). The 
headcount index (P0) shows the proportion of the poor population to the total 
population. It is a simple poverty measure and its interpretation is straightforward. 
However, this measure is insensitive to the depth of poverty, which the poverty gap 
index (P1) takes into account. The poverty gap is an estimate of the income (or 
expenditure) that would be required to bring every individual up to the poverty 
threshold. A reduction in the income of any poor individual would increase the poverty 
gap (and vice versa), but the poverty head count would remain unchanged. But the 
poverty gap index is insensitive to the redistribution of income among the poor. As the 
name indicates, the distribution-sensitive poverty measure (P2) is sensitive to the 
reallocation of income among the poor. This poverty measure decreases if income is 
transferred from a poor individual to a poorer individual (and vice versa). 
All three poverty measures are members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class 
(Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984), which may be expressed as 
  (Eq 2.6.1) 
where z denotes the poverty line, α is a measure of the sensitivity of the index to 
poverty, the income (or consumption expenditure) per capita for the ith person’s 
household is xi in a population N, and the poverty gap for individual i is Gi = z – xi (with 
Gi = 0 when xi > z). The head-count index P0 is obtained when α = 0; when α = 1, the 
index is the poverty gap index P1, and when α is set equal to 2, P2   is the squared 
poverty gap or poverty severity index.  
The poverty profile also provides estimates of inequality in income and land distribution 
in the YRB using the Gini coefficient; the most widely used single measure of inequality. 
It is based on the Lorenz curve, a cumulative frequency curve that compares the 
distribution of a specific variable (for example, income) with the uniform distribution that 
represents equality. For measuring the inequality in income distribution, the Gini 
coefficient can be estimated from the cumulative percentage of households (from poor to 
rich) on the horizontal (X) axis and the cumulative percentage of income on the vertical 
(Y) axis of the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient is then defined as 
(Eq 2.6.2) 
 
where xi is a point on the X-axis and yi is a point on the Y-axis. When there are N equal 
intervals on the X-axis the equation simplifies to 
 (Eq 2.6.3) 
For estimating poverty in the YRB, we used the latest international poverty line of 
US$1.25 per day, measured at the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate with 
2005 as the base year. The 2005 PPP exchange for China is 3.4 yuan per US$1.00.    
We used income data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China for analyzing poverty and 
inequality in the YRB. Because we used the PPP exchange rate with 2005 as the base 
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year, we adjusted per capita income data from the 2001 survey for inflation using the 
consumer price index (CPI) for China, with the base year 2005 = 100.  
The HIES data set used for the analyses represents the rural communities and 
households only in the YRB. This partial data set included 5,085 households in nine 
provinces belonging to the YRB. We also used 1951-2000 average rainfall data from 83 
out of 90 counties in the YRB.    
In addition to poverty measures, determinants of poverty need to be assessed. There 
are two main approaches to modeling the determinants of poverty in a multivariate 
regression framework. The first approach seeks to explain the level of household income 
(or consumption expenditure) per capita—the dependent variable—as a function of a 
variety of explanatory variables. The form of this model could be as follows:  









 (Eq 2.6.4) 







β    is a set 
of explanatory variables—such as community and household characteristics—denoted by 
X and indexed by k=1, …, K; β  is a K x 1 vector of parameters; pλ vector of 
parameters;  is location fixed effect; and ui is a random error term. The dependent 
variable yi/z is in log form (natural logarithm), allowing for the log normality of the 
variable.  
The second approach is a direct modeling of household-level poverty measures—to 
explain whether a household is poor or not—using a probit or logit regression. In this 
case the dependent variable is binary, taking on a value of 1 if the household is poor and 
zero otherwise, and the independent variables are as in first approach. This approach 
has often been used in the literature (see, for example, Bardhan 1984; Gaiha 1988; 
World Bank 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Grootaert 1997). Some of the information, 
however, is lost when the direct approach is used for modeling the determinants of 
poverty, because the information on the household living standards above the poverty 
line is censored—all nonpoor are treated alike. There are a few other reasons why 
modeling household income or consumption is preferable to modeling household poverty 
levels (see, for example, Datt and Jolliffe 1999).   
In our analysis of poverty determinants in the rural YRB, we have used the first 
approach described above. For modeling income as in equation (2.6.4), we used the 
income data from the 2001 HIES. We converted the income data from RMB to 
international PPP dollar with 2005 as the base year, as we did for poverty analysis. The 
income model in equation (1) has been estimated using the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression. The standard errors have been corrected for the sampling effects. 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion 
- Results for water-related poverty profile in the Yellow River Basin  
In this section, we provide a profile of poverty in the YRB focusing on the empirical links 
between water and poverty in the basin. The profile assesses the magnitude of poverty 
and its distribution across geographic and socioeconomic domains, provides information 
on the characteristics of the poor, and examines the pattern of poverty to see how it 
varies by water availability and access.  
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Poverty and Inequality in the YRB 
Table 2.4.1presents the poverty measures for the rural YRB region and by parts of the 
provinces belonging to the YRB. Using the PPP US$1.25 a day poverty line and per capita 
income levels, the table shows that 30.5 percent of the population in the rural YRB 
region were living in poverty in 2001.1    
 




headcount rate  
Poverty gap  
Squared  
poverty gap  
 (percent) (x100) (x100) 
YRB 30.5 8.9 3.7 
Parts of the provinces belonging to YRB 
Shanxi 21.3 5.1 1.9 
Inner Mongolia 8.1 2.0 0.7 
Shandong 3.1 0.8 0.3 
Henan 14.6 2.9 0.9 
Sichuan 17.8 2.2 0.5 
Shaanxi 42.1 13.4 5.9 
Gansu 52.2 14.9 5.9 
Qinghai 44.9 15.5 7.3 
Ningxia 26.3 8.2 3.6 
    
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
Note: The international poverty line of US$1.25 a day is in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) 
term. 
 
There are pronounced regional differences in poverty rates within the YRB. Parts of nine 
provinces of China belong to the YRB region. The incidence of poverty (headcount 
poverty rate) varies widely in different parts of the YRB, ranging from a low of 3.1 
percent in Shandong province in the east to highs of 52.2 percent and 44.9 percent, 
respectively, in Gansu and Qinghai provinces in rural western China.2 This pattern of 
poverty incidence corresponds quite well to that of the national level—poverty in China is 
mainly concentrated in the western part of the country. 
Table 2.4.2 also shows the depth (poverty gap) and the severity (squared poverty gap) 
of poverty at the YRB level and by parts of provinces belonging to the basin. The 
measures of poverty depth and poverty severity provide complementary information on 
the incidence of poverty. While province-level poverty depth and severity followed the 
pattern of headcount poverty rates in most cases, there are a couple of differences. For 
example, the part of Gansu province in the YRB shows the highest headcount poverty 
rate, but it is in the second rank (after Qinghai) according to both the poverty depth and 
the severity indices. Compared to the people in the Qinghai part of the YRB, the people 
in the Gansu part of the YRB have a higher risk of being in absolute poverty, but their 
                                                
1 The poverty measures are based on the estimated population distributions of persons ranked by 
household income per person, where each person in a given household is assumed to have the 
same income. Sample households were multiplied by household size to calculate population. 
2 The province-level poverty results need to be treated cautiously because the samples of 
households in the portions of the provinces belonging to the YRB may not necessarily be 
statistically representative of those portions. 
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poverty tends to be less deep and less severe. Further, the YRB-part of Shaanxi province 
ranks the third in terms of both the poverty headcount and the depth indices, but it is in 
the second rank in terms of the severity of poverty—the same as Gansu. The types of 
interventions needed to help these groups of people would therefore likely be different.  
 
Figure 2.4.1 illustrates the poverty incidences in the YRB region in a poverty map of the 
region. The poverty rate shown outside the YRB in a province represents the average 
rural poverty rate in that entire province. For instance, the overall PPP US$1.25 a day 
poverty rate in rural Gansu province was 37.6 percent, but the rate was 52.2 percent in 
the part of the province that belongs to the YRB.  Similarly, the incidence of poverty was 
higher (17.8 percent) in the small part of Sichuan province belonging to the YRB than 
that of the average for Sichuan province (8.6 percent). On the other hand, the 
headcount poverty rate was lower in the YRB-part of Shanxi province (21.3 percent) 
than that in the entire Shanxi province (24.6 percent).  
 
Figure 2.4.1.: Poverty map of the YRB by province: People living on less than $1.25 a day  
 
Turning next to inequality measures, Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 show, respectively, the 
patterns of income and land distributions in the YRB, the simplest way to measure 
inequality. In Table 5.2, the population in the YRB was divided into 10 equal groups 
(deciles) from poorest to richest, and the percentage of per capita total income that 
accrued to each decile group is reported.  The figures in the table show that 7.1 percent 
of all income was earned by the poorest 20 percent of households and 27.5 percent by 
the richest 10 percent.  The distribution of cultivated land in the YRB is more skewed 
than that of income: only 4 percent of all land under cultivation was cultivated by the 
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Table 2.4.2 Distribution of per capita income by decile, YRB 2001 
 
Per capita income 
decile 
Average per capita 
income  
Share of total income 
in each decile 
 (yuan/person/year) (percent) 
1 (poorest) 775 2.8 
2 1,181 4.3 
3 1,473 5.4 
4 1,749 6.4 
5 2,019 7.4 
6 2,348 8.6 
7 2,757 10.1 
8 3,302 12.1 
9 4,196 15.4 
10 (richest) 7,528 27.5 
All households 2,732 100.0 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
Table 2.4.3 Distribution of cultivated land by decile, YRB 2001 
 
Cultivated land decile 
Average cultivable 
land    
Share of total 
cultivated land in  
each decile 
 (hectare/household) (percent) 
1 (lowest) 0.08 1.1 
2 0.21 2.9 
3 0.28 3.9 
4 0.34 4.8 
5 0.43 6.0 
6 0.52 7.3 
7 0.67 9.3 
8 0.88 12.3 
9 1.26 17.6 
10 (highest) 2.49 34.8 
All households 0.71 100.0 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey, National Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
The most widely used summary measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is 
mainly used for comparing inequality over time and space. The estimated Gini indices 
are 40.5 percent for income distribution and 46.3 percent for cultivated land distribution 
in the YRB.  
The Gini coefficient can be interpreted in the context of a Lorenz curve. Figure 2.4.2 
presents the Lorenz curve for income distribution and Figure 2.4.3 provides the Lorenz 
curve for cultivated land distribution in the YRB. The interpretation of the Lorenz curve 
for income distribution in Figure 2.4.2 follows. After ranking all persons by per capita 
income, the Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percent of total income on the cumulative 
percent of population. From this graph, it is possible to determine what percent of total 
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income is realized by, say, the poorest 25 percent of the population. The 45-degree line 
represents the line of perfect equality, where everyone has the same income. The area 
between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve gives a measure of the extent of 
inequality. The Gini coefficient is measured as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45-degree line of perfect equality and the area of the triangle underneath 
the 45-degree line. Similar interpretation holds for the Lorenz curve for land distribution 
in Figure 2.4.3.  
 
 
Figure 2.4.2.: Lorenz curve for income distribution in the YRB 
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Figure 2.4.3: Lorenz curve for distribution of cultivated land in the YRB 
Regional Dimensions of Poverty within the YRB 
In general, the incidence of poverty is high in remote areas and in areas characterized 
by a low resource base, low rainfall, and other inhospitable climatic conditions (World 
Bank 2005).  
 
In the YRB, 43 percent of the sample households live in plain land villages, 13 percent in 
live in hill villages, and 44 percent live in mountain villages. Figure 2.4.4 shows the 
distribution of sample households living in plain land, hill, and mountain villages by per 
capita income quintile. The results indicate that poverty is considerably higher in the 
mountain region compared to the other two regions of the YRB.  Among all sample 
households in the poorest quintile group, 70 percent live in mountain villages, 17 percent 
live in plain land villages, and 13 percent live in hill villages. The mountain villages are 
home to a disproportionately large proportion of households belonging to the second 
lowest income quintile as well. On the other hand, while only 19 percent of all 
households belonging to the highest income quintile live in mountain villages, 74 percent 
of the households in that quintile live in plain land villages.  
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Figure 2.4.4: Regional distribution of households by per capita income quintile 
 
Figure 2.4.5 shows the estimates of the PPP US$1.25 a day poverty headcount rates for 
the three geographical regions. The poverty rate is the highest in the mountain region 
and the lowest in the plain-land region. As shown above in Table 2.5.1, among the nine 
provinces that lie in the YRB, Gansu and Qinghai have the highest levels of poverty—
52.2 percent and 44.9 percent, respectively. The Yellow River has its source in these 
mountainous provinces. These two provinces have low levels of rainfall. Further, Qinghai 
has inhospitable climate characterized by long and very cold winters. On the other hand, 
Shandong province has the lowest levels of rural poverty in the YRB and poverty in 
Henan province is also relatively low. These provinces lie in the lower reaches of the 
Yellow River where the climate is mostly wet and warm. Our analysis thus indicates that 
the poor in the YRB are highly concentrated in the mountain regions while households in 
the plain land regions along the lower reaches of the Yellow River are relatively well-off. 
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Figure 2.4.5: Regional distribution of households by poverty status 
 
- Water-Related Poverty Profile of the YRB 
Background 
Shortage of water is one of the most prominent characteristics of the YRB. The river 
feeds 12 percent of China’s population, accounts for 15 percent of the country’s irrigation 
area, and contributes towards 9 percent of China’s GDP. Yet, the average annual runoff 
of 58 billion cubic meters represents only 2 percent of China’s annual runoff (Feng and 
Wu 2009). More recent estimates refer to total runoff of 53.5 BCM. The per capita water 
resource is approximately 590 cubic meters which is about one-fourth of the national 
average, and one-sixteenth of the world average. Moreover, even this limited runoff is 
highly variable in its spatial as well as temporal characteristics. The watershed above the 
Gansu province, which represents nearly 40 percent of the total basin area, produces 
nearly 56 percent of the annual average runoff. Thus, lack of discharge is not necessarily 
a sign for poverty.  Sixty percent of the year’s average natural runoff at every station on 
the main stream occurs during the flood season from July to October. The peak 
discharge is large and falls sharply during the flood season whereas the discharge is 
small during the dry season and variation is limited. Besides this seasonal dimension to 
the variation, there is also a large year-to-year variations in total runoff. Irrigated 
agriculture is the major consumer of water from the river, using up nearly 78 percent of 
the total water use (Jianzhong et al. 2009). Water is therefore a highly valuable resource 
and no analysis of poverty in the region can be complete without analyzing it in the 
context of the availability of water.  
At the outset, it is important to note that we had serious data limitations in analyzing 
water-related poverty for the YRB. An analysis of water-related poverty would typically 
involve the use of data from a survey specially designed to collect water-related 
information from households and communities. However, the partial HIES data set 
provided to us had only three water-related variables: amount of land irrigated at the 
village level; access to safe drinking water; and amount of land irrigated by electric 
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tubewell at the household level. We supplemented the household survey data with 
annual average rainfall data to assess water availability. 
We proceed with an analysis of the relation between water and poverty in the YRB in the 
following sections. We used the variables on the level of surface water irrigation 
coverage in a village and the use of electric tubewells for irrigation by households living 
in the village to disaggregate the analysis by irrigated and non-irrigated villages. A 
village without any surface water irrigation coverage and without any use of electric 
tubewells for irrigation is considered a non-irrigated village. We also classified 
households by poor and nonpoor in irrigated and non-irrigated villages.  
Water from the YRB is primarily used for irrigation purposes. Nearly 80 percent of the 
run-off is used for irrigation (Jianzhong et al. 2009). Yet, 65 percent of the surveyed 
households reported to be living in villages without any irrigation and the average 
irrigation coverage is only 24 percent. Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood for 
the majority of the rural households in the basin with crop production contributing to 43 
percent of total household income. Water availability is therefore of critical importance 
from a livelihood perspective. Poverty in the YRB, therefore, is likely to be highly 
interlinked with water poverty (here, through lack of access to water for crop 
production). Water requirements for agriculture can either be met through rainfall or 
through irrigation or both. Our descriptive analyses of water-related poverty below take 
into account both irrigation and rainfall as water source.  
Household Demography 
Table 2.4.4 shows the average household size, composition, and dependency ratios for 
poor and nonpoor households living in irrigated and non-irrigated villages. The overall 
average household size in the YRB is 4.4 (not shown in the table). Poorer households 
tend to be relatively larger; and households in non-irrigated villages are slightly larger 
than those in irrigated villages. On average in the YRB (not shown in the table), 
households have 2.9 adults of working age (16–60 years), 0.3 children under age 6, 0.9 
children between the ages of 7 and 14 years, and only 0.3 elderly persons above 60 
years. The household composition has similar patterns across irrigated and non-irrigated 
villages.  
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Table 2.4.4 Household demography  
Households living in irrigated 
villages  
Households living in Non-irrigated 
villages  Description 
  Poor Nonpoor All  Poor Nonpoor All 
 
Household size (number) 4.8 4.1 4.3  5.1 4.4 4.7  
Less than 6 years 
(number) 
0.4 0.2 0.3  0.4 0.3 0.3 
7-15 years (number) 1.1 0.8 0.9  1.2 0.9 1.0 
16-60 years (number) 3.0 2.8 2.9  3.1 2.9 3.0 
More than 60 years 
(number) 
0.3 0.2 0.3  0.4 0.3 0.3 
Dependency ratio 
(percent) 
71 57 59  80 60 69 
        
Family Structure: (percent) 
Bachelordom or couple 
only 
2.2 5.8 5.1  1.3 4.4 3.1 
Couple and one child 8.4 18.5 16.5  6.6 14.9 11.4 
Couple and two children 28.0 35.2 33.8  24.4 27.5 26.2 
Couple and three or 
more children 
22.6 15.6 17.0  27.5 22.8 24.7 
Single parent and 
children 
2.5 1.6 1.8  1.5 1.9 1.8 
Family with three 
generations 
29.2 19.5 21.4  32.5 22.6 26.7 
Other 6.9 3.7 4.3  6.3 5.9 6.1 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
Note: Dependency ratio = Number of members aged below 15 and over 60 / Number of members aged 15-60. 
 
The total dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of members in the age 
groups 0–14 years and above 60 years to the number of members of working age (15–
60 years). The ratio is expressed as a percentage. Poor households tend to have higher 
dependency ratios.  This indicates that adult members of working age in poor households 
have more people to support than those in nonpoor households. Households living in 
non-irrigated areas have higher dependency ratios than households living in irrigated 
areas.  The dependency ratio is 71 percent for the poor in irrigated villages and 80 
percent for the poor in non-irrigated villages. The dependency ratios for nonpoor 
households are 57 percent and 60 percent, respectively, in irrigated and non-irrigated 
villages.  
There are stark differences in family structures between the poor and the nonpoor. For 
example, 8.4 percent of the poor families in irrigated villages have their family composed 
of a couple with one child. The figure is 18.5 percent for the nonpoor families.  
Education 
Education is a prerequisite for poverty alleviation. Providing universal, high-quality 
education contributes significantly to poverty reduction and promotes economic growth 
in developing countries. At the individual level, every additional year of education 
increases a person’s potential for a better life in the future. 
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Figure 2.4.6 shows the net enrollment rates in school for children aged 7 to 15 years.3 
The results disaggregated by irrigated and non-irrigated villages suggest that enrollment 
rates are higher in irrigated villages than those in non-irrigated villages, and that the 
rates are lower for children from poor households than those from nonpoor households. 
However, the gap in school enrollment between the poor and the nonpoor is smaller in 
irrigated villages than that in non-irrigated villages. In non-irrigated villages, the net 
enrollment rate for children from nonpoor households is 4.4 percentage points higher 
than those from poor households. This difference is 2.0 percentage points in irrigated 
villages. However, the overall school enrollment rate in China (and in the YRB) is higher 
than in most developing countries.   
 
Figure 2.4.6: Net school enrollment rate, children aged 7-15 
 
Table 2.4.5 reports the levels of illiteracy and education attainment of the labor force in 
the YRB, by poor and nonpoor and irrigated and non-irrigated villages. The rate of 
illiteracy is considerably higher for households living in non-irrigated villages than those 
living in irrigated villages. The gap in literacy between the poor and the nonpoor is also 
large, with poor households living in non-irrigated villages having the lowest literacy 
levels—about one-fourth of them are illiterate or semi-literate. 
   
                                                
3 Net enrollment rate (NER) = (All school-going children aged 7-15 years old / all children aged 7-
15 years in the sample) * 100. The data set does not provide disaggregated information by 
primary and secondary school-going children.  
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Table 2.4.5. Education of labor force 
Households living in irrigated 
villages 
 
Households living in non-irrigated 
villages  Description 
 Poor Nonpoor All  Poor Nonpoor All 
 (percent) 
Illiterate and semi-literate 13.7 7.2 8.4  25.8 13.1 18.4 
Completed primary 25.0 24.2 24.3  32.5 27.7 29.7 
Completed junior secondary 49.9 53.3 52.7  32.7 45.7 40.3 
Completed senior secondary 10.4 13.2 12.6  8.1 11.3 9.9 
Completed specialized 
secondary 
0.9 1.8 1.6  0.6 1.8 1.3 
College education of above 
3 years 
0.1 0.4 0.3  0.2 0.4 0.3 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
The patterns of schooling are very similar in nature. The differences in schooling 
between the irrigated and non-irrigated villages are quite remarkable.  For example, 
while about half of the poor households in irrigated villages completed their junior 
secondary school, only one-third of the poor in non-irrigated villages attained that level 
of education.   
Employment 
Table 2.4.6 presents the employment status of sample households by various sectors in 
the YRB.  Among the eight categories, considerable differences in employment are 
noticed in mining and manufacturing sectors— across irrigated and non-irrigated villages 
and also across the poor and the nonpoor. While only 1.7 percent of the sample 
households living in irrigated villages have mining workers as a household member, this 
rate is 6.4 percent in non-irrigated villages. By contrast, relatively more people work in 
the manufacturing sector in irrigated villages than in non-irrigated villages. 
 
Table 2.4.6 Employment by sector 
Households living in irrigated 
villages 
Households living in non-
irrigated area villages  Description 
  Poor Nonpoor All Poor Nonpoor All 
   (percent)    
 Household has a farmer 96.3 94.4 94.7 96.6 94.5 95.4 
 Household has a mining 
worker   
1.2 1.8 1.7 2.2 9.3 6.4 
 Household has a 
manufacturing worker 
6.4 9.9 9.2 3.2 3.9 3.6 
 Household has a construction 
worker 
7.5 8.4 8.2 11.3 8.3 9.6 
 Household has a wholesale 
trader  
5.5 6.2 6.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 
 Household has a social service 
worker 
3.7 5.3 5.0 4.6 5.6 5.2 
 Household has a government 
worker 
1.3 1.2 1.2 0.3 1.7 1.1 
 Household has a worker of 
other occupation   
17.7 17.9 17.9 11.5 17.5 15.0 
Source:   Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
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Budget Shares and Food Consumption  
Table 2.4.7 shows that average monthly per capita consumption expenditure among 
households living in irrigated areas is 31 percent higher than that of households living in 
non-irrigated areas. While the average share of expenditure on food is higher in non-
irrigated areas, the shares on other goods and services—clothing; housing; medical 
expenses; transport and communication; culture, education and recreation; and other 
services—are higher in irrigated villages.  
 




Households living in irrigated 
villages   
Households living in non-irrigated 
villages 
Description  Poor Nonpoor All  Poor Nonpoor All 
Monthly per capita 
expenditure (yuan) 
79 144 131  68 124 100 
Budget share (percent) 
Food 54.0 48.4 49.5  60.8 53.8 56.8 
Clothing 7.4 7.9 7.8  6.2 8.1 7.3 
Housing 10.1 12.7 12.1  10.3 11.2 10.8 
Household facilities, 
articles and services 
5.2 5.3 5.3  3.8 3.9 3.9 
Medical 5.6 5.7 5.7  5.3 5.4 5.4 
Transport and 
communication 
4.1 6.0 5.6  2.8 4.5 3.8 
Cultural, educational 
and recreational service 
11.6 11.3 11.4  9.1 10.2 9.8 
Other 2.1 2.8 2.6  1.7 2.8 2.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 
National Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
Table 2.4.8 shows the patterns of cash food expenditures in irrigated and non-irrigated 
areas by poor and nonpoor households. The monthly per capita cash food expenditure of 
households in irrigated areas is about 32 percent higher than that of households in non-
irrigated areas. However, the share of expenditure on staple foods is higher for 
households in non-irrigated areas. The share of expenditure on most other food items is 
higher among the households in irrigated areas. Table 2.4.9 presents the information on 
the quantity of daily per capita food consumption, which is self-explanatory. 
Ownership of Household Assets  
Table 2.4.10 presents the ownership of some selected assets and equipment by the poor 
and nonpoor in irrigated and non-irrigated areas. In general, as expected, a greater 
proportion of households in irrigated areas own most of the assets and equipments. 
However, the only exceptions to this pattern are household ownership of draught 
animals, water heaters and heating equipment. The proportion of households that own a 
draught animal in non-irrigated villages is more than double than that in irrigated 
villages. This leads us to infer that crop production in irrigated areas is likely to be more 
mechanized and input intensive as compared to non-irrigated areas. Further, a 
considerably greater proportion of households in non-irrigated households own heating 
equipment and a similar proportion own water heaters while a much larger proportion of 
irrigated households, both poor and nonpoor, have fans in their homes. This pattern 
indicates that households in irrigated areas are mostly located in warmer regions while 
non-irrigated areas are more concentrated in the colder climatic zones. 
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Table 2.4.8      Cash food expenditure and food budget share 
Households living in irrigated 
villages   
Households living in non-
irrigated villages 
 Description Poor Nonpoor All 
 
Poor Nonpoor All 
  
Monthly per capita cash food 
expenditure (yuan) 
18.5 35.4 32.1  15.6 30.7 24.4 
Food budget share (cash only) (percent) 
Staple foods 16.3 10.2 11.4  21.9 17.4 19.3 
Vegetables 9.1 9.0 9.0  9.0 8.1 8.5 
Pulses 1.3 1.2 1.2  1.3 1.3 1.3 
Oils 7.8 6.8 7.0  5.0 4.5 4.7 
Sugar 2.0 1.6 1.7  1.7 1.7 1.7 
Meats and poultry 12.7 15.5 15.0  8.5 11.8 10.4 
Eggs 2.8 3.8 3.6  1.1 1.7 1.4 
Fish 0.5 1.5 1.3  0.2 0.6 0.5 
Condiments 7.4 5.5 5.9  8.0 6.1 6.9 
Tobacco 11.4 12.0 11.9  14.4 15.8 15.2 
Wine 6.0 6.9 6.7  6.0 7.5 6.9 
Other beverages 2.5 1.8 2.0  5.0 3.1 3.9 
Dried fruits 3.6 4.6 4.4  3.3 3.4 3.4 
Milk and milk products 1.1 1.0 1.0  1.1 1.0 1.0 
Other prepared foods 15.4 18.5 17.9  13.3 16.0 14.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
Table 2.4.9   Quantity of daily per capita consumption of food items 
Households living in irrigated 
villages 
 
Households living in non-irrigated 
villages  Description 
  Poor Nonpoor All  Poor Nonpoor All 
 (grams/person/day) 
Wheat 443 510 497  464 508 489 
Rice 38 53 50  17 41 31 
Maize 38 54 51  28 49 40 
Potatoes 29 25 26  44 47 46 
Pulses 8 10 10  10 12 11 
Vegetables 140 234 216  92 161 132 
Condiment 3 7 6  3 5 4 
Oils 19 18 18  16 21 19 
Meats 21 38 35  19 31 26 
Eggs 6 15 13  9 10 10 
Milk 3 3 3  9 15 12 
Fish 1 3 3  0 1 1 
Sugar 3 4 4  2 3 3 
Beverages 10 23 20  10 16 14 
fruits 34 90 79  24 45 36 
Other prepared 
food 
3 6 5  2 4 3 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
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Poverty, Irrigation, and Access to Safe Drinking Water 
Our estimates suggest that the PPP $1.25 a day headcount poverty rate is significantly 
lower in irrigated areas than that in non-irrigated areas of the YRB region: while 19.4 
percent of all households living in irrigated villages are poor, the rate is more than 
double (41.4 percent) in non-irrigated villages.  
 
Table 2.4.10 Ownership of selected assets and equipment  
Households living in irrigated 
villages 
 
Households living in non-irrigated 
villages 
Poor Nonpoor All  Poor Nonpoor All 
 Asset 
  
 (percent of households) 
Automobile 1.0 1.9 1.7  0.4 2.9 1.9 
Small hand-held tractor 23.1 35.5 33.1  14.1 21.8 18.6 
Water pump 14.1 24.3 22.3  6.6 8.3 7.6 
Draught animal 26.5 22.1 22.9  60.5 50.0 54.4 
Productive cattle 13.2 18.6 17.5  19.6 20.1 19.9 
Sanitation equipment 83.5 88.9 87.8  86.3 84.5 85.2 
Heating equipment 73.8 66.8 68.2  87.3 80.2 83.2 
Washing machine 24.9 40.3 37.3  10.6 26.9 20.1 
















Air conditioner 0.4 0.4 0.4  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Microwave oven 0.0 0.3 0.2  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Water heater 0.7 2.5 2.2  1.0 3.3 2.3 
Bicycle 79.8 89.7 87.8  63.2 64.9 64.2 
Land-line phone 19.8 32.1 29.7  8.1 19.8 14.9 
Mobile phone 1.6 4.0 3.5  0.6 2.5 1.7 
Color television 46.9 59.0 56.7  30.7 53.8 44.1 
Computer 0.0 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.3 0.2 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
When the poverty rate is disaggregated at the province level, we observe a strong and 
negative correlation between poverty and the share of population living in irrigated 
villages. Figure 2.4.7 shows this relationship—the nonpoor are more concentrated in 
irrigated villages. Shandong, Inner Mongolia and Henan, respectively, are the provinces 
where the proportion of population living in irrigated villages is the highest, second 
highest and third highest. These are also the provinces with the lowest, second lowest 
and third lowest levels of poverty, respectively. On the other hand, Gansu and Qinghai 
are provinces with the lowest share of population living in irrigated villages and also the 
highest levels of poverty among the nine provinces belonging to the YRB. 
Irrigated villages have better access to safe drinking water in the YRB. Figure 5.8 shows 
that the difference in household access to safe drinking water is large between irrigated 
and non-irrigated villages. The figure also shows that nonpoor households have greater 
access to safe drinking water than poor households have, but the poor-nonpoor gap in 
access is larger in non-irrigated villages. While the difference in access to safe drinking 
water between poor and nonpoor is 15.5 percentage points in non-irrigated villages, it is 
only 3.1 percentage points in irrigated villages.  
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Figure 2.4.7: Headcount poverty and share of population living in irrigated villages 
 
Figure 2.4.9 shows that poverty and proportion of population having access to safe 
drinking water are negatively correlated at the province level. However, the relationship 
is not as strong as it is between poverty and people living in irrigated villages as shown 
in Figure 5.7.  
Regional Dimensions of Water and Poverty  
Earlier, we had found that poverty is concentrated in the mountain region of the YRB, 
and that people living in the plain land region are better off. Here, we examine whether 
there is convergence between income poverty (lack of money) and water poverty (lack 
of water). We look at the regional distribution of rainfall and irrigation—the two sources 
of water for agricultural production. 
Figure 2.4.10 shows that mountain regions in the YRB have the lowest annual average 
rainfall (454 mm) followed closely by hill villages (460 mm). Plain land villages receive 
considerably higher levels of rainfall (549 mm), 21 percent more rainfall than mountain 
villages.  
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 Figure 2.4.8: Access to safe drinking water 
 
Figure 2.4.9: Headcount poverty and share of population with access to safe drinking water 
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Figure 2.4.10: Regional patterns of rainfall and tubewell irrigation 
The regional distribution of irrigation coverage, measured by percentage of households 
who used tubewell irrigation for cultivation, is even more skewed in favor of plain land 
villages. As Figure 2.4.10 shows, 62 percent of households in plain land villages had 
used electric tubewells for irrigation. By contrast, only 32 percent households in hill 
villages and 14 percent households in mountain villages had access to tubewells for 
irrigation.  
These results, in combination with earlier findings, reveal a clear convergence of water 
poverty and economic poverty—both being concentrated in the mountain regions, less so 
in the hill regions and least in the plain land regions.  
We now look at the interaction between poverty and levels of average rainfall within 
these three geographical regions. Figure 2.4.11 shows that, in the mountain region 
where the overall level of rainfall is low, the average annual rainfall experienced by poor 
and nonpoor households is somewhat similar. However, in the hill villages, there is a 
large difference in the amount of rainfall received by poor and nonpoor households—poor 
households are concentrated in low-rainfall villages. On the other hand, in the plain land 
region, poor households live in villages with relatively higher rainfall levels than nonpoor 
households do. These results indicate that higher levels of rainfall have beneficial effects 
in the hill region, but adverse economic effects in the plain land region.  
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Figure 2.4.11: Regional variations in rainfall and poverty 
Water Productivity 
The productivity of water denotes the contribution water in improving crop yields (that 
is, amount of crop output per unit of sown land).  We look at the effects of two sources 
of water on crop yields—rainfall and irrigation.  
Rainfall and Crop Productivity 
Wheat is the most common crop grown by farmers in the YRB, followed by maize. About 
80 percent of the sample households grew wheat, and wheat cultivation accounted for 
48 percent of crop land on average. Maize is the second most common crop, grown by 
65 percent of the households in the YRB. However, very few farmers—only 8 percent of 
the YRB households—grew rice. Because of the dominance of wheat and maize in the 
YRB agricultural sector, we consider the yields of wheat and maize to examine the 
relationship between annual average rainfall and crop yields.  
Figure 2.4.12 shows that crop yields are highest in the lowest rainfall quintile. The yields 
drop sharply for villages belonging to the second rainfall quintile and then rise with 
increases in rainfall. The highest crop productivity in the lowest rainfall area might 
appear counterintuitive.  
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Figure 2.4.12: Crop yields by rainfall quintile 
However, the apparent puzzle becomes clear when we look at irrigation coverage in 
conjunction with rainfall. Figure 2.4.13 shows the distribution of village-level irrigation 
coverage of total cultivated land by rainfall quintile. The pattern in Figure 2.4.13 
matches the one in Figure 2.4.12—villages belonging to the lowest rainfall quintile also 
have the maximum irrigation coverage in the YRB. The results presented in the two 
figures indicate that the productivity of irrigation water is optimum in areas with the 
least amount of rainfall in the YRB region.  
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Figure 2.4.13: Distribution of irrigation coverage by rainfall quintile 
 
Irrigation and Crop Productivity 
The relationship between crop yields and irrigation coverage is direct and instantly 
recognizable. Higher irrigation coverage of cultivated land at the village level is 
associated with greater crop productivity (Figure 2.4.14). Wheat yield increases by 32 
percent from the lowest to the highest irrigation quintiles. Maize yield appears to be even 
more responsive to irrigation—the yield increases from 4.2 kg/ha in the first irrigation 
quintile to 6.9 kg/ha in the fifth quintile—64 percent increase from the lowest to the 
highest quintiles. Figure 2.4.15 shows that yields of various crops grown in the YRB are 
substantially higher in irrigated villages than those in non-irrigated villages. 
Irrigation induces technology adoption in crop production. Figure 2.4.16 shows that the 
shares of land under high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and maize crops increase 
significantly with increased coverage of irrigated land. For instance, the HYV share in 
wheat cultivation increases by 34 percentage points from 42 percent in the lowest 
irrigation quintile to 76 percent in the highest irrigation quintile.   
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Figure 2.4.15: Crop yields by irrigated and non-irrigated villages 
  
  Objectives CPWF Project Report 
 
  Page | 79 
 
 
Figure 2.4.16: Adoption of high-yielding varieties by irrigation coverage quintile 
 
Crop yields of poor households are however considerably less than those of nonpoor 
households. Figure 2.4.17 shows that, even within irrigated villages, there are large 
differences in crop yields between the poor and the nonpoor households. These 
differences arise mainly because the poor are less able to make the investments needed 
for yield improvement, such as investments on irrigation, fertilizers, high quality seeds, 
or improved pest management.  
Variation in Crop Yields 
Low level of yield variability encourages farmers to adopt improved technology in crop 
production. Figure 2.4.18 shows that the variation in crop yields across households living 
in irrigated villages is much less than that of households living in non-irrigated villages, 
except tubers. For instance, the coefficient of variation of wheat yields is 35.6 percent in 
irrigated areas versus 54.8 percent in non-irrigated areas. Thus, irrigation leads to more 
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Figure 2.4.18: Variation in crop yields by irrigated and non-irrigated villages 
 
Figure 2.4.19 suggests that, the variation in yields is less for poor households living in 
irrigated villages than that for poor households living in non-irrigated villages. A similar 
pattern holds for nonpoor households in irrigated and non-irrigated villages. However, 
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within irrigated and non-irrigated villages, the variation in yields is higher for poor than 
nonpoor households. It is likely that many poor households living in irrigated villages 
may not have access to irrigation. However, data limitations do not allow us to confirm 
this assumption.   
 
 
Figure 2.4.19: Variation in crop yields among poor and nonpoor households  
 
Water and Poverty in Upstream, Midstream, and Downstream Areas of the YRB 
Table 2.4.11 shows selected welfare indicators of households living in different segments 
of the Yellow river flow, that is, households belonging to ‘upstream’, ‘midstream’ and 
‘downstream’ areas of the YRB. Households in the upstream area have, on average, the 
lowest levels of wellbeing followed by those in the midstream area. Households in the 
downstream area enjoy the highest level of economic attainments. This is true for most 
of the welfare indicators such as the incidence of poverty, per capita income, irrigation 
coverage, and crop yields.  
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Table 2.4.11 Profile of households in upstream, midstream, and downstream areas of the YRB 
 
Location of households 
 Upstream Midstream Downstream All 
 
    
Poverty headcount rate—living on less 
than $1.25 a day (%)  47.5 29.6 9.9 30.5 
 
    
Average per capita income 
(yuan/person/year)  1,851 2,802 3,536 2,732 
 
    
Village-level surface water irrigation 
coverage of cultivated land (%) 8.8 30.6 21.8 23.2 
 
    
Percentage of households having land 
under tubewell irrigation 19.5 30.3 69.8 36.8 
 
    
Average annual rainfall (mm) 447 480 663 507 
 
    
Wheat yields (metric ton/hectare) 3.8 3.8 5.3 4.2 
Variation in wheat yields (%) 42.7 50.7 25.1 43.4 
 
    
Maize yields (metric ton/hectare) 5.0 5.2 5.8 5.3 
Variation in maize yields (%) 55.0 48.8 30.3 44.6 
 
    
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
 
The $1.25 a day poverty headcount ratio shows stark differences across the three areas. 
The poverty rate in the upstream area (47.5 percent) is nearly five times higher than 
that in the downstream area (only 9.9 percent), while the rate in the midstream area 
(29.6 percent) is three times higher. This pattern is quite similar to that observed in 
mountain, hill, and plain-land regions of the YRB.  
The differences in per capita income, though considerable, are not as remarkable as the 
differences in the poverty rate. The average per capita income of households living in the 
downstream area is 91 percent and 26 percent higher than the average per capita 
incomes of those living in the upstream and the midstream areas, respectively.  
Next, we look at the relationships between the availability and use of water for irrigation, 
and indicators of economic wellbeing in upstream, midstream and downstream areas. 
Water availability and use near the lower reaches of the Yellow river are much higher 
than those in the upper reaches as the average rainfall and irrigation data reflect.  
Rainfall in the downstream area is 48 percent and 38 percent higher than that in the 
upstream and midstream areas, respectively. The differences in the use of electric 
tubewell irrigation are even larger between the three areas. The percentage of 
households using electric tubewells for irrigation increases considerably from upstream 
to midstream areas, and increases dramatically from midstream to downstream areas. 
While only 20 percent of the households use tubewell irrigation in the upstream area, the 
rate of use is 30 percent in the midstream area and as high as 70 percent in the 
downstream area. However, village level coverage of surface-water irrigation reveals a 
rather different pattern with the largest share of cultivated land being irrigated in the 
midstream area. The patterns of the surface water irrigation coverage and the use of 
electric tubewells for irrigation suggest that households living in the downstream area 
rely mostly on groundwater for irrigating their crops, probably due to the lack of surface 
water availability from the Yellow river.  
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The combination of higher rainfall and irrigation use—particularly, the extensive use of 
tubewell irrigation—seem to contribute to higher crop productivity, and hence, increased 
income of the households living in the downstream area. As evidenced from the data in 
Table 5.11, not only are the yields of wheat and maize (the two most important crops 
grown in the YRB region) much higher, but also the variability in the yields across 
households is significantly lower in the downstream area compared to the upstream and 
midstream areas.  
However, the higher incidence of irrigation in the midstream area compared to the 
upstream area does not translate into higher crop productivity and lower yield variability. 
A possible explanation could be the fact that there is not much difference in rainfall 
between these two locations. The average rainfall in the upstream and the midstream 
areas is about 30 percent lower than the average rainfall in the downstream area. 
Topographical factors may also play a role in this regard.  
- Determinants of poverty  
The water-related poverty profile of the YRB in the previous section provided tabulated 
and graphical information on the levels of poverty and inequality, and the characteristics 
of the poor in the context of water availability and access. The findings of the descriptive 
analysis provide us with important clues to the underlying determinants of poverty. 
However, the bivariate nature of the informational content of the profile did not isolate 
the effect of a particular variable on poverty from other confounding factors. In this 
section, we have extended the descriptive analysis of the profile by modeling the 
determinants of poverty through multivariate analysis to addresses the question of what 
causes poverty in the rural YRB, with particular emphasis on water and agriculture. 
Selecting Explanatory Variables 
In selecting among potential determinants of poverty, we were careful in choosing the 
explanatory variables that are most likely to be exogenous to current income or poverty. 
For instance, we did not include household assets (except for land) and dwelling 
characteristics, because they are thought to be determined by household income or 
poverty status.  
The selected variables can be classified into community- and household-level variables. 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are 
provided in Table 2.4.12. In addition to these explanatory variables, we introduced 
province fixed effects in the model to control for potential omitted-variable bias. Since 
parts of 9 provinces belong to the YRB, we used a dummy variable for each of the 8 
provinces, and one province was left out of the regression to serve as the point of 
reference.    
Estimated Parameters of the Model 
Table 2.4.13 presents the estimated parameters of the OLS regression model of the log 
of per capita income.  The estimates show how closely each independent variable is 
related to per capita income (the dependent variable), holding all other influences 
constant. The interpretations of the key results are provided below.  
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Table 2.4.12 Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
 
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Dependent variable     
Natural logarithm of per capita income in PPP dollar 4.00 0.628 0.56 6.81 
     
Community (village) characteristics     
Share of total farm land under irrigation (percent) 23.18 31.052 0.00 100.00 
Annual average rainfall (mm) 507.22 165.921 182.31 933.10 
Dummy: Plain land village = 1 0.49 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Hilly village = 1 0.19 0.394 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Mountain village = 1 0.50 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Ethnic minority village = 1 0.12 0.326 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Village has paved road  = 1 0.95 0.224 0.00 1.00 
Distance to the nearest bus stop (km) 6.66 9.704 0.10 70.00 
Distance to the nearest post office (km) 4.37 4.036 0.02 30.00 
     
Household characteristics     
Household size 4.40 1.339 1.00 14.00 
Household size, squared 21.18 13.728 1.00 196.00 
Number of children below age 15 1.21 0.976 0.00 6.00 
Number of persons above age 60 0.27 0.571 0.00 3.00 
Dummy: Illiterate adult member  = 1 0.25 0.434 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Adult with primary education  = 1 0.51 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Adult with junior secondary education  = 1 0.76 0.429 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Adult with senior secondary education  = 1 0.24 0.429 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Adult with specialized secondary education  = 1 0.04 0.198 0.00 1.00 
Dummy: Adult with 3 years college education   = 1 0.01 0.090 0.00 1.00 
Share of non-farm income in total income (percent) 40.98 27.869 0.00 99.82 
Owned cultivated land (ha) 0.73 0.789 0.00 10.00 
Percentage of  wheat land  under  HYV wheat 49.66 49.124 0.00 100.00 
Dummy: Household has  land under electric tubewell 
irrigation = 1 
0.36 0.480 0.00 1.00 
Percentage of total expenditure for food 33.41 13.285 2.90 85.00 
Distance to primary school (km) 1.19 1.652 0.02 30.00 
Distance to junior high school (km) 4.42 5.187 0.25 80.00 
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
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Table 2.4.13 Determinants of income, OLS regression estimates  
 
Description of variables Coefficient t-statistic 
P>t 
    
Community (village) characteristics    
Share of total farm land under irrigation (percent) 0.00733 4.31*** 0.000 
Annual average rainfall (mm) -0.00334 -4.06*** 0.000 
Annual average rainfall, squared 0.000003 4.24*** 0.000 
Interaction effect: % irrigated land * average rainfall -0.00001 -3.93*** 0.000 
Dummy: Plain land village = 1 0.11246 1.93* 0.056 
Dummy: Hilly village = 1 -0.03105 -0.66 0.507 
Dummy: Mountain village = 1 0.01552 0.25 0.800 
Dummy: Ethnic minority village = 1 -0.19774 -3.06*** 0.002 
Dummy: Village has paved road  = 1 0.11730 2.20** 0.029 
Distance to the nearest bus stop (km) -0.00124 -0.69 0.492 
Distance to the nearest post office (km) 0.00397 0.84 0.403 
Household characteristics    
Household size -0.23999 -6.54*** 0.000 
Household size, squared 0.01451 3.90*** 0.000 
Number of children below age 15 -0.05217 -5.01*** 0.000 
Number of persons above age 60 0.00704 0.56 0.579 
Dummy: Illiterate adult member  = 1 -0.06266 -2.53** 0.012 
Dummy: Adult with primary education  = 1 0.00898 0.51 0.609 
Dummy: Adult with junior secondary education  = 1 0.05695 2.83*** 0.005 
Dummy: Adult with senior secondary education  = 1 0.09483 4.75*** 0.000 
Dummy: Adult with specialized secondary education  = 1 0.05739 1.45 0.150 
Dummy: Adult with 3 years college education  = 1 0.08001 1.12 0.266 
Share of non-farm income in total income (percent) 0.00364 6.74*** 0.000 
Owned cultivated land (ha) 0.05016 2.01** 0.046 
Percentage of  wheat  land  under HYV wheat 0.00015 0.45 0.654 
Dummy: Household has  land under tubewell irrigation = 1 0.05906 1.73* 0.086 
Percentage of total expenditure for food -0.01600 -17.56*** 0.000 
Distance to primary school (km) 0.04012 1.60 0.112 
Distance to Junior high school (km) 0.00013 0.03 0.974 
Location (province) dummy Yes   
Constant 5.62833 20.28*** 0.000 
Number of observations 3,646   
F-statistic 42.43***   
Adjusted R-squared 0.56   
    
Source:  Calculated by authors using data from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, National 
Bureau of Statistics, Peoples Republic of China. 
Notes: Dependent variable is natural logarithm of per capita PPP dollar per month. The standard errors are 
corrected for sampling effects by estimating the equation using the ‘svyreg’ command of the Stata 
statistical software. Significance levels: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 
percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Community-Level Irrigation and Rainfall 
As mentioned earlier, the 2001 HIES data used for our analysis came from rural areas of 
the YRB. From the village-level data, we calculated the share of irrigated land in a village 
as the area under effective irrigation divided by total cultivated land area in that village. 
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The coefficient of this variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level.  
The income elasticity with respect to the share of irrigated land in total cultivated land 
area in a village is 0.17 at sample mean. Thus, a 10-percent increase in the village-level 
irrigation coverage increases per capita income of households living in that village by 1.7 
percent on average. The effect of village-level irrigation coverage on poverty is provided 
in the simulation analysis below.  
Besides irrigation, rainfall is a critical source of water for agricultural production in a rural 
community, affecting income of the households living in the community. Rainfall may 
also have effects on living standards of people through other ways. In our model, the 
annual rainfall variable denotes 50-year average rainfall (in millimeter) at the community 
level. We have also added an interaction term to the model to incorporate the joint effect 
of the two water-related variables (rainfall and irrigation) on income, over and above 
their separate effects.  
The coefficient estimates of both the linear and the squared rainfall variables are 
statistically significant. The linear term has a negative coefficient while the squared 
rainfall variable has a positive sign, yielding a U-shaped relationship between rainfall and 
income. This relationship implies that a marginal increase in rainfall actually decreases 
household income in low-rainfall villages, and the marginal effect becomes positive 
beyond a critical level of rainfall. This critical level of rainfall is 492 mm per year—about 
3 percent lower than the average annual rainfall of 507 mm in the YRB region.4 These 
results might appear counterintuitive if interpreted without taking into account the 
moderator effects of the interaction between rainfall and irrigation. 
The interpretation of the interaction term in conjunction with the net effects of rainfall 
greatly expands the understanding of the relationships between rainfall, irrigation and 
income. The interaction term between irrigation coverage and average annual rainfall is 
statistically significant and has a negative sign, suggesting that the combined effect of 
interaction between the two sources of water dampens their individual effects. This 
result, in combination with the negative linear term and the quadratic positive term of 
the rainfall variable suggest that irrigation yields a higher return at the margin in 
relatively low-rainfall communities. However, the marginal return to irrigation is lower in 
relatively high-rainfall communities of the YRB, above a certain level (that is, 
communities with annual rainfall greater than 492 mm). 
Other Community-Level Characteristics 
Among the community-level variables, living in plain-land villages and villages with 
paved roads in the YRB boost per capita income, as the statistically significant 
coefficients of these variables suggests. However, the effects of living in hilly or 
mountain villages on income turn out to be statistically insignificant. The coefficient of 
the ethnic minority village is statistically significant at the 99 percent level with a 
negative sign. This result indicates that the ethnic minority group is relatively poorer 
than the general population in the YRB.  
Household-Level Characteristics 
Demographic Factors 
Household size and composition have poverty implications. Household size has a 
significant negative effect on its living standards—as household size increases, per capita 
income decreases. This inverse relationship implies that poorer households tend to be 
larger, which is a common finding in other developing countries. However, the quadratic 
                                                
4 Differentiating the income function with respect to rainfall amount (R), setting it to zero, and 
solving for R gives the critical value of 453 mm of annual rainfall.    
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term is significant and positive, which implies that, the relationship between household 
size and per capita income turns positive when the household size crosses a critical 
number. This turning point is estimated at 8 persons. These results are an indication of 
economies of household size in living standards.  
The poor also tend to live in younger households. The number of children under 15 has a 
significant negative effect on household income.    
Education 
Literacy and schooling are important determinants of people’s ability to take advantage 
of income-earning opportunities. A household with an illiterate adult member has a 
statistically significant negative effect on income per capita.5 Households with an adult 
member who completed junior secondary education or senior secondary education both 
have significant positive effects on household living standards, as measured by 
household income per person.  
Non-Farm Income 
We find that non-farm income as percentage of total household income has a statistically 
significant positive effect on household living standards. The income elasticity of non-
farm income share at sample mean is 0.15. This estimate suggests that a 10 percent 
increase in the non-farm income share of rural households living in the YRB region leads 
to an increase in per capita household income by 1.5 percent on average. This largely 
reflects the underlying lower rate of return to agriculture compared to other sectors.  
Agriculture 
Cultivable land is a vital asset base of households living in rural areas. We find that 
owned cultivated land has a significant positive effect on per capita household income.  
The household survey data set has information on farm land irrigated by electric 
tubewells. However, we could not construct a variable representing the share of 
cultivated land under tubewell irrigation, because the cropping intensity with tubewell 
irrigation was way above 100 percent as many farmers grew double or triple crops in a 
year on the same plot of land using tubewell irrigation.  As an alternative, we used a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a household had any land under tubewell 
irrigation, zero otherwise. The coefficient of the tubewell irrigation variable is positive 
and statistically significant, suggesting that the use of tubewell irrigation increases per 
capita household income.   
Wheat is the most common crop grown by farmers in the YRB. About 80 percent of the 
sample households grew wheat, half of all wheat land was under high-yielding variety 
(HYV), and wheat cultivation accounted for 48 percent of crop land on average. In our 
model, we used the share of HYV wheat in total land under wheat cultivation as an 
explanatory variable. Although the coefficient of the variable has a positive sign, it is not 
a statistically significant determinant of per capita household income.  
Food Expenditure 
We find that the share of food consumption expenditure in total household expenditure is 
negatively related to per capita income, and the relationship is statistically significant. As 
household income rises the share spent on food falls conforming to the Engelian 
relationships. 
                                                
5 Our construction of the literacy and education variables was constrained by the type of data 
provided to us in the partial household survey data set.  The only information available on literacy 
and education is “education of labor force.” We used this information to create dummy variables 
that take the value of 1 if at least one adult person (that is, the labor force age of 16-60) in the 
household belonged to one of the literacy and education categories, zero otherwise. Thus, for 
example, if a household had one illiterate adult member and one adult member who completed 
primary education, then that household was considered twice in the model. However, such cases 
were quite small in number.  
Objectives CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 88 
Poverty Simulations 
We generated predictions of poverty from the estimated parameters of the income model 
for a set of selected determinant variables. Using the estimated parameters, we first 
predicted per capita income in PPP dollar for every household in the sample. Next, based 
on the predicted per capita income, we calculated the PPP $1.25 a day headcount 
poverty rate for the YRB as the base simulation. Finally, we re-estimated the headcount 
poverty rate separately for each of the four determinant variables by increasing the level 
of the variable by 10 percent.6   
Table 2.4.14 presents the simulation results. Among the three determinant variables 
considered for simulations, the simulated impact of community-level irrigation coverage 
generates the largest reduction in poverty in the YRB—increasing irrigation coverage by 
10 percent reduces the predicted value of poverty by 5.11 percent.    
Non-farm incomes are an important determinant of poverty in the YRB. Simulation 2 
suggests that, the headcount poverty rate is expected to decline by 4.52 percent if the 
share of non-farm income in total per capita household income increases by 10 percent.   
In simulation 3, we examine the effect of increasing cultivated land area of households, 
a measure of expanding physical capital. The predicted result of this simulation is 
relatively modest—the percentage of rural population living in poverty would decline by 
1.03 percent if cultivated landholdings were increased by 10 percent. 
                                                
6 The simulations assume that the considered changes in the determinant variables do not affect 
the model parameters of other explanatory variables, which is a plausible assumption for small 
changes.   
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Table 2.4.14 Poverty simulations 
Percentage change in 
Description of simulation 
Per capita 
income 




   
1. Increase irrigation coverage at the village level 
(share of cultivated land irrigated) by 10 percent 
1.69 -5.11 
   
2. Increase the share of non-farm income in total per 
capita household income by 10 percent 
1.49 -4.52 
   
3. Increase cultivated land area of households by 10 
percent 
0.31 -1.03 
   




In this study, we analyzed water-related poverty in the Yellow River Basin. The YRB is 
home to around 9 percent of China's population and accounts for 15 percent of the 
country’s irrigated area. Shortage of water in this region is a major challenge for the 
livelihoods of many and for the economic development of the region as a whole.  
We illustrated various approaches to study “water poverty” and “water-related poverty.” 
The livelihoods approach offers ways to determine who the “water poor” are and how 
this state affects them. An alternative approach is to measure the relationship between 
water and income poverty. We followed the second approach, which involves a two-step 
analysis of poverty for the YRB—constructing a water-related poverty profile and 
assessing water and non-water determinants of income poverty.  
The poverty situation in the YRB needs to be seen in the context of China’s remarkable 
performance in poverty reduction. We looked into China’s performance toward achieving 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of poverty reduction; and analyzed poverty 
trends and how they relate to growth and inequality.  
Economic reforms in China, begun after 1978, have generated significant and steady 
growth in investment, consumption and standards of living in the country. China has 
been the fastest-growing major economy in the world for the past 30 years with an 
average annual GDP growth rate of 9.7 percent from 1978 to 2007. China’s impressive 
growth performance has been associated with dramatic reduction in poverty: the $1.25 a 
day headcount poverty rate fell from 84 percent in 1981 to only 16 percent in 2005. 
During this period, 538 million people have been lifted out of poverty, mainly benefiting 
from liberalization of agriculture and rural industries. The first MDG target is to reduce by 
half between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living in poverty and suffering from 
hunger. Indeed, China has over achieved the poverty MDG—in 2005, the $1.25 a day 
poverty rate in the country was only about one-fourth the rate in 1990.  
During the 1999-2005 period, the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to per 
capita GDP growth is estimated at -1.1; that is, 1 percent growth of GDP per capita 
resulted in 1.1 percent reduction in the number of the poor. The estimate for the 
growth-poverty elasticity for the 2002-2005 period is -1.6, indicating that for every 1 
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percent increase in GDP per capita, poverty reduced by 1.6 percent on average in the 
more recent years in China. 
China’s growth rates were high, but inequality also increased. The trends of increasing 
income inequalities overshadow China’s impressive performance in economic growth and 
poverty reduction.   
Having analyzed the trends in growth, poverty and inequality at the national level, we 
moved to the task of constructing a water-related poverty profile for the YRB. Most of 
the data for our analysis came from the 2001 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  Therefore, the findings of our 
analyses represent the situation in 2001.  
Using the purchasing power parity (PPP) $1.25 a day poverty line and per capita income 
levels, we estimated that 30.5 percent of the population in the rural YRB region were 
living in poverty in 2001. The poverty rate was highest in the mountain region and 
lowest in the plain land region. Parts of nine provinces of China belong to the YRB 
region. The incidence of poverty (headcount poverty rate) varied widely in different parts 
of the rural YRB, ranging from a low of only 3.1 percent in the YRB part of Shandong 
province in the east to as high as 52.2 percent in the YRB part of Gansu province in 
western China. This pattern of poverty incidence corresponds quite well to that of the 
national level—poverty in China is mainly concentrated in the western part of the 
country.  
Income distribution in the YRB is rather skewed—only 7.1 percent of all income is earned 
by the poorest 20 percent of households and 27.5 percent by the richest 10 percent.  
The estimated Gini index is 40.5 percent for income distribution in rural YRB.  The Gini at 
the national level was 38.0 percent for rural China in 2002. 
The profile of poverty in the YRB focused on the empirical links between water and 
poverty in the basin. The PPP $1.25 a day headcount poverty rate is significantly lower in 
irrigated areas than in non-irrigated areas of the YRB region: while 19.4 percent of all 
households living in irrigated villages are poor, the rate is more than double (41.4 
percent) in non-irrigated villages.  
Education is a prerequisite for poverty alleviation. The net school enrollment rates 
disaggregated by irrigated and non-irrigated villages suggest that enrollment rates are 
higher in irrigated villages than those in non-irrigated villages, and that the rates are 
lower for children from poor households than those from nonpoor households. However, 
the gap in the school enrollment rate between the poor and the nonpoor is smaller in 
irrigated villages than that in non-irrigated villages. These results indicate that the 
availability of irrigation at the community level is not only associated with increased 
school enrollment in the community, but this improvement also seems to benefit the 
poor more than the nonpoor. 
Irrigated villages have better access to safe drinking water in the YRB. The difference in 
household access to safe drinking water is large between irrigated and non-irrigated 
villages—78 percent of households in irrigated villages have access to safe water 
compared to only 47 percent in non-irrigated communities. The results also show that 
nonpoor households have greater access to safe water compared to poor households, 
but the poor-nonpoor gap in the access is much smaller in irrigated villages. While the 
difference in access to safe water between poor and nonpoor is 16 percentage points in 
non-irrigated villages, it is only 3 percentage points in irrigated villages. Thus, irrigation 
appears to provide the poor with higher access to safe water. These findings have 
important policy implications, as access to safe water is critical for improved health and 
nutrition, particularly for children. This calls for further research in China and elsewhere 
on the links between irrigation, poverty and access to safe water.   
Crop yields are highest in the villages that receive the lowest average annual rainfall. 
The yields drop sharply for villages belonging to the second rainfall quintile and then rise 
with increases in rainfall. The highest crop productivity in the lowest rainfall area might 
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appear counterintuitive. Further analysis however shows that, villages belonging to the 
lowest rainfall quintile also have the maximum irrigation coverage in the YRB. These 
results suggest that the productivity of irrigation water is optimum in areas with least 
amount of rainfall in the YRB region.  
Irrigation induces technology adoption in crop production. The shares of land under high-
yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and maize—the two main crops grown in the YRB—
increase considerably with increased coverage of irrigated land. Cultivation of HYVs of 
crops is more capital-intensive than that of traditional varieties of crops. Irrigation takes 
much of the risks out of crop production as the dependence on rainfall is reduced. Thus, 
the access to irrigation encourages farmers to invest more on seed-fertilizer technology 
in agriculture.  
The variation in crop yields across households living in irrigated villages is much less 
than that of households living in non-irrigated villages. Low level of yield variability also 
motivates farmers to adopt improved technology in crop production.  
The $1.25 a day poverty headcount ratio shows stark differences across upstream, 
midstream, and downstream areas of the YRB. The poverty rate in the upstream area 
(47.5 percent) is nearly five times higher than that in the downstream area (only 9.9 
percent), while the rate in the midstream area (29.6 percent) is three times higher. The 
percentage of households using electric tubewells for irrigation increases considerably 
from upstream to midstream areas, and increases dramatically from midstream to 
downstream areas. However, village level coverage of surface-water irrigation reveals a 
rather different pattern with the largest share of cultivated land being irrigated in the 
midstream area. The patterns of the surface water irrigation coverage and the use of 
tubewells for irrigation suggest that households living in the downstream area rely 
mostly on groundwater for irrigating their crops, probably due to the lack of surface 
water availability from the Yellow River.  
The findings of the descriptive analysis of poverty profile provided us with important 
clues to the underlying determinants of poverty. However, the bivariate nature of the 
informational content of the profile did not isolate the effect of a particular factor on 
poverty from other confounding factors. Therefore, we extended the descriptive analysis 
of the profile by modeling income to identify the determinants of poverty in the rural 
YRB, with particular focus on water and agriculture. 
Access to irrigation leads to increased agricultural productivity, and hence, incomes of 
farmers. Irrigation coverage (that is, the percentage of cultivated land under irrigation in 
a village) is a statistically significant determinant of per capita income of households. 
The estimated income elasticity with respect to irrigation coverage suggests that, a 10-
percent increase in the village-level irrigation coverage increases per capita income of 
households living in that village by 1.7 percent on average. Further, poverty simulations 
using the estimated parameters of the income model suggest that, increasing irrigation 
coverage by 10 percent reduces the incidence of poverty by 5.11 percent. 
Irrigation yields a higher return at the margin in relatively low-rainfall communities. The 
marginal return to irrigation is lower in relatively high-rainfall communities of the YRB 
above a certain level (to be precise, communities with annual average rainfall greater 
than 492 mm).  
While the impact of irrigation expansion on poverty reduction is large, we also find fairly 
large and positive effect from expanding off-farm income opportunities in rural YRB. The 
headcount poverty rate is expected to decline by 4.52 percent if the share of non-farm 
income in total per capita household income increases by 10 percent.  
In sum, expanding irrigation in the YRB will help boost crop yields, which in turn will 
increase incomes of the poor and reduce poverty. However, there are limits to expanding 
irrigation coverage, and labor productivity is known to be lowest in agriculture. 
Therefore, accelerating a shift of rural labor force out of agriculture by creating off-farm 
employment opportunities in higher productivity sectors in rural areas is arguably even 
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more important for the poor. That said, rapid agricultural growth must be pursued for 
poverty reduction. The World Development Report 2008 shows that growth in agriculture 
is two to four times more poverty alleviating than growth in other sectors. Both China 
and India offer concrete evidence of this finding. Therefore, faster agricultural growth 
accompanied by a speedy shift of rural labor force out of agriculture is a key for poverty 
reduction in the YRB. 
 
2.5 High-Impact Interventions 
To assess high-impact interventions, we implemented a review on past, current and 
planned interventions by the Chinese Government. We also held discussions with 
stakeholders in the upstream, midstream, and downstream part of the basin, and the 
researchers in the project developed their own priority list of interventions. Finally, we 
designed and implemented a multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework to simulate 
the YRB. The model draws on the YRCC water simulation model described in Annex B 
and is also described there.  
The following sections provide a brief overview of the methodologies used followed by a 
presentation of results. 
2.5.1 Methods 
We used a literature review to assess high-impact interventions. We also convened 
stakeholder workshops in the upstream, mid-stream, and downstream part of the basin. 
Finally, we used quantitative simulation analysis. The last methodology is described 
further in the following. 
The theory of MAS has emerged from computer science theories associated with 
distributed artificial intelligence (Sycara, 1998).  An agent is defined as an autonomous 
unit within a system that interacts with others and characterized by behavioral rules.  
Agents in a watershed MAS can be defined as water users that utilized water for its own 
benefits. The behavior in water use decisions for a single agent is affected by the 
behaviors of its neighbors and also limited by physical conditions and management 
regulations.  The MAS model depict the water management institution more realistically 
than a conventional centralized model which assumes a “super hand” controlling not only 
system-level decisions but also the decisions of individual water users or stakeholders. 
Traditionally, to address these water resources allocation issues, the entire watershed 
has been modeled as a single system and water use of individual water users (agents) is 
a decision variable in a consistent mathematical programming model that optimize 
system-level objectives.  However, if the number of decision variables is too large, the 
model may become unsolvable.  The situation is even more complex if the format of the 
utility function is nonlinear.  Using the MAS modeling framework to formulate the water 
allocation problem is supposed to avoid the computational difficulty by decomposing the 
large model into a number of connected smaller models. To implement the MAS model, 
we define 52 water use agents, 5 reservoir agents and 3 ecosystem agents for the YRB 
following the setting in Zhao et al (2009). The map of the agents corresponding to the 
definitions is given in Figure 2.5.1.  
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Figure 2.5.1:  Agent map of the Yellow River Basin- 52 general agents, 5 reservoir agents and 3 
ecosystem agents. 
The following criteria are set up to ensure that water prices converge at a reasonable 
level: 1) total water consumption equals to total water permits; 2) whenever the outflow 
from agent i becomes negative, the water trading with agent i will stop, which means 
that additional trade is physically impossible although it is desired by agents; 3) a 
criterion that prevents an agent to buy water from downstream agents (negative 
outflow) by controlling the water prices; 4) only the water consumption for agricultural 
water use is allowed to be traded, and the M&I water use is treated as the basic water 
use for all agents and cannot be relocated; 5) the minimum flow requirements are set 
for ecosystem agents using UWFR results. See also Appendix B3. 
2.5.2 Results 
- Results from the Basin Diagnostic Tour 
The Basin Diagnostic Tour, implemented in January, 2008 visited the irrigation system of 
Victory Canal in Henan, the Farm Irrigation Research Institute (FIRI) – Henan, the flood 
retention scheme and eastern route of the SNWT project in Shandong, an irrigation canal 
in Shandong, and the Shandong Academy of Agricultural Sciences Crop Research 
Institute. 
 
Key results from discussion with various stakeholders during the tour included: 
 
 Water scarcity is considered the largest problem for irrigation 
 Water fees and water quality are also important issues constraining agricultural 
productivity. 
 Irrigators are weary of increased competition with urban-industrial and 
environmental water uses. 
 Zero tillage [a companion CPWF project that we visited] is considered as one 
strategy to save water and labor, adoption for maize and wheat. 
 Most farmers have off-farm jobs [small land area, many non-farm employment 
opportunities] 
 Climate change is recognized as a potential future threat – experience of more 
extreme cold events during the winter and reduced runoff despite stable rainfall 
 Relatively low poverty in Henan and Shandong provinces [downstream basin area] 
 
- Results from Stakeholder Workshops  
 
In order to further understand water management institution, policies and related pro-
poor issues, we organized several stakeholder workshops (or focus group discussion) in 
three provinces in the Yellow River Basin (YRB). These three provinces are Ningxia, 
Objectives CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 94 
Shaanxi and Henan Provinces. In Ningxia Province, four focus group discussions were 
organized, two with the management bureau of Ningxia Province and the management 
bureau of Qingtongxia Irrigation District, and two with groups of farmers. In Shaanxi 
Province, we also conducted two focus group discussions, the first with the management 
bureau of Jinghui Irrigation District, and the second with farmers. In Henan Province, we 
organized two focus groups discussions, one with the management bureau of People’s 
Victory Irrigation District, and the other one with farmers. 
During the stakeholder workshop, we have tried to understand two major issues. First, 
what kind of water resources the stakeholders have access to, and second who decides 
on water access. Based on the discussion, it appears that in the Ningxia Province, local 
people mainly have access to four kinds of water resources: gravity irrigation, pump 
irrigation for surface and groundwater, and domestic tap water. Rainfall is the major 
water source for some stakeholders in Ningxia Province. In Shaanxi and Henan Province, 
except for pump irrigation of surface water resources, local people can easily access four 
other water resources: gravity irrigation, pump irrigation for groundwater, domestic tap 
water and rainfall.  
Regarding the question on who regulates access to water resources, it seems that there 
are no differences among provinces. For example, managers of irrigation districts 
regulate the water access of farmers. For rural domestic and industrial water use, the 
decision makers are always village committee and local water resources bureaus. For 
urban domestic water use, water supply companies decide on water access. For urban 
industrial and environmental water use, both water resources bureaus and local 
government decide on water access.  
It is interesting to note that in all provinces, the factors contributing to pro-poor poverty 
alleviation are similar and local people in various regions also gave them a similar 
significance. The first important factor that can help farmers increase their income is 
non-farm employment. If the non-farm employment is higher, farmers’ income will also 
be higher. The second important income source for farmers is profit from agricultural 
production. This is dependent on many factors, such as irrigation availability, the quality 
of marketing of agricultural products and output/input ratio. In addition, education and 
local transportation conditions are also considered as two important factors influencing 
poverty.   
In the stakeholder workshops, we also discussed the issue of water allocation priority. 
The priority seems different between upstream regions (such as Ningxia Province) and 
downstream regions (such as Shaanxi and Henan Province). In the upstream regions, 
industry is less developed compared to downstream regions. Domestic water use has 
been given the first priority in water allocation in all regions, but the second allocation 
priority in Ningxia is agricultural water use, whereas in both Shaanxi and Henan 
Provinces it is for industry. For all provinces, environmental water use has been given 
the last priority in water allocation.  
In the YRB, several measures have been adopted to increase water productivity and deal 
with water shortages. The first measure is to reform irrigation management institutions 
through changing management from collective to either WUAs or contracting 
management (with or without incentives). Second, the water price has been reformed to 
give certain incentives to water users. Third, water rights transfer pilot projects have 
been implemented; these have moved part of the water from the agricultural sector to 
industry with the purpose of increasing agricultural water use efficiency. Finally, water 
saving technologies has been adopted along with agricultural technologies that can 
increase crop productivity. 
Based on the discussion, we also could highlight some challenges facing local water 
managers. First, although reforms have been implemented for irrigation management 
institutions, it is still difficult to operate WUAs effectively. Second, the irrigation 
infrastructure is poor, not only for main and branch canals, but also in the field canals at 
the village level. Third, there are no incentives for local water managers (WUA managers) 
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to increase water use efficiency. The wages of IDs managers depend on water fee 
collection, hence, if water use is reduced so will their wages. Therefore, there are 
conflicts between increasing water use efficiency on the one hand, and raising water 
revenues on the other. Besides, ID managers still face difficulties to collect water fees, 
particularly in Henan. 
Wages for ID managers are closely linked with water fee collection, and as such they are 
extremely unpredictable, due to variable water supply and to the difficulty in collecting 
water fees. Under such management mechanism, ID managers have no incentive to 
increase water use efficiency. They are afraid to increase water prices since they think 
farmers will reduce water use (or turn to groundwater use), resulting in income shortfalls 
for them. Most ID managers suggested for the government to subsidize water fees, so 
that farmers can use more water and the fee could be collected more easily. Due to 
financial constraints of the local government, the revenue situations of most IDs are 
hard to be improved in the short term.  
There are some additional challenges. In the past 15 years, water prices have been 
increased in most IDs. However, this has potential negative impacts on farmers’ income 
and agricultural production. On the other hand, without increases in prices farmers have 
no incentive to increase water use efficiency. Discussions also revealed that the 
upstream regions use more water than the water quota allocated by the YRCC, while the 
downstream regions use less water than the water quota (of 1987). As a result most of 
these regions are considering reservoirs to store water that they cannot use. Perhaps the 
allocation system could be improved then. 
Other problems have to do with the water rights transfer projects. Although the projects 
have facilitated  innovation and increased  water use efficiency in agriculture, there are 
no real water rights transfer between industrial and agricultural water users; all the 
transfer projects have been managed by the local governments and the managers of the 
irrigation districts, while local managers and farmers were not really involved, which 
makes the  water rights transfers ineffective . Moreover, if the transfer should for any 
reason affect negatively local managers and farmers, they have no instrument to ask for 
compensation. Finally, we found that in the Henan Province after the implementation of 
the new water project infrastructures were not able anymore to withdraw water from the 
Yellow River. Before the project, the river bed of the Yellow River was high and local 
infrastructures for water abstraction were designed accordingly. After the 
implementation of the Xiaolangdi project, the river bed decreased and water intakes 
became too high to abstract water.  Financial and engineering problems are presently 
hindering solutions to this problem. 
 
- Results from Researcher Consultation 
 
Results from the researcher consultation are shown in Figure 2.5.2. Researchers agreed 
on three best-bet options: The first best bet option is continued investments in yield 
improvement, including for drought stress. The Chinese Government is already pursuing 
this avenue and is the developing-country government with highest research 
expenditures on agricultural R&D, including for water savings in agriculture. The second 
option identified is further advances in water management, with a focus on irrigation 
management reform—a focus of WP4 and water rights and water markets, which are 
analyzed with the MAS model developed for WP5. A final area for high-impact 
interventions identified are continued irrigation infrastructure investments to make 
structures perform in real-time for both drought and flood management and to increase 
overall water use efficiency in agriculture. 
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Table 2.5.1:  High impact interventions according to researcher consultation 
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- Selected results from literature reviews and engineering analyses 
Given the size of the YRB, no single intervention could possibly do justice to the extreme 
diversity of water-related challenges found in the basin, which ranges from the upstream 
mountainous areas dominated by livestock herders, to the hilly/mountainous Loess 
Plateau with severe erosion challenges, the semi-arid to arid irrigated plains in Inner 
Mongolia/Ningxia with rapidly growing industries, to the key urban-industrial centers 
interspersed with highly productive irrigation downstream. Many interventions have been 
implemented in the past to increase water supply and enhance flood control. Key among 
these are the construction of the Xiaolangdi reservoir, completed in 1999, which has 
increased the designed flood-control period from 60 years to over 1000 years; the 
construction of several thousand silt-trap dams across the Loess Plateau; and two large 
watershed rehabilitation projects implemented by the government of China and the 
World Bank. Additional interventions in recent years to address growing water shortages 
and the need for food include the conversion of hillside production into terraces (this was 
also done as part of the watershed rehabilitation project); rainwater harvesting schemes 
in the western upland areas; the use of plastic sheeting to contain soil moisture and 
reduce evaporation in the arid parts of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia; and the resettlement 
of people out of extremely dry areas. 
Technical interventions:  
While many technical or engineering interventions have been already implemented in the 
basin, a series of additional measures could increase water supply or reduce demand. 
The possibly most important one is the south-to-north water transfer (SNWT) project. If 
fully implemented, it could transfer up to 50 km3 (comparable to total Yellow River 
runoff) from the Yangtze River in southern China to the North China Plain. However, 
among the three routes (western, middle and eastern routes) only the western route 
would directly affect water resources in the YRB. It could transfer 20 km3 to irrigate an 
additional 1.3 million ha and provide water for economic development in Qinghai, Gansu, 
Shanxi and Shanxi provinces, as well as Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, all in the YRB. 
However, economic, engineering, and ecological side effects prevent this route from 
development in the foreseeable future.  
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Even without the SNWT, engineers at YRCC still see some potential for water savings in 
the basin, amounting to 5.7 km3 by 2020 and 7.6 km3 by 2030, mostly in the agriculture 
sector (but allowing for continued agricultural and economic growth and small increases 
in irrigated area). During the last two decades, the water utilization level and water use 
efficiency in the YRB have been improved greatly; but there is still considerable room for 
improvement when comparing the YRB with Australia or the United States, for example. 
According to statistics, the water withdrawal quota per ten thousand Yuan GDP in the 
YRB decreased from 876 m3 in 1980 to 104 m3 in 2006, a decline of 88 percent. 
Furthermore, the water recycling rate is 61%. However, in the developed world, the 
water withdrawal quota per ten thousand Yuan GDP is below 50 m3, and the industrial 
water recycling rate reaches 80% to 85%. In the YRB, the farm real-irrigation quota 
dropped from 542 m3/mu in 1980 to 420 m3/mu in 2006. The irrigation water use 
efficiency is 0.49, compared to 0.7~0.8 in developed countries. 
Through adjustments in planting dates and crop varieties, technological advances in 
agriculture, and various engineering measures, we expect additional water savings in 
irrigation in the range of 54.72 million mu by 2020 and 30.39 million mu by 2030, 
resulting in total irrigation water savings of 4.04 BCM and 5.42 BCM. The industrial 
water-saving measures mainly include the adjustment of the industrial structure, the use 
of advanced technologies and advanced equipment, and improved water recycling rates. 
Through these water-saving measures, the water withdrawal quota per ten thousand 
Yuan GDP is expected to decline to 52.9 m3 by 2020, the water reuse rate is projected to 
increase to 72.3%, resulting in total water savings of 1.53 BCM in the industrial sector, 
by 2020. By 2030, the water reuse rate in the industrial sector will increase to 83.5%, 
the water withdrawal quota per ten thousand Yuan GDP will be decreased to 30.4 m3, 
and the water-savings amount will be 2.05 BCM. In the urban-domestic sector, water 
savings will be achieved through engineering measures, new technologies and 
management techniques to reduce water losses, including disconnecting invalid water 
connections and increasing the efficiency of water uses. The expected volume of water 
savings is 0.12 BCM by 2020, and 0.17 BCM by 2030. Combined water savings across all 
three sectors will reach 5.69 BCM and 7.64 BCM in 2020 and 2030. The summary of 
proposed water savings is shown in Table 2.1.6.  
 










2020  1.53  4.04  0.12  5.69  
2030 2.05  5.42  0.17  7.64  
 
However, these savings will not be sufficient to turn around trends of growing water 
deficits in the basin, particularly in dry years.  Thus, even more investment in 
agricultural research and development will be needed to achieve even more rapid 
improvements in crop yields without use of more irrigation water. 
An assessment of crop water productivity across the YRB showed that while there is still 
scope for increased water-use efficiency in irrigated agriculture in the YRB, the scope is 
limited and further declines in allocation of water to irrigation will eventually result in 
reduced food production with serious implications for local food security and farmer 
incomes, as well as potential impacts on global food prices and trade. 
Reform of governance: 
Despite high levels of water scarcity in the country and in the YRB, integrated water 
management in China remains elusive as a result of fragmented management and 
conflicts among water users at the national, provincial, and local levels. Key challenges 
in Chinese water legislation and administration relate to the lack of regulations 
supporting implementation of the 2002 water law; and poor incentives for water 
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conservation at the level of the irrigation system. To address growing water scarcity, in 
addition to water supply/engineering measures, the government has started to support 
reform of irrigation management. Our studies found that significant scope for 
governance and institutional reforms remain in the following areas: 1) Reforming 
irrigation management institutions; 2) Reforming water pricing; 3) Implementing water 
rights transfer projects; and 4) Support for water reallocation across provinces.  
Economic solutions: Role of water pricing and water markets 
Market mechanisms and water pricing measures are also adopted to promote water 
savings. Although China does not currently have formal water markets that are 
supported by clearly and universally assigned water property rights, China is slowly 
reforming its water policies in an attempt to reallocate water (Heaney, et al., 2005).  
Effective pricing mechanisms focus on incentives for farmers to value water resources 
and to use water carefully (Liang, 2005). Water was always free to farmers until 1978, 
when the government started charging for the use of water. Current water prices do not 
reflect the actual cost of water, since the government subsidizes prices (He, et al. 2005). 
Farmers pay for the water based on the amount of irrigated land, not based on how 
much they use. Water pricing for irrigation does not reflect the actual costs of water 
because farmers remain poor, and raising water prices would raise the costs of 
production for farmers. Water pricing mechanisms are more important than the pricing 
itself (Li and Zhang). Water prices have increased more than fivefold for industrial 
withdrawals and agricultural irrigation since the 1990s. Increasing water prices are 
intended to encourage farmers to conserve valuable water resources and reduce water 
use instead of increasing agricultural products prices and punishing farmers. Therefore, 
care should be taken for designing water pricing systems for agriculture, and a pricing 
scheme that pays farmers for reducing water use is preferred to a direct water price (Cai 
and Rosegrant, 2004).  
A crop irrigation water quota is another form of water pricing. The user would be 
charged much higher prices (than the standard price) for water use that exceeds the 
quota amount. For example, in the water rights experimental City of Zhangye, users pay 
an additional 50 percent charge for exceeding their quota by 30%, a 100% charge for 
the use of an extra 31 to 50 percent of water, and a 200 percent charge for an excess 
water use of 51 percent or more (He, et al. 2005).  
The third part of water pricing is the water tax. An increase in water prices by a tax 
would encourage farmers to adopt improved irrigation technology. However, this may 
result increased agricultural product prices, leading to reduced competitiveness in the 
world market. 
Although water prices have been steadily raised over the past several decades in China, 
and particularly since the latest round of water-pricing reforms started in 1997, 
agricultural water is still thought to be much under-priced. As a result, water charges 
remain a limited instrument to increase water use efficiency and productivity further.  
oreover, given the growing rural-urban income divide, it is unlikely that the government 
will raise irrigation fees to levels high enough to reduce irrigation water use seriously. 
Furthermore, in the YRB, the UWFR has led to income shortfalls of districts in parts of 
the basin where irrigation water supplies were cut considerably, particularly in 
midstream provinces. 
Since 2000, YRCC has promoted the establishment of water-right systems by conducting 
demonstration projects aimed at reducing water competition among sectors. The 
purpose of these demonstration sites is to reallocate water from agriculture to industry 
through increasing irrigation efficiency, generally through engineering measures, such as 
canal lining. One transfer pilot project operates in Ningxia Province and 16 projects 
signed transfer contracts in Inner Mongolia, with a value of US$100 million. Under these 
projects, irrigation districts transfer part of their water use rights to industrial enterprises 
for a period of 25 years. However, analyses showed that water users in the irrigation 
districts are generally not aware of the water rights transfer; transfers are determined 
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by the administration, not markets; and there are no adjustments based on market 
signals or economic measures. Thus, major challenges remain until a true market for 
water rights can be established.  
Importantly, the intra-provincial irrigation-to-agriculture transfers in the YRB provide 
important inputs for the potential development of inter-provincial water trading, which 
has been discussed by both policymakers and water allocation managers at the MWR and 
YRCC for several years.   
- Selected results from modeling analysis 
The MAS model is populated with aggregated data from the water-simulation model of 
the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC). A total of 52 water-use agents are 
defined: nine for the provinces sharing Yellow River flows, three to reflect downstream 
ecological needs, five to represent key reservoirs, and the remainder to represent key 
tributaries and inflows. The model is calibrated to 2000 data.  
Using this modeling framework, we compare two scenarios to evaluate the 
consequences of changes from the current scheme of water allocation (that is, 
business-as-usual under the current UWFR based on the 1987 allocation agreement): 
(1) water allocation across provinces without quotas, and (2) water trading among 
agents using irrigation water. For the lower three ecosystem agents, we also assess the 
impact of using environmental flow requirements (as established by several Chinese 
studies) on the potential for water trading. 
The scenario without regulation mimics the situation before the UWFR was 
implemented, so the only constraint affecting water users would be the physical limit of 
water availability. An obvious result from this scenario is that upstream water users will 
take advantage of available water while downstream water users can only utilize 
whatever is left from upstream. The water-trading scenario is implemented through a 
price bargaining process, where local water prices are adjusted to ensure that the 
systemwide total water consumption matches the total value of water permits.  
The environmental flow scenario establishes stream-flow requirements for the three 
downstream ecosystem agents (Huayuankou, Gaochun, and Lijin). Requirements are 
differentiated for a normal flow period (from November to March), a fish nursery period 
(from April to June), and a flooding period (from July to October). 
 
Impact of the UWFR on Water Use and GDP 
As expected, annual water consumption under the scenario without regulation is 
higher—by 11 percent (38.3 billion cubic meters (m3) compared with 34.5 billion m3 
under the UWFR). At the same time, the basin-wide GDP—at 1123.26 billion RMB under 
the scenario without regulation—is 10 percent lower than the 1246.68 billion RMB 
achieved under the UWFR scenario (see also Figure 2.5.2). As a result of increased 
water consumption without the UWFR, flows to downstream ecosystems are reduced 
and flow cutoff events occur from February to June.  
Flow impacts are even stronger for the ecosystem agent that is farthest downstream, 
where cutoff periods start in February and continue through December. These results 
reflect the period from 1972 to 1998, before the UWFR was enforced, and show the 
benefit of the UWFR for downstream ecosystem flows. Moreover, basin-water 
consumption under the UWFR scenario is lower and GDP higher as compared with the 
unmanaged scenario. Although some upstream agents experience declines in GDP (by 
about 2.5 billion RMB annually), total basin GDP is higher.  
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Figure 2.5.2:  System-wide comparison between UWFR scenario (baseline) and the scenario 
without UWFR: (a) monthly water consumption (billion m3); (b) monthly GDP (billion RMB)  
 
Impact of Water Trading on Water Use and GDP  
The water trading scenario starts from an initial water price of 27 RMB/m3 based on trial-
and-error. If the local water price is above this value, all agents would only use water for 
M&I use and sell the rest of their water entitlement.  This implies that the maximum 
marginal benefit of agriculture water use over the whole basin is 27 RMB/m3. Starting 
from this initial water price, the model ends with equilibrium water prices for each agent 






Figure 2.5.3. Equilibrium water prices for different agents in different months. (a) January; (b) 
June; (c) August; (d) September 
Generally, water prices are higher in tributaries than in the mainstream because much 
less water is available and can be transferred.  January is an example of a month with 
relatively uniform water prices for agents along the mainstream and the major 
tributaries.  Only a few agents located at smaller tributaries in the downstream area 
have higher water prices.  Moreover, since January is usually the month with lowest 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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flow, the average water price for the entire system is relatively higher compared to 
other months.  In general, water prices are lower in high-flow months.  However spatial 
heterogeneity in water prices exist in the high-flow season.  Moreover, water prices in 
tributaries, particularly the source areas of tributaries, are higher than those in other 
places.  This is because water transactions from mainstream toward tributaries or from 
downstream toward upstream are physically impossible without engineering works.  The 
marginal benefit of water in those areas will therefore be higher in these areas under 
the water trade scenario. 
The annual water consumption under the water-trading scenario is slightly lower at 33.8 
billion m3 than the annual water consumption under the UWFR scenario while total GDP 
is higher at 1270.1 billion RMB in the former scenario. As expected, water-use agents 
upstream use less water under the water-trading scenario compared to the UWFR 
scenario (a decline of about 3.27 billion m3), while midstream and downstream agents 
use more (2.55 billion m3). Thus, upstream agents tend to sell water to gain revenue, 
while downstream agents buy water for greater water-use benefit. The GDP increase is 
5.64 billion RMB for upstream agents and 17.8 billion RMB for midstream and 




















Note: Provinces are shown from upstream to downstream. 
Figure 2.5.4:  Water consumption in the YRB under alternative allocation scenarios  
Figure 2.5.4 presents the results for water consumption by province (from upstream to 
downstream) under the unmanaged, UWFR, and water-trading scenarios. The water-
trading scenario follows prescribed withdrawals downstream to support the ecosystem 
agents, but also reallocates water from Inner Mongolia and Ningxia to Shanxi, Shaanxi, 
and Gansu provinces. 
For all months evaluated, the quantity of water sold exceeds the quantity of water 
purchased. The additional water is assumed to be purchased by the Government to 
fulfill ecosystem flow requirements. The total value of water transactions of 2.95 billion 
RMB is actually quite low compared with the total additional basin-wide GDP increase 
(Table 2.5.3). As such, water trading increases the basin economy by more than 20 
billion RMB, and the implementation is economically efficient. The results of the water-
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trading scenario demonstrate that basin-wide water-related GDP can increase under 
water trading despite strict flow control measures for the downstream ecosystem.  
 

























1 0.0004 0.0001 0.0674 0.0405 0.0005 0.11 0.11 0.56 
2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.02 
3 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 
4 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.06 
5 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.04 0.18 0.51 0.32 0.06 
6 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.02 
7 0.08 0.79 0.93 0.66 0.88 1.58 0.71 0.81 
8 0.12 0.44 0.99 0.42 0.56 1.41 0.86 0.54 
9 0.09 1.41 1.54 0.44 1.50 1.98 0.48 0.42 
10 0.06 0.69 0.87 0.09 0.75 0.96 0.21 0.28 
11 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.07 
12 0.0005 0.0908 0.0564 0.0610 0.0914 0.12 0.03 0.05 




Can the YRB Economy accommodate full environmental flow requirements?  
The UWFR was implemented mainly to restore downstream flows in the YRB and to 
preserve the ecosystem in the delta area. However, studies on environmental flow 
requirements for the YRB delta suggest that flows should be greater than those listed in 
the UWFR, particularly to preserve deltaic fish nurseries from April to June.  
Under the environmental flow scenario as specified above, water purchases decline to 
zero for the months of January, April, and June. Thus, no one is buying water in the 
basin during those months; instead agents consume water equivalent to municipal and 
industrial needs, which receive highest priority. At the same time, agents sell large 
amounts of water to support the high ecosystem demands. Despite these sales, 
instream flow requirements cannot be met fully in the months of January, April, and 
June. Thus, it is physically impossible to satisfy both human and ecosystem 
requirements in those months unless additional measures, such as reservoir re-
operation or new infrastructure development, are undertaken. As water scarcity 
increases under the environmental flow scenario, water-trading prices on the 
mainstream also rise by 30 percent compared with the UWFR scenario, where they rise 
from 1.16 RMB/m3 to 1.62 RMB/m3.  
2.5.3 Conclusion 
The government of China has recognized the severe water constraints in the YRB. To 
address growing water scarcity, the government has started to change its approaches 
from management of water supply toward improved management of water demand. 
Signs of the new approaches are the 2002 water law, the increased number of 
regulations on water prices and a series of water trading pilots implemented in the YRB. 
However, most organizations concerned with water management are still headed and 
staffed by engineers, and traditional water-engineering measures, as exemplified by the 
SNWT, still dominate interventions in terms of funding. 
There is no panacea for addressing the severe water scarcity challenges in the YRB. 
Based on an assessment of options available, we believe that the government should 
continue to reform the institutions responsible for irrigation management and water 
pricing across all water-using sectors; but current users need to be compensated for 
ceding water resources to users with higher-valued uses. Projects that transfer enhanced 
water rights that follow market mechanisms, and include the establishment of water 
rights and related responsibilities would be a first step in that direction. Reform is also 
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required at all the administrative levels from the central to the local government to 
support fully integrated land and water management at the basin level and to avoid 
large inefficiencies caused by conflicting objectives of the various agencies involved in 
water supply and food production in the YRB. 
Expanding irrigation in the YRB will help boost crop yields, which in turn will increase 
incomes of the poor and reduce poverty. However, the potential for expanding irrigation 
is limited, and labor productivity is known to be lowest in agriculture. Therefore, 
accelerating a shift of the rural labor force out of agriculture by creating off-farm 
employment opportunities in higher-productivity sectors in rural areas is arguably even 
more important for future rural economic development. 
Other ancillary measures that need to be continued include further adoption of water-
saving technologies, and continued support to agricultural research and development to 
increase crop productivity for both irrigated and rainfed crops. Continued productive 
investment is needed, rather than subsidies, in the rural non-farm sector to ensure that 
the urban-rural poverty gap does not widen even further. There is still scope for savings 
of agricultural water through improved water productivity. But continued transfers of 
water out of agriculture will eventually result in declining production, with implications 
for national food production as well as global food prices and trade. 
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The methods used for the knowledge base is principally GIS maps of key parameters of 
importance for agricultural water use in the Yellow River Basin. Several GIS-based 
databases have been connected to the MAS model for dynamic updating of the data sets.  
Data and output indicators from this project have been incorporated into the CD-Rom 




The Knowledge base WP has generated the following datasets that are made available on 
a CD-Rom “Yellow River Water and Food for Poverty Alleviation Atlas:” 
 
1. Physiography: Digital elevation data to provide more accurate basin/watershed 
boundaries, river networks. The elevation datasets are also crucial for surface 
water modeling and management. 
2. Land cover and land cover change:  Land cover maps for the Yellow River Basin. 
3. Climatic and hydrologic data, time series of precipitation and temperature. Monthly 
data at the resolution of 50km (from IPCC (http://www.ipcc.ch/). 
4. Water supply and irrigation infrastructure data, including reservoirs and dams, water 
lift projects and water diversion projects. 
5. Crop distribution data - Spatial distribution of major crops split by irrigated and 
rainfed portions. The method provided by Cai et al. (2006a) was used to retrieve 
irrigated and rainfed crop area and yield at the level of irrigation district. 
6. Socio-economic data - Rural/urban population density distribution; poverty and water 
maps generated from this project.  
 
The GIS-maps and databases generated can be directly linked to the current Digital 
Yellow River framework.  However, the Digital Yellow River framework is not one 
coherent system—instead pieces are scattered across various YRCC organizations.  
 
The project has also generated a website http://www.ccapwater.com/river/index.html  
that is directly linked to the CCAP website to achieve wide policy impact. A first policy 
brief has been drafted and is currently being reviewed. A total of 5 policy briefs will be 
produced at the end of the project. All briefs will be available on the website for 
downloading in English and Chinese.  
 
2.6.3 Discussion 
We had hoped to achieve a larger exchange and integration of data with our Chinese 
partners. However, there is still considerable reluctance on their side regarding data 
sharing. It took us almost 2 full years to obtain data for water simulation modeling. 
Researchers outside China were not allowed to handle the Chinese household data set.  
 
2.6.4 Conclusion 
Access to agreed upon GIS layers remains fundamental to achieving enhanced food and 
water security in the YRB. Thanks to our collaborators at YRCC, CCAP, BNU, and 
Tsinghua University, we have been able to use the latest available data for our analyses. 
However, such data is not available for other researchers to per-use and many 
researchers will therefore continue to need to rely on secondary/internationally available 
data to do their analyses for this river basin and other basins in China.
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3. OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS 
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and policy briefs 
 
 
Of the changes listed above, which have the greatest potential to be adopted and have 
impact?  What might the potential be on the ultimate beneficiaries? 
 
The research results generated, including the water-poverty analysis and the MAS 
modeling, including the ecosystem flow assessment, will likely have the largest impact 
for enhanced basin water allocation. We hope to disseminate these results widely 
through a series of policy briefs that we have produced both in English and Chinese. 
 
The insights from the irrigation water reform research will help shape Chinese irrigation 




What still needs to be done to achieve this potential?  Are measures in place (e.g., a new 
project, on-going commitments) to achieve this potential?  Please describe what will 
happen when the project ends. 
 
More work is being done on assessing ecosystem flow requirements and the values of 
ecosystems. We hope that some of this work can build on our project.  
 
 
Each row of the table above is an impact pathway describing how the project contributed 
to outcomes in a particular actor or actors.   
Which of these impact pathways were unexpected (compared to expectations at the 
beginning of the project?) 
 
It took a long time to realize the benefits of collaboration, including data sharing. In fact, 
the project was inactive for the larger part of a full year as a result. However, in the end, 
most planned outputs could be achieved. 
 
 
What would you do differently next time to better achieve outcomes (i.e. changes in 
stakeholder knowledge, attitudes, skills and practice)? 
 
Clarify expectations of all collaborators early on in the project; present preliminary 
results not only at the medium- and final workshops in Beijing, but improve 
communication during project duration with other stakeholders in China, particularly the 
provincial leadership in charge of provincial water allocation. 
 
Establish a panel that includes officials from both the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry 
of Water Resources to discuss current water policies that adversely affect agriculture and 
current agricultural policies that adversely affect water resources in the YRB and to 
identify mutually beneficial policies. 
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3.2 International Public Goods 
3.2.1 Tools and Methodology 
We used a variety of research methods, ranging from stakeholder consultations, 
workshops with researchers, to descriptive qualitative analysis, and quantitative, 
modeling analysis. Quantitative analysis methods included a) econometric analyses to 
relate agricultural water with poverty outcomes and to relate water-related institutions 
with water savings; b) hydrologic and water supply and demand simulation modeling, 
including SWAT modeling to assess the impact of climate change on Yellow River Basin 
water resources; water supply and demand modeling (YRCC-led) to assess water 
availability and use in the basin; and MAS modeling to assess the impact of alternative 
high-impact interventions; and c) GIS-based analysis of water productivity to assess the 
spatial variation of water productivity across the basin.  
 
The most innovative components of our research were the water-poverty analysis and 
the MAS modeling that empirically showed the benefits from water rights trading taking 
hydrologic constraints and ecosystem requirements into account in the YRB. 
 
3.2.2 Project Insights 
Key project insights include: 
 
• Most of the poor are concentrated in the western part of the YRB, where irrigation 
options are costly and limited. 
 
• Irrigation has been a significant contributor to poverty alleviation in the YRB. 
Thus, limited further expansion should continue. 
 
• Under business as usual, the water deficit in the YRB will continue to increase; 
the deficit will also continue to widen as a result of climate change; and will be 
particularly high in dry years. 
 
• Engineering measures in the water sector, including the SNWT, will not be 
sufficient to reverse growing water shortages. 
 
• While there is still scope for improving water productivity in the basin, and rainfed 
and irrigated soybean and maize achieve similar yields in the downstream part of 
the basin, further increases in crop water productivity will soon reach limits. 
 
• Once yields decline in the YRB as a result of growing water shortages and 
transfers out of irrigation agriculture, net food imports in China and food prices 
globally will be affected. 
 
• To address growing shortages, the establishment of water use rights below the 
province level—and particularly for irrigators or organizations representing groups 
of irrigators will be crucial.  
 
• We show empirically that water rights trading by irrigators alone will reduce water 
shortages and increase overall basin GDP.  
 
• We show that some government policies in the agriculture arena have adverse 
impacts for the water sector and vice versa. Examples include high input 
subsidies instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture that adversely affect water 
quality in the YRB and elsewhere in China. While many subsidies have been 
decoupled, in practice, monetary transfers are still used for fertilizers.  The long-
term cost of this policy is not only a wastage of productive resources that could 
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be invested in crop yield improvement, extension, transportation and agricultural 
marketing, but also the long-term costs to water availability and quality, with 
adverse health impacts for everybody, but particularly for those who cannot 
afford bottled water. Another policy in the agriculture arena that has adversely 
impacted the irrigation sector is the removal of the agricultural land tax that has 
increased the difficult to collect the water service fee as both fees used to be 
collected together (logistical/cost factor). Moreover, farmers feel that the 
elimination of the land tax should also lead to an elimination of the water fee.  On 
the water side, the new policy in the YRB to flush silt out of the lower basin 
through large reservoir spills is highly effective, but it has led to irrigation channel 
intakes along the river to be too high up the river bed for actually accessing 
water. Thus, irrigation looses out to river safety. Another policy in the water 
sector has been to increase irrigation service fees to conserve water resources. 
However, unless incentives are changed, irrigation district managers are hurt 
through this policy as their income depends on the volume of water delivered. 
Thus, if conservation is the key, the incentives for ID managers need to be 
changed towards merit payments keyed to water conservation and not keyed to 
overall irrigation water volume delivered.  
 
3.2.3 Partnership Achievements 
 
With project collaborators 
 
The development of various modeling tools required new partnerships between project 
partners. For example, the development of the climate change impact analysis water 
supply and demand in the YRB required a linkage between BNU and YRCC; and the 
development of the MAS model required a linkage between YRCC, Tsinghua University, 
and UIUC.  This model development was facilitated by staff from China visiting the ARI 
collaborator at Illinois. 
 
Second, the water-poverty analysis would not have been possible without the close 
collaboration between CCAP who has a copy of the 2001 HIES and IFPRI, which has 
implemented many poverty analyses in the past.  
 
With the CPWF BFP 
 
The exchange of information on modeling tools and work package progress was helpful, 
not only for the project leader, but also for collaborators who were more removed from 
the CPWF 
 
Learning across large-scale basins is highly innovative and will be helpful to gain new 




For the YRB 
 
We found that the exchange of researchers has been highly fruitful for both parties. One 
student from Beijing National University and one associate professor from Tsinghua 
University spent one year each at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This 
has helped enhance data exchange, and has increased mutual learning and collaboration 
and helps ensure future collaboration.  We suggest that future research projects should 
consider such exchanges as well. 
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In terms of research, we believe that more research is needed on ecosystem service 
impacts from upstream water usage, on water quality impacts from poor agricultural 
policies, including the cost of water quality deterioration to the overall basin economy.  
 
 
For basin-level research 
 
Additional research should be undertaken on the linkage between water and poverty and 
water and food security in a river basin context, for example, as they are affected over 
time by climate change and, even more importantly, by the reallocation of water out of 
agriculture. We have shown for the Yellow River Basin that irrigators have progressively 
lost access to water. A threshold where water has adversely impacted overall food 
production, has not yet been reached, but will likely be reached in the coming decade.  
We already show declines in wheat yield as a result of reduced irrigation water 
availability in based on village survey data for Ningxia and Henan provinces. 
 
Additional research should be undertaken on the adverse impacts on water and food 
from poor agricultural policies and on food from poor water policies. This research should 
be combined with identifying win-win strategies that support both water and food. We 
have identified, for the YRB, a series of agricultural policies that harm water (quantity 
and quality), and a series of water policies that adverse affect agriculture. Both types of 
policies increase the costs to government and the economy overall. 
 
Given the positive effects of water rights trading, further discussions should be held with 





Publications are listed in Appendix A. 
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Appendix A: Abstracts of publications 
 
1) Abstracts of published papers 
 
Zongxue Xu, F.F. Zhao, and J.Y. Li. 2008. Impact of climate change on 
streamflow in the Yellow River Basin. In Fighting Poverty Through Sustainable 
Water Use: Volumes I. Proceedings of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water 
and Food 2nd International Forum on Water and Food, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
November 10—14, pp. 167-169. 
To assess how streamflow in the headwater catchment of the Yellow River Basin will be 
affected by climate change in the future, the HadCM3 model, developed at the Hadley 
Centre in the United Kingdom, was used to generate low emission scenarios (B2) in this 
study. The statistical method was used to generate future possible local meteorological 
variables in the study area. The down-scaled data were then used as input to the Soil 
and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model to simulate the corresponding future 
streamflow regime in the headwater catchment of the Yellow River Basin. Three 
benchmark periods simulated were 2010–2039 (2020s), 2040–2069 (2050s), and 2070–
2099 (2080s). The time series generated by HadCM3 and statistical downscaling method 
indicate a significant increasing trend in both maximum and minimum temperature 
values, and a slight increasing trend in precipitation. The hydrologic impact analysis 
made with the downscaled temperature and precipitation time series as input to the 
SWAT model suggested an overall decreasing trend in annual streamflow in the 
headwater catchment of the Yellow River Basin, in three benchmark periods in the 
future. This should be considered by policymakers of water resources planning and 
management. 
 
Yang, Y.C.E., Cai, X. and Stipanović, D. M. 2009. A decentralized optimization 
algorithm for multi-agent system-based watershed management. Water 
Resources Research. 45, W08430, doi:10.1029/2008WR007634 
A watershed can be simulated as a multiagent system (MAS) composed of spatially 
distributed land and water users (agents) within a common defined environment. The 
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watershed system is characterized by distributed decision processes at the agent level 
with a coordination mechanism organizing the interactions among individual decision 
processes at the system level. This paper presents a decentralized (distributed) 
optimization method known as constraint-based reasoning, which allows individual 
agents in an MAS to optimize their behaviors over various alternatives. The method 
incorporates the optimization of all agents’ objectives through an interaction scheme, in 
which the ith agent optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration and 
forwards the solution and consequences to all agents that interact with it. Agents are 
allowed to determine how important their own objectives are in comparison with the 
constraints, using a local interest factor (bi). A large bi value indicates a selfish agent 
who puts high priority on its own benefit and ignores collaboration requirements. This 
bottom-up problem-solving approach mimics real-world watershed management 
problems better than conventional ‘‘top-down’’ optimization methods in which it is 
assumed that individual agents will completely comply with any recommendations that 
the coordinator makes. The method is applied to a steady state hypothetical watershed 
with three off-stream human agents, one in-stream human agent (reservoir), and two 
ecological agents. 
 
Also as Yang, Y.E., J. Zhao and X. Cai (2010), A Multi-Agent System Based Model for 
Water Allocation Management in the Yellow River Basin, proceedings of  
World Water Congress, Environmental and Water Resources Institute (EWRI), Am. 
Society of Civil Engineers, Providence, RI, 2010. 
 
2) Abstracts of papers submitted to journals  
Yi-Chen Ethan Yang, Jianshi Zhao, and Ximing Cai. Under review. A Multi-Agent 
System Model for Water Allocation Management in the Yellow River Basin 
The management of large river basins, such as the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China, is 
complicated by distributed, local decision processes, as well as mechanisms that 
coordinate individual decisions and manage basin-level issues. Since 1998, the Yellow 
River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) has used the Unified Water Flow Regulation 
(UWFR) water allocation management plan as a centralized controlling mechanism that 
enforces an upper limit of water withdrawals (water permits) for eight provinces located 
in the basin. The implementation of UWFR has maintained a prescribed minimum flow in 
the downstream channel and avoided the flow cutoff events that occurred every year 
between 1972 and1998. In the context of the regulation plan, this study attempts to 
explore the socioeconomic and environmental consequences of the regulation, 
understand the behaviors of the water users, and test alternative management plans to 
improve water allocation management in the basin. To address these objectives, a multi-
agent system (MAS) based model is developed for the YRB in which water users, 
reservoirs and downstream ecological zones are defined as agents. The MAS 
model depicts agents' autonomy in water use decisions and interactions among the 
agents in the context of a water right and market system. A decentralized optimization 
algorithm was extended to determine local water prices as an incentive to influence 
agents' decision toward the basin-level policy targets. The proposed water market 
scenario shows possible improvements of the UWFR with respect to social (equity), 
economic and environmental objectives. 
 
Claudia Ringler, Ximing Cai, Jinxia Wang, Akhter Ahmed, Yunpeng Xue, 
Zongxue Xue, Ethan Yang, Zhao Jianshi, Tingju Zhu, Lei Cheng, Fu Yongfeng, Fu 
Xinfeng, Gu Xiaowei, and Liang You. Yellow River basin: Living with scarcity. 
Under review, Water International. 
The Yellow River Basin is a key food production center of global importance facing 
rapidly growing water scarcity. Water availability for agriculture in the basin is 
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threatened by rapid growth in the demand for industrial and urban water, the need to 
flush sediment from the river’s lower reaches, environmental demands, and growing 
water pollution. Climate change is already evident in the basin with long-term declines in 
river runoff, higher temperatures, and increasing frequency and intensity of drought. The 
Chinese Government has exhausted most options for improving water supply. The 
challenge will be to switch to improved water demand management, which is hampered 
by existing governance structures, and lack of integrated agriculture and water resource 
policies. 
 
Ximing Cai, Yi-Chen E. Yang, Claudia Ringler, Jianshi Zhao, and Liangzhi You. 
Agricultural Water Productivity Assessment for the Yellow River Basin. Under 
review, Agricultural Systems. 
Agricultural water productivity (WP) has been recognized as an important indicator of 
agricultural water management.  This study assesses the WP for irrigated (WPI) and 
rainfed (WPR) crops in the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China, using data from sixty 
counties throughout the basin.  WPI and WPR are calculated for major crops (corn, 
wheat, rice, and soybean) using experimental, statistical and empirically estimated data. 
The spatial variability of WP is analyzed with regard to water and energy factors (i.e., 
the ratio of actual and potential evapotranspiration to precipitation, respectively), as well 
as agricultural practices (irrigation versus rainfed). Results show that although irrigated 
corn and soybean yields are significantly higher than rainfed yields in different regions of 
the YRB, WPI is slightly lower than WPR for these two crops.  This can be explained by 
the seasonal coincidence of precipitation and solar energy patterns in the YRB, that is, 
high solar radiation and precipitation during the summer, which allows for the effective 
use of precipitation for crop growth, and relegates irrigation to a supplemental source in 
most parts of the basin.  However, as expected, irrigation stabilizes crop production per 
unit of water consumption over space.  WPI and WPR vary spatially from upstream to 
downstream in the YRB as a result of varying climate and water supply conditions.  The 
water factor has stronger effects on both crop yield and WP than the energy factor in the 
upper and middle basin, whereas energy matters more in the lower basin. 
 
3) Abstracts of online reports (http://www.ccapwater.com/river/index.html) 
Ahmed, A.U., J. Wang, A. Bhaskar, and W. Quabili. 2009. Water and poverty in 
China’s Yellow River Basin. Prepared for the CPWF YRB Focal project. (WP1) 
In this report, we have carried out a water-related poverty analysis for the YRB. The 
purpose of the analysis is to determine to what extent irrigation or agricultural water 
management explains poverty in relation to other factors. This assessment is important 
for an understanding of the options for making interventions in the agricultural water 
sector so as to have the highest likelihood of reducing poverty. The profile of poverty in 
the YRB focused on the empirical links between water and poverty in the basin. The PPP 
$1.25 a day headcount poverty rate is significantly lower in irrigated areas than in non-
irrigated areas of the YRB region: while 19.4 percent of all households living in irrigated 
villages are poor, the rate is more than double (41.4 percent) in non-irrigated villages. 
Access to irrigation leads to increased agricultural productivity, and hence, incomes of 
farmers. Irrigation coverage (that is, the percentage of cultivated land under irrigation in 
a village) is a statistically significant determinant of per capita income of households. 
The estimated income elasticity with respect to irrigation coverage suggests that, a 10-
percent increase in the village-level irrigation coverage increases per capita income of 
households living in that village by 1.7 percent on average. Further, poverty simulations 
using the estimated parameters of the income model suggest that, increasing irrigation 
coverage by 10 percent reduces the incidence of poverty by 5.11 percent. Given the 
limits to expanding irrigation coverage and low labor productivity in agriculture, 
accelerating a shift of rural labor force out of agriculture by creating off-farm 
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employment opportunities in higher productivity sectors in rural areas is arguably even 
more important for the poor. 
 
Li Jingzong, Fu Yongfeng, Xu Zongxue, Cheng Lei, Sun Yongliang, and Zhu 
Tingju. 2010. Water Supply and Demand in the Yellow River Basin: 
Opportunities from Water Savings (WP2) 
The YRB is a highly water-scarce basin. Much of the infrastructure on this highly 
controlled river has been built for flood control, but climate change and droughts will 
bring new challenges to a basin that has only been prepared for flood management. The 
report describes the current water supply and demand situation in the river, and reviews 
the impact of future supply and demand, as well as the potential impact of climate 
change on water resources. It continues with a combined analysis of demand increase 
and climate change impacts, and concludes with avenues for reform, focusing on 
technical and engineering methods. 
 
Ximing Cai, Yi-Chen E. Yang, Claudia Ringler, Liangzhi You. 2009. Water 
Productivity Assessment for the Yellow River Basin. (WP3) 
Agricultural water productivity (WP) has been recognized as an important indicator of 
agricultural water management. Using data from sixty counties from upstream, middle 
stream, and downstream sub-basins, this study assesses the WP for irrigated (WPI) and 
rainfed (WPR) crops in the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China and extends the analysis to 
the entire basin. WPI and WPR are calculated for major crops (corn, wheat, rice, and 
soybean) with experimental, statistical, and empirically estimated data. The spatial 
variability of WP and the water and energy factors are analyzed with regard to climate, 
land cover, and agricultural practices. Results show that although irrigated yield is 
significantly higher than the rainfed yield for corn and soybean in different regions of the 
YRB, WPI is slightly lower than WPR for the these two crops. This can be explained by 
the synchronized pattern of precipitation and solar energy in the YRB, which allows 
effective use of precipitation for crop growth. As expected, irrigation stabilizes the crop 
production per unit of water consumption. WPI and WPR vary spatially from upstream to 
downstream, with both climate and water supply conditions linked to irrigation systems. 
The water factor has stronger effects on both crop yield and WP than the climate factor. 
Among the sub-basins, the midstream region faces more critical agricultural water 
management issues from the perspectives of both crop yield and WP. 
 
Wang Jinxia and Lijuan Zhang. 2010. Water Policy, Management and 
Institutions: Role in Pro-Poor Water Allocation in the Yellow River Basin. (WP4) 
The overall goal of this report is to examine water policy in the Yellow River Basin (YRB), 
the institutional arrangements that shape this policy and determine how water is 
managed, and understand their impacts on water use efficiency, water productivity, 
agricultural production and poverty. In order to realize this goal, we have pursued the 
following three objectives. First, we describe the legal framework for water 
administration and management in the Yellow River Basin. Second, water allocation 
principles and mechanisms at the national, basin and local levels that affect basin water 
allocation and use are described. Given the significant correlation between access to 
irrigation and wealth in villages in the Yellow River Basin, policies, institutions and 
economic incentives (such as water pricing policy, water management, water rights and 
transfer) affecting irrigated agriculture are examined in detail. Finally, we describe the 
major results from informal discussions with stakeholders in the upstream, midstream, 
and downstream parts of the basin. Data used in this report are based on literature 
reviews, government reports, as well as from empirical analyses and surveys conducted 
by the authors. 
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Xue Yunpeng, Yan Sun, and Claudia Ringler. A Review of Governance, Laws and 
Water Interventions in the Yellow River Basin over the last 60 Years. (WP5a)  
As part of the Yellow River Basin (YRB) focal project of the CGIAR Challenge Program on 
Water and Food (CPWF), this paper presents a literature review of the history and 
impacts of intervention policies on water-related poverty in rainfed and irrigation regions 
of the YRB. In addition, high-potential interventions that increase water and food 
security for the poor while maintaining environmental sustainability have been identified. 
In irrigated regions, the policy has shifted from expanding irrigated areas to reducing 
total irrigation water use and increasing irrigation water use efficiency and productivity, 
with the goal of providing more water for industry, urban areas, and the environment. 
However, since many irrigation systems have been poorly constructed and/or 
maintenance has been postponed over the years, and financial difficulties have 
prevented both irrigation districts and farmers from applying water-efficient techniques, 
policies that increase investment in water-saving practices and promote better water and 
finance management are essential. Additionally, the side effects of raising irrigation 
water prices and water rights transfers from agriculture to industry must be studied 
carefully. For much poorer rainfed regions with problems related to water accessibility 
and soil erosion, past policies of building high lifting pump stations and long-distance 
water transfer projects are effective, but the costs are too high to continue these into the 
future. Comprehensive soil and water conservation approaches including terracing, 
rainwater harvesting, re-vegetation and small sediment trap dams, cash cropping, and 
fence grazing are promising new approaches for these areas. 
 
Ximing Cai and Yi-Chen E. Yang. A Multi-Agent Based System Model for Water 
Allocation Management in the Yellow River Basin. (WP5b) 
Several administrative water reallocation schemes have been implemented in the Yellow 
River Basin. The most successful, administrative water transfer to date in the basin was 
the enforcement of the quota-based Water Allocation Agreement of 1987 through Unified 
Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) in 1999 that ensured that flow to the Yellow river mouth 
was not cut off after 2000. This policy was in line with the refocus, over the last decade, 
on sustainable water use and keeping the Yellow River ‘healthy’ promoted by the 
Government of China. However, the enforcement of the UWFR policy did not compensate 
those provinces and water users that had to give up water as a result. This led to 
significant income declines for both irrigation districts and irrigating farmers.  Given the 
key importance of compensating irrigation for giving up water for both flows at the river 
mouth and rapid urban-industrial development downstream, we analyze the potential 
impact on GDP of water rights trading using a Multi-Agent System (MAS) modeling 
framework for the Yellow River Basin. 
 
4)  Titles of online policy briefs (available in English and Chinese) (at 
 http://www.ccapwater.com/river/index.html) 
1) Water and Poverty in China’s Yellow River Basin --By Akhter U. Ahmed, Jinxia 
Wang, Anjor Bhaskar, and Wahid Quabili 
2) Water Supply and Demand in the Yellow River Basin: Opportunities from 
Water Savings --By Xu Zongxue, Fu Yongfeng, Cheng Lei, Sun Yongliang, Zhu Tingju, 
and Li Jingzong 
3) Water Productivity Assessment for China’s Yellow River Basin--By Ximing Cai, 
Yi-Chen E. Yang, Claudia Ringler, and Liangzhi You 
4) Water Policy, Management, and Institutions: The Role of Pro-Poor Water 
Allocation in the Yellow River Basin --By Jinxia Wang and Lijuan Zhang 
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5) Water Rights and Water Rights Trading: Option for the Yellow River Basin? --
By Nicola Cenacchi, Yunpeng Xue, Fu Xinfeng, and Claudia Ringler 
6) Governance, Laws, and Water Interventions in the Yellow River Basin Over 
the Past 60 Years: From Supply- to Demand- Side Management--By Xue Yunpeng, 
Yan Sun, and Claudia Ringler 
7) Water Allocation Management in the Yellow River Basin: Potential for Water 
Trading?--By Ximing Cai, Yi-Chen E. Yang, Jianshi Zhao, and Claudia Ringler 
 
5) Abstracts of papers that will be submitted as working papers or journal 
articles  
Ximing Cai, Yi-Chen E. Yang, Jianshi Zhao, and Claudia Ringler. Water Allocation 
Management in the Yellow River Basin: Results from a Multi-Agent System 
Model. Under Review, IFPRI Discussion Paper.  
Several administrative water reallocation schemes have been implemented in the Yellow 
River Basin. The most successful, administrative water transfer to date in the basin was 
the enforcement of the cross-provincial, quota-based Water Allocation Agreement of 
1987 through Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) in 1999 that ensured that flow to 
the Yellow River mouth was not cut off after 2000. This policy was in line with the 
refocus, over the last decade, on sustainable water use and keeping the Yellow River 
‘healthy’ promoted by the Government of China. However, the UWFR did not take into 
account the value of water in various uses and water users who had to give up water 
resources, chiefly irrigators in the upstream and midstream provinces, were not 
compensated. We analyze the potential impact on GDP of irrigation water rights trading 
using a Multi-Agent System (MAS) modeling framework for the Yellow River Basin. 
Compared to the baseline scenario simulating the UWFR, the water trading scenario 
results in a small decline in water consumption, combined with a significant increase in 
agricultural GDP. Total basin GDP increases by 1.9% and would be much higher if 
domestic and industrial uses would become active water trading sectors. 
 
Zhu, Tingju. Dry Season Water Management in the Lower Yellow River. For 
submission to journal (TBD). 
The lower Yellow River irrigates more than three million hectares of cropland and 
supplies water for municipalities and major industries along the river downstream. The 
vast irrigated areas along the lower river constitute the central piece of the Huanghe-
Huai-Haihe plain, the breadbasket of China, producing more than 20 million metric tons 
of grain annually as well as cotton and oil crops. Despite its obvious socioeconomic 
importance, water supply shortages have been rather common for the downstream, due 
to natural hydroclimatic variability, overuse in the upstream reaches, and imperfect 
management of water infrastructures. The last two storage reservoirs on the main stem 
of the Yellow River, Sanmenxia and Xiaolangdi, play a key role in supplying water to the 
downstream, especially during the dry season. Effective management of conjunctive 
operation of these two reservoirs is essential for ensuring timely and reliable water 
supply to the downstream irrigated areas and non-agricultural users. Besides 
conventional purposes of irrigation, water supply and hydropower, the reservoirs have to 
undertake flood control and ice-flood control tasks, facilitating sediment-flushing in 
summer and forming of ice cap with sufficient flow capacity underneath it in winter.  
These functions pose additional complexity in modeling irrigation and water supply 
management in the downstream with these two reservoirs, essentially excluding the 
application of linear or non-linear program models. We formulate the water management 
problem using a dimensional dynamic programming model, with reservoir storages as 
state variables and water release from reservoirs as decision variables.  The Discrete 
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Differential Dynamic Programming (DDDP) algorithm is applied to refine model solutions 
and speed up model solving. Based on the dynamic programming results, a linear 
operating function is estimated for each ten-day period during the dry season and used 
to operate the reservoirs, in order to remove the ‘perfect hydrological foresight’ 
assumption in the optimization model. Simulation results indicate that the estimated 
empirical operating functions can manage the water resource system reasonably well, 
yet at acceptable cost of reduced water supply and hydropower performance. The overall 
analysis implies that water shortage occurs frequently in the lower Yellow River, due to 
insufficient water resource and high water demand. The shortage can be much higher 
during a major, indicating dramatic damages for irrigated agricultural and industries that 
depend on water from the lower Yellow River. Conjunctive use of surface and ground 
waters in the lower Yellow River irrigated areas and improved flexibility in operating 
upstream major storage reservoirs can provide promising solution for high water supply 
reliability in the lower Yellow River, however demand side management such as water 
saving irrigation technologies and improved industrial water use efficiency may greatly 
enhance water use sustainability in the lower Yellow River.  
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Appendix B: Model Descriptions 
 
B1 YRCC Water Simulation Model 
- General structure 
The water supply and demand equilibrium model system includes three main parts: pre-
processing, solution and post-processing. The basic function of the pre-processing 
program is to input a large number of basic data for the actual water resources system 
to reflect the physical and economic characteristics and system rules of operation. A 
standard river flow network was constructed based on the node map and basic data. The 
basic solution function program implements a long series of simulations across 
successive periods. The main parameters and their relationships are then exported from 
the pre-processing program. The simulated results on successive periods could be 
exported from the simulation program. Post-processing program is made up of a group 
of independent processes. In order to analyze the results and evaluate the program, the 
results are processed into different forms, including visual and easily readable charts. 
 
- Model design: Node-link system  
Nodes are the basic calculation unit of the model, as shown in Figure B1.1. To calculate 
the water balance in one node, requires: runoff in previous node, interval inflow, return 
flows from other nodes, water diversion into and out of the basin, domestic water (urban 
and rural) use, industrial water use (urban and rural), ecological water requirement 
(urban and rural), change in reservoir storage, reservoir water loss, and discharge from 
the node (including power generation). A (monthly) water balance equation for node i 












Where: Wi: runoff of the previous node in the period; Win: inflow to the node in this 
period; Wre: return flow from other nodes in this period: Wdii: water transfers into the 
node in this period; St0: water storage capacity of reservoirs at the beginning of this 
period; Wdou: the urban domestic water volume diverted from this node in this period; 
Wdor: rural domestic water volume diverted from this node in this period; Wmi the 
industrial water volume diverted from this node in this period; Wag: the agricultural 
water volume diverted water volume from this node in this period; Wecu: the urban 
ecological water volume diverted from this node in this period; Wecr: the rural ecological 
water volume diverted from this node in this period; Wdio: water volume transfer from 
this node outside the basin in this period; St: the reservoir water storage capacity at the 
end of this period; Wlo: the water loss of reservoirs in this period; and Wd: the water 
discharged from this node in this period.  
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Figure B.1.1: Schematic diagram of water balance for nodes 
 
- Model design: Irrigation water requirement 
To reflect the impact of annual precipitation on irrigation water requirement, the annual 
irrigation water quota is calculated based on crop water requirements and annual 
precipitation, which varies across time. Therefore, a variable quota is adopted to 
calculate irrigation water requirement in the model. 
 
- Model design: Water supply priority 
The water distribution policy is one of the most important factors and must be 
considered for the rational utilization and the optimal distribution of water resources. The 
water distribution policy and operating rules are embodied as water priority orders in the 
simulation model. The priority order refers to the priorities of water supply and storage; 
it is reflected as a set of values that can be arbitrarily set in the model. The key of 
ranking water uses is to reflect the relative relationship between the water distribution 
policy and operating rules. 
 
The simulation model is a network model, where costs of water flows are minimized. 
There is a separate file for cost of water transportation in the model. In addition, costs 
for domestic, industrial, and ecological water needs and reservoir storage are subject to 
the water supply priority. For different regions, sectors and time, water supply priorities 
are assigned through careful analysis and research. In the process of calculation, the 
model meets the needs of various kinds of water users according to the different 
priorities determined. The smaller the cost of the user’s priority, the higher the priority 
to receive water in the allocation of water resources. Through changing the priority 
order, a variety of water distribution policies and operating rules can be tested.  
 
- Model design: Reservoir operation rule simulation 
In the model, the task of regulating reservoirs is to meet the demand of various water 
users as much as possible. These include flood control, ice prevention, water supply, 
power generation, among others. According to the operating rules, the water volume for 
storage and reservoir discharge of reservoirs can be determined. Moreover, the guiding 
idea of the reservoir operation rules is that the reservoir water storage capacity is 
divided into several layers (in this model 11 layers are included). Storage below the dead 
storage is considered the first impoundment layer. The highest priority order is to ensure 
the dead storage, followed by different water demands for every layer, with different 
priorities, to guide the reservoir storage and discharge. 
 
























Appendices CPWF Project Report 
 
 Page | 126 
Since the Yellow River Basin is a large area, which involves many provinces and districts, 
is highly complex, has differences in hydrogeological conditions and groundwater depth, 
the basis of information varies greatly; therefore, in this study, the combined use of 
surface and ground water in different regions is calculated with the direct deduction 
method or the water balance method. 
 
- Model Solution 
(1) The year for water supply and demand analysis is 2020, considering entry into force 
of the Guxian Hydro-Junction Project. 
(2) According to the administrative divisions and the distribution of the drainage system, 
and considering the main sections and engineering conditions, the whole basin is 
divided into a total of 40 nodes for which a water resource supply and demand 
balance has been calculated is shown in Figure B.1.2. The names corresponding to 
the second-level districts and provinces for each node are shown in Table B.1.1. 
(3) There are two scenarios for water supply and demand analysis, one that takes into 
account climate change and one that does not. The natural water resource 
availability is 51.979 BMC for the first scenario (result of "the Yellow River Basin 
Integrated Water Resources Planning"); for the second scenario, water availability is 
provided by Beijing Normal University. 
(4) In the calculation of the water supply and demand balance, the priority of tributaries, 
surface water and groundwater unified deployment, the water release requirements 
for Lijin control section are considered. 
(5) For the water supply order we gave priority for domestic water, followed by all other 
uses, including irrigation, industrial, ecology, and environmental uses.  
 














A1 Qinghai Upper longyangxia A18 Shanxi 
From Hekouzhen to 
Longmen 
A2 Sichuan Upper longyangxia A19 Shanxi 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A3 Gansu Upper longyangxia A20 Gansu 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A4 Qinghai Upper longyangxia A21 Shaanxi 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A5 Qinghai 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A22 Ningxia 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A6 Gansu 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A23 Gansu 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A7 Qinghai 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A24 Shaanxi 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A8 Gansu 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A25 Shaanxi 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A9 Qinghai 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A26 Shanxi 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A10 Gansu 
From Longyangxia to 
Lanzhou 
A27 Henan 
From Longmen to 
Sanmenxia 
A11 Gansu 
From Lanzhou to 
Hekouzhen 
A28 Shanxi 
From Sanmenxia to 
HuaYuankou 
A12 Gansu 
From Lanzhou to 
Hekouzhen 
A29 Shanxi 
From Sanmenxia to 
HuaYuankou 
A13 Ningxia 
From Lanzhou to 
Hekouzhen 
A30 Shaanxi 





From Lanzhou to 
Hekouzhen 
A31 Henan 





From Hekouzhen to 
Longmen 




From Hekouzhen to 
Longmen 
A33 Shandong Underside HuaYuankou 
A17 Shaanxi 
From Hekouzhen to 
Longmen 
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Figure B.1.2: Node-link network, YRCC water supply demand simulation model 
B2 Beijing Normal University SWAT Model 
For climate change impact studies, hydrologic models are required to simulate sub-grid 
scale phenomenon, and such hydrologic models require input data at similar sub-grid 
scale, which has to be provided by converting the GCM outputs into a reliable regional 
hydrologic time series at the selected watershed scale. The methods used to convert 
GCM outputs into local meteorological variables required for reliable hydrologic modeling 
are usually referred to as ‘downscaling’ techniques (Dibike and Coulibaly, 2005; 
Huntingford et al. 2006).  
 
In this study, the statistically downscaled GCM output, and the atmospheric circulation 
indices as well as humidity variables derived from the HadCM3 model developed at the 
Hadley Centre in UK were used to downscale daily precipitation and temperature series 
at headwater catchment of the Yellow River basin. The climate scenarios generated were 
then used to drive the distributed Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model. 
Changes in the modeled daily flow regime between current and future climate scenarios 
were compared and analyzed.  
 
- Study Area and Data Descriptions 
The headwater catchment of the Yellow River basin from source of the river to 
Tangnaihai station with an area of 122,000 km2, known as the ‘water tank’ of the basin, 
contributes on average 35% of total runoff in the Yellow River basin. In terms of climate, 
the catchments are described as a semi-humid region of the Tibetan Plateau. The annual 
average precipitation is about 450 mm. More than 70% of the total annual precipitation 
falls in the flood season from July to October. During the past several decades, the 
streamflow regime in the headwater catchment of the YRB has changed significantly, 
which resulted in degradation of the ecosystem. Changes in hydrologic regime include 
decrease in streamflow and, more significantly, occurrence of drying-up, i.e. periods with 
zero flow. Understanding the relationships among the hydrologic regime, climate factors, 
and anthropogenic effects is important for the sustainable management of water 
resources not only for the study area but also for the entire YRB. 
 
Spatial data used in this study include a digital elevation model (DEM), land use/cover, 
soil type, and climatic data. A digital elevation model with a scale of 1:250,000 was 
provided by the Data Center for Resources and Environmental Sciences (RESDC), 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. Land use data with a scale of 1:1,000,000 and soil data 
with a scale of 1:4,000,000 were also obtained from same organization. The baseline 
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used in this study is 1961–1990, the standard World Meteorological Organization period. 
It has been selected because it incorporates some of the natural variability of the 
climate, including both dry (1970s) and wet (1980s) periods (Prudhomme et al., 2002). 
Daily streamflow data at the Tangnaihai station was available. Daily maximum and 
minimum temperatures (TMAX and TMIN) from 7 stations in and around headwater 
catchment of the Yellow River basin were compiled and daily precipitation (PRCP) from 
16 gauging stations is available in this study. 
 
- Methodology Descriptions 
The method used in this study is focused on the most widely used downscaling method 
which has been recently suggested by the Canadian Climate Impact Scenarios (CCIS) 
project for climate change impact studies (Dibike and Coulibaly, 2005). A well recognized 
statistical downscaling tool is made available to the broader climate change impact study 
community via the Canadian Climate Impacts and Scenarios project 
(http://www.cics.uvic.ca/scenarios/). It implements a regression based method and is 
referred to as Statistical DownScaling Model (SDSM) (Dibike and Coulibaly, 2005). From 
the 30 years of data representing current climate (1961-1990), the first 15 years are 
used for calibrating the regression model while the remaining 15 years of data are used 
to validate the model. In this study, the SWAT model is used. It is a physically-based 
model being able to estimate the impact of land uses on water, sediment and agricultural 
chemicals on a subcatchment and land use unit scale over long periods of time (Sun and 
Cornish, 2005). In which, the surface runoff is estimated using a modified SCS curve 
number method based on moisture content. Compared with the original SCS method, 
which describes moisture condition as a function of antecedent rainfall, the modified 
curve number method may cause calibration problems relating to soil structure, profile 
depth and plants grown. The Nash-Sutcliffe coefficient of efficiency (ENS), the coefficient 
of determination (r2) and the percentage volume difference DV (%) are used to measure 
the model performance. In every simulation for calibration, only one parameter was 
adjusted while others were kept unchanged. Reiterations of optimization were done until 
satisfactory results were met, which was based on graphical comparison and numeric 
evaluation of the simulated discharge against the measurements. 
 
B3 YRB MAS model 
A modified penalty-based decentralized method (Đnalhan et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2009) 
is applied in this study to solve the formulated MAS mathematical problem.  This 
algorithm allows each agent to have its own decision context that captures the local 
benefits and the interconnected constraints associated with these benefits.  The method 
achieves optimization among agents under a bargaining scheme, in which the ith agent 
optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration and sends the solution 
back to all other agents with which it interacts.  The method uses a two-step approach – 
first finding out a solution based on the choices of all individual agents, allowing the 
violation of some constraints defined with the optimization models for individual agents, 
and then trying to reduce the constraint violation at the system level.   
We apply the algorithm to the YRB. We also introduce a management mechanism that 
based on the free market concept. The mathematical expression for each water user 
(agent) is:  
 
{ })()(max),(max iiiiiiiii wxpxfwpxF −−=     (B3.1) 
 
where xi is the water consumption from agent i, fi(xi) is the benefit corresponding to xi 
consumption,  pi > 0 is the local water price applied to agent i and wi is water right or 
water permit for agent i.  Under this setting, xi-wi≠0 can be viewed as the amount of 
water trading for agent i.  When xi < wi, “- pi (xi-wi)” is positive, which means agent i 
uses less water than it is entitled.  Therefore, “- pi (xi-wi),” is the benefit of water selling 
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and works as an incentive to the agent.  When xi > wi, “- pi (xi-wi),” is negative and can 
be interpolated as the cost of water buying for agent i.  Applying the first-order condition 










      (B3.2) 
  
We assume that each agent will adjust its pi to satisfy equation B3.2, which means that 
the marginal benefit will equal to local water price and the ideal converge criteria at the 
system level matches when the condition in equation B3.2 is satisfied for all agents. 
The attributes that characterize the agents are the water availability, water use and their 
benefit functions. The total available water for a unit includes three components: local 
surface water, groundwater (which was treated as a local “reservoir”) and upstream 
inflow. 
According to the above definition, the decision variable of each province-level water use 
agent is the monthly water consumption for agriculture and M&I purpose.  Meanwhile, a 
utility function that uses GDP as the dependent variable and monthly water consumption 
as the independent variable is developed for each agent, at the monthly scale. Several 
assumptions are involved in the construction of the utility functions: 
1) All the utility functions take a concave, quadratic form.   
2) Annual GDPM&I, that is GDP generated by the urban-industrial sector, is evenly 
distributed across 12 months and the annual GDPAG is distributed into each month 
based on the monthly distribution of agricultural water use.  
3) M&I water use is given a higher priority than agricultural water use, which follows 
the general water use regulation in China.  
4) A time variable (T) is incorporated into the M&I utility function to reflect the 
technology change over years (Cai and Rosegrant, 2002).  
5) Monthly precipitation (P) is an input in the agricultural utility function.   
6) Groundwater will be used when surface available water (local surface plus 
upstream inflow) is insufficient to supply M&I water consumption; groundwater 
recharge will occur when surface available water is larger than the M&I water 
consumption. 
The format of M&I utility function and the constraints for agent i is given as: 
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where xi is the water consumption, Li is local surface inflow, Ij is the inflow from 
upstream agent j and Gi is available groundwater.  The plus and minus sign means it 
could be pumped from or recharged to groundwater.  T is the technology index and year 
2000 is set as the baseline year with T=100, MImax is the maximal M&I water 
consumption and A1i, B1i, C1i, and D1i are the coefficients for the quadratic format.  The 
non-linear regression method - least squares error method is used to estimate these four 
coefficients.  Since only seven years of water consumption and GDP data (1997 to 2003) 
are available for each agent, a calibration procedure is undertaken to adjust the value of 
A1i, B1i, C1i, and D1i to match the result of baseline year. 
The following equation represents the agricultural utility function of agent i and the 
constraints to which it is subject: 
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where AGmax is the maximal agriculture water consumption (i.e., water demand), xi-
MImax is the surplus M&I water that can be used for agriculture, Pi is the rainfall available 
for agriculture, and A2i and B2i are the coefficients which are also subject to calibration.  
There is no constant in equation 8 which means that we assume if no water (either 
irrigation or rainfall) is available, then GDPAG=0.  
The total benefit of a water use agent is the sum of GDPM&I and GDPAG.  These utility 
functions remain unchanged for all scenarios.  If not otherwise specified, the term 
“agent” means “water use agent” in the following sections. 
The Definition of Reservoir Agents 
There are more than three thousand reservoirs located in the Yellow River Basin.  Their 
total storage is approximately 70 km3, which exceeds the total annual runoff of the river, 
58 km3 (Cai and Rosegrant, 2004).  It is impossible and not necessary to identify all the 
reservoirs as agents in this study, because most of them are small and their capacity is 
not sufficient to carry over water across the minimum time period of the model (i.e. a 
month). Five key reservoirs from upstream to downstream: Longyangxia, Liujiaxia, 
Wanjiazhai, Sanmenxia and Xiaolangdi are selected as reservoir agents.  The combined 
storage for these reservoirs is about 51 km3. All these reservoirs have multiple purposes 
such as water supply, flooding control and hydropower generation. The actual operation 
rules for all of the reservoirs are very complex. To incorporate the real operation rule of 
each reservoir into the modeling is time consuming and behind the scope of this study.  
To simplify the model without misrepresenting this complex system, the reservoir agents 
are defined based on two behavior rules, 1) following their pre-determined operation 
curve to regulate the streamflow, and 2) maximizing hydropower generation. Two 


































  (B3.7) 
where xi is the water released from reservoir agent i, and Yi is the targeted water release 
specified by the basin management agency. ∆H(xi) is the difference of water head during 
a given month, which is also affected by the water release, and change in storage. xMax is 
the water release capacity, SMax is the storage capacity, Ij is the inflow from upstream, 
and Ei is the evaporation from the reservoir. The two objectives expressed by Equations 
5 and 6, respectively, may not be consistent. Following the current reservoir operation 
practices, the reservoir agent tries to match the pre-determined operation curve by 
minimizing the objective function (Equation B3.5). When no regulation exists, the 
reservoir agents maximize the objective for hydropower generation (Equation B3.6). The 
detailed use of different objectives will be explained in the scenario section.  
The Definition of Ecosystem Agents 
Three ecosystem agents are defined near the delta area to address the ecological and 
environmental concerns. Ecological and environmental flow requirements have been 
assessed by local scientists (e.g., Ni et al, 2002, Yang et al, 2009, Cui et al, 2009 and 
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Liu et al, 2009). They considered different environmental functions of the streamflow 
and defined the requirement of environmental streamflow for flooding (July to October) 
and non-flooding period (November to June). Yang et al (2009) estimated the baseflow 
of different regions for these two periods. The results of Ni et al. (2002) and Yang et al 
(2009) are used to set up the targeting flow for two ecosystem agents: Huayuankou and 
Gaocun. For one additional ecosystem agent, Lijin, at the delta of Yellow River, the 
target flows are assessed following the studies of Cui et al. (2009) and Liu et al. (2009). 
Cui et al (2009) separated a “fish breeding period” (April to June) from the rest of the 
non-flooding period. Liu et al. (2009) defined total ecological water requirement with 
consideration of wetland plants, freshwater fish community and bayou ecosystem. The 
targeting flow for the most downstream ecosystem agent is adapted from Cui et al 
(2009).  The targeting flows for all ecosystem agents in different time periods are 
provided in Table B.1.2. 
 
Table B.1.2 Targeting instream flow for ecosystem agents at different periods 
(without / with sediment flash consideration) 
 
Agents 
Normal flow period 
(November-March) 




EA1(Huayuankou) 0.341/0.605 0.341/0.605 0.455/5.111 
EA2 (Gaocun) 0.277/0.612 0.277/0.612 0.397/6.016 
EA3 (Lijin) 0.363/0.363 2.581/2.581 0.850/15.85 
* unit: BCM/month 
 





−=       (B3.8)  
st. 0=− ji Ix  
where xi is the streamflow for agent i, EcoTi is ecological targeting flow and Ij is 
upstream agent j water release.  The constraint is set as a hard constraint. Thus 
ecosystem agents under this formulation will act like reactive agents in the system (Yang 
et al., 2009). 
 
